Embedded and Defective Democracies. In: Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.33–58 (original) (raw)
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Embedded and Defective Democracies
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG eBooks, 2007
In the literature on democratization the mainstream of theoretical and empirical consolidology uses the dichotomy autocracy versus democracy. Democracy is generally conceived of as 'electoral democracy'. This simple dichotomy does not allow a distinction between consolidated liberal democracies and their diminished sub-types. However, over half of all the new electoral democracies represent specific variants of diminished sub-types of democracy, which can be called defective democracies. Starting from the root concept of embedded democracies, which consists of five interdependent partial regimes (electoral regime, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, effective power to govern), the article distinguishes between four diminished sub-types of defective democracy: exclusive democracy, illiberal democracy, delegative democracy and tutelary democracy. It can be shown that defective democracies are by no means necessarily transitional regimes. They tend to form stable links to their economic and societal environment and are often seen by considerable parts of the elites and the population as an adequate institutional solution to the specific problems of governing 'effectively'. As long as this equilibrium between problems, context and power lasts, defective democracies will survive for protracted periods of time.
2004
Transitology' and 'consolidology' have only rarely emphasized the importance of defining democracy in a normatively and theoretically sophisticated manner. Almost without discussion they accepted the parsimonious definition and elegant but simple concepts of Schumpeter, Dahl and Przeworski. 1 They reduced democracy to the question of free and general electoral competition, vertical accountability and the fact that the most powerful political and social actors played the political game according to democratically institutionalized rules. At least implicitly, democracy was conceived as an elitist electoral democracy. Neither the structural question of prerequisites for democracy 2 nor the conditions for sustainable legitimacy 3 played and could play a relevant role within this minimalist concept of the sustainability of democracy. But not only the external 'embedding' of democracy, but also the 'internal' embeddedness of the democratic electoral regime was neglected. Rule of law, civil rights and horizontal accountability were excluded from the concept of democracy. Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) 4 was the first to criticize that conceptual flaw of the mainstream of transitology and consolidology. Thirty years after the beginning of the third wave of democratization empirical evidence revealed the theoretical shortcomings of the minimalist 'electoralists'. It became evident that it is misleading to subsume Denmark, Sweden or France under the same type of regime-an electoral democracy-as Russia, Thailand or Brazil. Political science ran the risk of even falling behind the analytical capacity of daily newspapers in differentiating between different types of democracy. It became clear that the majority of new democracies could not be labelled 'liberal democracies'. General, competitive and free elections turned out to be insufficient in guaranteeing the rule of law, civil rights and horizontal accountability. Between elections many of the electoral democracies were not government by, of or for the people. It became obvious, again, that democratic elections need the support of complementary partial regimes, such as the rule of law, horizontal accountability and an open public sphere in order to become 'meaningful' elections. Democratic theory has once again met up with research on democratization. Since the mid-1990s studies
Conclusion: good and defective democracies
Democratization, 2004
Transitology' and 'consolidology' have only rarely emphasized the importance of defining democracy in a normatively and theoretically sophisticated manner. Almost without discussion they accepted the parsimonious definition and elegant but simple concepts of Schumpeter, Dahl and Przeworski. 1 They reduced democracy to the question of free and general electoral competition, vertical accountability and the fact that the most powerful political and social actors played the political game according to democratically institutionalized rules. At least implicitly, democracy was conceived as an elitist electoral democracy. Neither the structural question of prerequisites for democracy 2 nor the conditions for sustainable legitimacy 3 played and could play a relevant role within this minimalist concept of the sustainability of democracy. But not only the external 'embedding' of democracy, but also the 'internal' embeddedness of the democratic electoral regime was neglected. Rule of law, civil rights and horizontal accountability were excluded from the concept of democracy. Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) 4 was the first to criticize that conceptual flaw of the mainstream of transitology and consolidology. Thirty years after the beginning of the third wave of democratization empirical evidence revealed the theoretical shortcomings of the minimalist 'electoralists'. It became evident that it is misleading to subsume Denmark, Sweden or France under the same type of regime-an electoral democracy-as Russia, Thailand or Brazil. Political science ran the risk of even falling behind the analytical capacity of daily newspapers in differentiating between different types of democracy. It became clear that the majority of new democracies could not be labelled 'liberal democracies'. General, competitive and free elections turned out to be insufficient in guaranteeing the rule of law, civil rights and horizontal accountability. Between elections many of the electoral democracies were not government by, of or for the people. It became obvious, again, that democratic elections need the support of complementary partial regimes, such as the rule of law, horizontal accountability and an open public sphere in order to become 'meaningful' elections. Democratic theory has once again met up with research on democratization. Since the mid-1990s studies
Good'and 'bad'democracies: how to conduct research into the quality of democracy
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 2004
This introductory article moves from the definitions of democracy and of quality to propose a definition of democratic quality, that is, of 'good' and 'bad' democracies. The five main dimensions of such a quality (rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, freedom and equality/solidarity) are analysed by enlightening four aspects: the empirical definition, the main indicators, the attempts and practice of its subversion, and the central condition or conditions. A particular emphasis is devoted to the betrayal and circumvention of quality goals. In the short conclusions a few issues are pointed out for further discussion.
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