Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies (original) (raw)
Related papers
Review of Industrial Organization, 2012
The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission covered a broad range of topics in telecommunications policy. This paper highlights the economic issues that are addressed in the following key areas: spectrum management, universal service and intercarrier compensation reform, and merger review. In spectrum management, the FCC received congressional authority to implement an "incentive auction" to repurpose television broadcasting spectrum into flexible-use licenses that will be suitable for mobile wireless service providers. We discuss some important issues in designing the auction. We next address some aspects of the FCC's comprehensive reforms of intercarrier compensation, which mainly involves call termination rates, and of universal service. Finally, we discuss the economic analysis of two major mergers: AT&T-T-Mobile, which the FCC staff recommended should be referred to an administrative hearing, and Level 3/Global Crossing, which was cleared with no conditions.
Broadcast Television Spectrum Incentive Auctions in the U
This paper presents an overview of the upcoming television broadcast spectrum incentive auction in the U.S., which will be the first ever attempted worldwide, and discusses the main business, regulatory and technical challenges of a successful incentive auction. The process combines two separate but linked auctions: a reverse auction, which will identify the prices at which broadcasters are willing to relinquish their spectrum; and a forward auction, which will determine the price mobile network operators are willing to pay to acquire the new frequencies. The two auctions will determine the buyers and sellers and also the amount of spectrum to be cleared in the 600 MHz band after reorganizing the television stations that remain on air. This process is known as repacking and will create contiguous blocks of cleared spectrum at the high frequency side of the UHF band for mobile use. The paper also reviews the potential plans for the 600 MHz band and discusses the opportunities that could bring about the new digital terrestrial television standard known as " ATSC 3.0 " .
Review of Industrial Organization, 2020
The U.S. Federal Communications Commission is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation's non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, FCC economists helped develop efficient mechanisms for making available more flexible-use spectrum for the deployment of advanced broadband technologies; developed two new universal service funding mechanisms that aim to close the digital broadband divide; and, through careful analysis of firm cost data, contributed to a renewed effort by the Commission to develop price caps for interstate calls on prison inmate calling services. FCC economists also contributed to the Commission's extensive response to COVID-19.
Economics at the FCC, 2015–2016: Competition, Merger Review, and Spectrum Management
Review of Industrial Organization, 2016
The Federal Communications Commission is responsible for regulation in the telecommunications and electronic media sectors, and for management of the nation's non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the analysis of market power and the efficacy of various regulatory regimes in the business data services market, assessed potential harms that were associated with major mergers in the cable television industry and the efficacy of conditions designed to mitigate those harms, and helped to structure service and licensing rules to promote efficient usage of spectrum in the face of burgeoning demand for new wireless broadband services.
Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband pcs Spectrum
Journal of Economics <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Management Strategy, 1995
The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. W e discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures. We wish to thank Dillip Abreu, Barry Nalebuff, Charlie Plott, David Porter, and David Salant for helpful discussions, and two referees for their comments. Any remaining errors however, are ours alone. 1. The amendment was enacted on August 10,1993, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which added a new section 309(j) to the Communication Act of 1934 (as amended, 47 U.S.C. Tl151-713, Communication Act).
The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multipleround auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
Review of Industrial Organization
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation's non-federal radio spectrum. During the past year, FCC economists continued to work on auctions so as to repurpose mid-band spectrum for advanced wireless services-including 5G-as well as initiatives to close the connectivity gap and make broadband more affordable. FCC economists also evaluated the likely competitive effects of Verizon's proposed acquisition of prepaid competitor TracFone Wireless. Finally, FCC economists helped in setting up the novel Broadband Data Collection.
Designs on the Mechanism: Economics and the FCC Spectrum Auctions
2004
My heartfelt thanks goes to Philip Mirowski, who has provided me so much in the way of intellectual stimulation and encouragement during my years at Notre Dame. I would like to thank David Ruccio for being a valuable interlocutor, and for pushing me in his inimitably aggressive, yet warm, manner, and Esther-Mirjam Sent for her consistent support from the very beginning of my attendance at Notre Dame Economics. I would also like to thank Teresa Ghilarducci for providing help under impossibly difficult circumstances. I was lucky to have encountered many talented professors at Notre Dame Economics, and doubly so to have attended with such high caliber graduate students. Two I would like to single out for their helpful comments are Kyu Sang Lee and Thomas Scheiding. Over the course of completing this dissertation I encountered several individuals willing to give of their time to help out. I would especially like to acknowledge John Ledyard and Lauren Patrich. I have benefited from presenting portions of this dissertation at the Performativities Workshop at the École des Mines de Paris (2004), the Eastern Economics Association Meetings (2003), the Summer Institute for the Preservation of the History of Economic Thought at George Mason University (2002), the History of Economics Society Meetings (2001), the Theory and Methods Workshop at the University of Notre Dame (2001), and the Ph.D. seminar sponsored by the University of Amsterdam and the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics vi (2000). Francesco Guala offered particularly helpful comments on portions of this work.