The Patent Explosions: Quantifying Changes In the Propensity to Patent (original) (raw)

Exploring the Patent Explosion

The Journal of Technology Transfer, 2004

This paper looks more closely at the sources of patent growth in the United States since 1984. It confirms that the increase is largely due to US patenters, with an earlier surge in Asia, and some increase in Europe. Growth has taken place in all technologies, but not in all industries, being concentrated in the electrical, electronics, computing, and scientific instruments industries. It then examines whether these patents are valued by the market. We know from survey evidence that patents in these industries are not usually considered important for appropriability, but are sometimes considered necessary to secure financing for entering the industry. I compare the market value of patents held by entrant firms to those held by incumbents (controlling for R&D). Using data on publicly traded firms 1980-1989, I find that in industries based on electrical and mechanical technologies the market value of entrants' patents is positive in the post-1984 period (after the patenting surge), but not before, when patents were relatively unimportant in these industries. Also, the value of patent rights in complex product industries (where each product relies on many patents held by a number of other firms) is much higher for entrants than incumbents in the post-1984 period. For discrete product industries (where each product relies on only a few patents, and where the importance of patents for appropriability has traditionally been higher), there is no difference between incumbents and entrants.

Reassessing patent propensity: Evidence from a dataset of R&D awards, 1977–2004

Research Policy, 2013

It is well known that not all innovations are patented, but the exact volume of innovative activities undertaken outside the coverage of patent protection and, relatedly, the actual propensity to patent an innovation in different contexts remain, to a major degree, a matter of speculation. This paper presents an exploratory study comparing systematically patented and unpatented innovations over the period 1977-2004 across industrial sectors. The main data source is the 'R&D 100 Awards' competition organized by the journal Research and Development. Since 1963, the magazine has been awarding this prize to the 100 most technologically significant new products available for sale or licensing in the year preceding the judgments. We match the products winners of the R&D 100 awards competition with USPTO patents and we examine the variation of patent propensity across different contexts (industries, geographical areas and organizations). Finally we compare our findings with previous assessments of patent propensity based on several sources of data.

On the Origins of the Worldwide Surge in Patenting: An Industry Perspective on the R&D-Patent Relationship

Social Science Research Network, 2013

This paper decomposes the R&D-patent relationship at the industry level to shed light on the sources of the worldwide surge in patent applications. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset that includes 5 patent indicators computed for 18 industries in 19 countries covering the period from 1987 to 2005. The analysis shows that variations in patent applications reflect not only variations in research productivity but also variations in the appropriability and filing strategies adopted by firms. The results also suggest that the patent explosion observed in several patent offices can be attributed to the greater globalization of intellectual property rights rather than to a surge in research productivity.

The Patent System at a Crossroads

University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series, 2018

Judicial decisions, agency actions and legislative enactments have promoted a creeping reversion toward the weak patent regime that prevailed for several decades preceding the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The pending Supreme Court case, Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, provides an opportunity to reflect upon the choice between a “property rights�? vision of the patent system in which resource allocation is principally directed by market signals and an administrative vision of the patent system in which resource allocation is perpetually subject to adjustment by courts and regulators. A growing body of empirical research raises doubts concerning the social costs that have been attributed to a robustly enforced patent system and, by implication, poses a challenge to policy actions that have targeted property-like attributes of that system.

Is US Patent Policy Strong Enough to Withstand the Winds of Change: A Study of the Need to Change United States Patent Policy

Is US Patent Policy Strong Enough to Withstand the Winds of Change: A Study of the Need to Change United States Patent Policy, 2015

The purpose of this case study was to learn how US patent policy requirements differ for the Software and Pharmaceutical Industries, specifically if United States Patent Policy adequately protects intellectual property rights [1] for two divergent industries while still encouraging research and development (R & D) investment sufficient to increase profits and innovation. Data for this study consisted of 38 witness testimonies delivered to US Congress between the years 2005 and 2010 by experts representing the two industries of interest: pharmaceutical and software. Key findings from the data analysis of these 38 testimonies revealed both within industry differences and between industry differences in patent law protection. Within industry differences showed variance based on size of the company and the degree to which they relied on their own R & D. Between industry differences reflected divergent ‘products’ with Pharmaceutical Industries needing long-term protection to recover R & D expenditures that include expenses for human trials research to proceed from patent application to market. Software industry, on the other hand, uses follow-on innovation of others to continue technological advancement by constantly improving upon existing software. The data show that these two industries use patent policy protection in different ways for different reasons. This information will enable Policymakers to develop another form of product protection in lieu of the current patent law to better meet the needs of these two industries rather than try to modify the existing law.

Where's the Innovation? An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012

While the main theoretical benefit of patent protection is increased innovation, some assert a swamped U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has granted an inefficiently large number of patents with negligible innovation value. I test this argument's plausibility and determine the characteristics of patents without innovation by analyzing 980 litigated patents subject to anticipation or obviousness decisions between 2000 and 2010. Using a selection corrected probit model, I obtain unconditional estimates of the likelihood patents with given characteristics lack innovation value. I estimate a surprising 28 percent of all patents would be found at least partially invalid if litigated. Software, business method and licensing firm-owned patents possess significantly higher innovation-based invalidity rates. 1 Note, however, there are other possible economic justifications for patent protection. For example, some argue the patent system also lowers transaction costs and facilitates trade (see, for example, Kieff 2001). 2 That patent laws exist to ensure the economic justification for patent protection is not surprising given the Constitution's explicit reason to grant patent rights-"[T]o promote the progress of. .. the useful Arts." U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court confirmed this justification in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966), stating: "The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge." Further, in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), the Court explained: "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant