Understanding inflation expectations uncertainty in the euro area. Does psychology help? (original) (raw)
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Inflation expectations in the euro area: are consumers rational?
Review of World Economics, 2010
In this paper, we propose a quantitative measure for inflation expectations based on consumer survey data. Thereafter, we proceed to testing the rationality assumption. This issue is of noteworthy interest in its own as it is commonly assumed in the theoretical modelling literature that the rational expectations hypothesis holds. This analysis is conducted for the euro area as a whole, as well as for several member countries, using a sample covering the last two decades. Moreover, we also assess if the conclusions hold when one focuses on the post-euro introduction period.
The Anchoring of Long-Term Inflation Expectations of Consumers: Insights from a New Survey
SSRN Electronic Journal
We provide new evidence on the level and probability distribution of consumers' longterm expectations of inflation in the euro area and the Netherlands, using a representative Dutch survey. We find that consumers' long-term (ten years ahead) euro area inflation expectations are not well anchored at the ECB's inflation aim. First, median long-term euro area inflation expectations are 4%, 2pp above the ECB's inflation aim of 2%. Second, individual probability distributions of long-term euro area inflation expectations show that expected probabilities of higher inflation (2pp or more above the ECB's inflation aim) are much higher, at 28% on average, than those of lower inflation (2pp or more below the ECB's inflation aim), at 12%. This suggest that the de-anchoring of Dutch consumers' long-term euro area inflation expectations is mainly due to expected high inflation, rather than to expected low inflation (or deflation). This finding is in contrast to recent concerns by ECB monetary policymakers about a possible deanchoring of long-term inflation expectations on the downside. Furthermore, we find that consumers' long-term euro area inflation expectations are significantly higher if respondents have lower incomes. Based on measures of anchoring calculated directly from individual consumers' probability distributions of expected long-term inflation, namely the probability of inflation being close to target, the probability of inflation being far above target, and the probability of deflation, we also find that long-term euro area inflation expectations are better anchored for consumers with higher net household income.
Inflation expectations and inflation uncertainty in the eurozone: evidence from survey data
Review of World Economics, 2008
This paper uses the European Commission's Consumer Survey to assess whether inflation expectations have converged and whether inflation uncertainty has diminished following the introduction of the Euro in Europe. Consumers' responses to the survey suggest that inflation expectations depend more on past national inflation rates than on the ECB's anchor for price stability. The convergence in inflation expectations does not appear to be faster than the convergence in actual inflation rates. Regarding inflation uncertainty, the data indicate a relationship with country size, suggesting that within EMU, inflation uncertainty may increase in countries that have a smaller influence on ECB policy.
Inflation Perceptions and Anticipations in the Old Eurozone Member States
Prague Economic Papers, 2011
There is empirical evidence that the introduction of the euro led to a significant increase of perceived inflation in most countries. Such an increase and persistence in the perceived inflation might thenhave an impact on inflation expectations and other macroeconomic variables. The authors have used expectational errors to describe the difference between inflation expectations/anticipations and its observed values, subsequently to identify the causality between these variables.
SSRN Electronic Journal
An experiment using a representative survey of the German population shows that letting respondents report a number rather than asking them to choose from a list of predefined ranges lowers the response rate for both perceived past and expected inflation and decreases (increases) reported past (expected) inflation. Income, education, gender, objective and subjective knowledge about monetary policy, and political affiliation affect the effect's size but not its sign. East and West German respondents who were 15 or older when the Berlin Wall fell have reactions different from those who were younger at that time, which supports the 'impressionable years' hypothesis based on different inflation experiences.
Inflation Perception and Anticipation Gaps in the Eurozone
There is significant empirical evidence that the introduction of the euro led to a significant increase of perceived inflation in most countries. Such an increase and persistence in the perceived inflation might then have an impact on inflation expectations and other macroeconomic variables. The authors have used the short-term Phillips curve to describe the difference between inflation expectations and its current values, subsequently to identify the impact of this difference on other economic indicators. The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 provides an overview of the theory and empiricism on the gap between measured and perceived inflation. Section 2 then builds up the theoretical framework based on the short-term Phillips curve approach and derives two hypotheses, to be tested subsequently. Section 3 provides the methodology. Section 4 presents the modelling and results of the empirical analysis. In section 5 authors compare its results and used methodology with papers ...
How Does Consumption Respond to News about Inflation? Field Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial
Social Science Research Network, 2019
We implement a survey of Dutch households in which random subsets of respondents receive information about inflation. The resulting exogenously generated variation in inflation expectations is used to assess how expectations affect subsequent monthly consumption decisions relative to those in a control group. The causal effects of elevated inflation expectations on nondurable spending are imprecisely estimated but there is a sharp negative effect on durable spending. We provide evidence that this is likely driven by the fact that Dutch households seem to become more pessimistic about their real income as well as aggregate spending when they increase their inflation expectations. There is little evidence to support the idea that the degree to which respondents change their beliefs or their spending in response to information treatments depends on their level of cognitive or financial constraints.
Journal of Consumer Affairs, 2010
When financial decisions have consequences beyond the immediate future, individuals' economic success may depend on their ability to forecast the rate of inflation. Higher inflation expectations have been reported by individuals who are female, poorer, single and less educated. Our results suggest that these demographic differences in inflation expectations may be partially explained by variations in expectation formation and financial literacy. Specifically, higher inflation expectations were reported by individuals who focused more on how to cover their future expenses and on prices they pay (rather than on the US inflation rate) and by individuals with lower financial literacy.