Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge (original) (raw)
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Regionalism and Federalism in the Italian Political Culture
Studia Europaea, LIX, nr. 2, pp. 99-116., 2014
The Italian regionalism constantly reported to traditionalism all along the XIX th century, when it appealed to territorial, historical, linguistic or ethnical peculiarities having still a strong liberal-federalist basis. The regional formulas reflected best in the theories of the catholic federalists, moderates, republicans, but also in those of the left wing, the so called radicals. Socialist politics and generally speaking the ecclesiastic liberalism of the catholic church encouraged the federalist thinking towards local autonomy, administrative liberty, territorial decentralization, democracy, modernization. The new Italian regionalism, shaped in the context of intense post-war federalist approaches, had strong political-ideological implications, which developed mainly around the North-South discrepancies. The nowadays tendencies towards federalist structures such as fiscal or even secessionist federalism, extremely evident in the case of Spain, begin to materialize in Italy as well.
Italian Regionalism: A Semi-Federation is Taking Shape — Or is It?
Territorial Choice, 2010
In Italy the issue of reforming sub-national government has in recent years primarily concerned regional government. Thus on 7 October 2001, Italian voters went to the polls to vote in a referendum on proposals to revise articles of the constitution concerned with relations between the central state and the regions. The reform had been introduced by the centre-left majority one year before in 'double reading'. But according to the Italian Constitution of 1948, if parliament only approves a constitutional revision in the second reading with a simple majority rather than a qualified two-thirds majority, then the proposal may be required to obtain popular approval. In this case 64.2 per cent of those who participated in the referendum approved the amendments, while 35.8 per cent rejected them. Roughly five years later, on 25-26 June 2006, Italian voters again went to the polls to vote on a constitutional amendment reforming 57 articles of the second part of the Constitution. This part of the Constitution had been partially revised by the previous constitutional referendum. On this occasion, however, the proposed reform, approved by the then centre-right majority without the required qualified majority, was rejected by the voters; 61.3 per cent of those who took part in the referendum voted against whereas 38.7 per cent voted in favour. These two stories clearly exemplify some of the difficulties Italy has faced (and still faces) in the definition of centre-periphery relations. More specifically, they bring to the fore two problems: first a seemingly never-ending debate on the need for a Constitutional reform in order to make the Italian political system more stable and effective and, second, the difficulty of introducing bipartisan federal reforms. Even if a large majority of the political parties agree on the need to undertake fundamental institutional reform and to create a federal state, the same H. Baldersheim et al. (eds.
Italian Regionalism before the Constitutional Court Whether Italy is a quasi-federal system, or a decentralized unitary state is a matter of scholarly disagreement. 1 Undoubtedly, the answer to this question depends on the criteria applied when ascribing Italy to either taxonomy. As it lacks a chamber representing regions at the national level, 2 for instance, U.S.-related approaches to federalism rank Italy among non-federal jurisdictions. Such uncertainty suggests we reappraise Italian regionalism from an alternative perspective. This article focuses indeed on the dynamics of the Italian constitution, as well as on the actors that allow them to evolve, in order to grasp its most relevant features. Beginning with the dynamics, these revolve around the concept of 'territorial constitution', which points to the geography of federal arrangements, i.e. the governance through constituent units. In federal arrangements, the vertical distribution of powers is complemented by other forces, such as territorial interests, which are allocated within regional boundaries and demarcated on a geographical basis. 3 The territorial constitution permits us to sidestep the objections that arise under traditional, and formalistic, approaches to federal studies. Not only is it shared by federalising and decentralising processes, but it has also played a pivotal role in those processes not included among mature or emergent federations. 4 Italy certainly has a territorial constitution, since the distribution of powers intermingles with interests that are geographically allocated within regional boundaries. Legislative, administrative, and financial responsibilities are constitutionally assigned to regions so that these must meet the needs of their political communities. 5
Regionalism in the Italian Constitutional System
Diritto&questinipubbliche, 2009
The aim of this essay is to briefly deal with the history of the relationship between State and Regions in Italian regionalism. I will pay special attention to what has happened to the category of regions usually called “Regioni Speciali”. In section 2 I will study the birth of Italian regionalism. I will examine the “special treatment” of the Regione siciliana before the Constitution came into force, starting in 1946; the approval of the Italian Constitution in 1947, and the “ordinary model” of regionalism held in this charter; finally, the “constitutional statutes” – approved by the same Constituent Assembly in 1948 – regulating the constitutional position of the regions mentioned in art. 116 Cost. Section 3 describes the most important features of the “ordinary model”, as they appeared in the constitutional text. In fact, constitutional interpretation – especially by the constitutional Court – has reshaped the relationship between State and Regions. The path followed by the Court, indeed, was far from the expectation one may have had when reading the Constitution. The relationship between State and Regions in the living Constitution is the topic of Section 4, where I try to describe the features of the model, as shaped by the decision of the constitutional judges. I will attempt, therefore, to offer a point of view about the reasons that form the basis of such a model. The thesis suggested in this essay holds that the main reason lies in some assumptions in the field of constitutional theory, especially those concerning the validity of the Constitution and the idea of the People. The consequence of this assumption in the organizations of the relationship between State and Regions is the ontological superiority of the first over the second. The key term I will use to explain this “way of life” in the experience of Italian regionalism is “interesse nazionale” (national interest). Section 5 studies the “life” of the “Regioni speciali”. This kind of Regions never enjoyed the special treatment one could derive from the constitutional text. It is well-known that in 2001 the Italian Parliament approved the most important constitutional reform since 1948. The “legge costituzionale” n. 3/2001 – whose title is Modifiche al titolo V della parte seconda della Costituzione – changed many articles in the part of the Italian Constitution dedicated to the relationship between the central State and other autonomous territorial organizations: Regions, of course, followed by “comuni” (city councils); “province” (provinces) and “città metropolitane” (metropolitan areas). In section 5 I will attempt to offer a comprehensive reading of the shape that constitutional reform gave to the Italian system. The main idea is that the l. cost. 2/2001 determined the fall of the State’s superiority. The key-words I will use to explain this point of view are “pluralismo istituzionale paritario” (that we can translate as “equal institutional pluralism”) and “sussidiarietà” (subsidiarity). Of course, subsidiarity is a wellknown concept in political and legal studies. My aim is not to focus on this principle, but to explain the Italian path towards subsidiarity, drawn by the constitutional reform and the decisions of the Constitutional Court, and, before these, by the legislative reforms of the 1990s. The thesis I will try to draw is that this principle expresses a profound changeover in the way of thinking of the problem of validity and the very idea of People.
Étude sur le Régionalisme 2014/2015, 2015
This report is part of an overall study run by AER - Assembly of Europea Regions in 2014-2015 about the state of regionalism in more than 30 countries in Europe. The other reports can be found under: http://www.aer.eu/en/knowledge-centre/thematic-expertise-thematic-issues/regionalism/aerpublications/20142015-study-on-regionalism.html Each report was written by independent experts, mostly academic representatives. Information provided in this report therefore only engage its authors
The article aims to underline firstly the trend towards the homogenization of the subnational forms of governments, at regional level, across regional States, focusing on Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK). This is only marginally the outcome of constitutional provisions and jurisprudence, but it is mainly caused by the passive attitude of the Regions, which either remain inactive to the opportunity of reforms and adaptation or decide to adopt institutional solutions already experimented or 'constitutionally prepackaged', without any changes.
The autonomy principle in italian regionalism. Annual report 2013 - Italy
Regionalism had been considered as an institutional, political imbalance cause since the Risorgimento age. The reasons had been the fear of a potential damage of the national unity and especially the strong diffidence by the political parties towards models than cannot be controlled by the State. In fact, it is to be recalled the intense debate on the model of State that the Constituent Assembly had to adopt (1946-1947), the long time necessary in order to achieve the regionalism system (1948-1970) and the long period of the «regionalism without a model» (1971-1998). Currently (1999-today), regionalism is still an undefined entity. It is still looking for a valuable model: that is quite evident because, after constitutional reforms in 1999 and 2001, the need of unity and the decisions of the constitutional Court have progressively justified an increased centralization of competences.
The Italian regionalism in the context of the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan
Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas, 2022
This article aims to analyse the impact of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) on Italian regionalism. After summarising the characteristic features of the Italian multi-level government model, the text analyses three significant issues of the NRRP: drafting, governance, and implementation. For each of these issues, an attempt will be made to define the role played by the regions and local authorities and their relationship with the central government, to identify elements of continuity and disruption concerning the trends present in the system of territorial autonomies prior to the adoption of the Plan. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the NRRP has given the system a shift towards centralism. If the reforms and investments envisaged in the Plan are successful, however, this could herald the opening of a new season for territorial autonomies in Italy.
The System of Local Government in Italy: A Stress-Test to Traditional Paradigms?
Ius gentium, 2022
In 2001 a constitutional reform was approved with the aim to considerably increase the powers and the political autonomy of the Italian Regions. In championing the federalisation of the country, the relations between State and Regions were reshaped. Despite the presence of many typical federal traits, many other essential federal features are missing. The system of local autonomies is one of the most emblematic elements that distinguishes Italy's decentralised model from traditional federations. According to the theorical approaches to federalism, federations usually adhere to a common paradigm when it comes to local entities: local governments are creatures of the subnational units, whereas non-federal countries follow a different path, in which local entities depend on the central State. Against this background, the chapter explores the hybrid nature of the Italian paradigm, i.e., a system in which relations with local governments cannot be situated in neither of these two groups. In addressing this fuzziness, the chapter gives evidence of the main characteristics of mixed paradigms by emphasizing the components that in the Italian case show significant deviations from the abovementioned dichotomy. This chapter is the product of a joint effort. However, Alice Valdesalici wrote Sects. 2, 3 and 6, while Martina Trettel authored Sects. 4 and 5. Sects. 1 and 7 have been co-authored.