WP / 16 / 145 Sovereign Risk and Deposit Dynamics : Evidence from Europe by (original) (raw)

Sovereign Exposures of European Banks: It Is Not All Doom

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019

In this paper we investigate whether or not observed changes in the composition of the sovereign bond portfolios of European banks are determined by a risk-return trade-off. Banks have been shown to disproportionally invest in bonds issued by their domestic sovereign, causing a negative bank-sovereign doom loop. Several motivations for such behavior have been demonstrated in the extant literature, such as e.g., search for yield or moral suasion, which from an investment perspective all involve some degree of irrational behavior. We depart from this approach and investigate the risk-return trade-off in the bank sovereign bond portfolios. We use data from all stress tests and transparency exercises conducted by the EBA between 2011 and 2018 for a sample of 76 European banks. Using the Sharpe ratio for the risk-return assessment, we find that over the entire period banks' investments and divestments of sovereign bonds are characterized by rational risk-return considerations. Moreover, both bond risk (measured by the standard deviation of bond returns) as well as sovereign risk (sovereign CDS spreads) are negatively related to bond buying, implying that, on average, banks do not engage in excessive risk-taking behavior in their sovereign bond portfolios. Our main conclusion is that over the 2011-2018 period banks may have exhibited spells of excessive risk behavior in their sovereign bond buying, but over the entire period their sovereign bond investments exhibit a sound risk-return trade-off. These findings have implications for policy initiatives to tackle concentrations in sovereign bond holdings by European banks.

Financial stability in Europe: Banking and sovereign risk

Journal of Financial Stability

We analyze the link between banking sector quality and sovereign risk in the whole European Union over 1999-2014. We employ four different indicators of sovereign risk (including market-and opinion-based assessments), a rich set of theoretically and empirically motivated banking sector characteristics, and a Bayesian inference in panel estimation as a methodology. We show that a higher proportion of non-performing loans is the single most influential sectorspecific variable that is associated with increased sovereign risk. The sector's depth provides mixed results. The stability (capital adequacy ratio) and size (TBA) of the industry are linked to lower sovereign risk in general. Foreign bank penetration and competition (a more diversified structure of the industry) are linked to lower sovereign risk. Our results also support the wakeup call hypothesis in that markets re-appraised a number of banking sector-related issues in the pricing of sovereign risk after the onset of the sovereign crisis in Europe.

A Tale of Two Euro-Zones: Banks' Funding, Sovereign Risk & Unconventional Monetary Policies

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

The admission by the Greek government on October 18, 2009, of large-scale accounting fraud in its national accounts sparked an unprecedented sovereign debt crisis that rapidly spread to the Eurozone's weakest member states. As the crisis increasingly drove a wedge between a seemingly resilient Eurozone core and its faltering periphery, its first collateral victims were the private banks of the hardest-hit sovereigns. They were rapidly followed by the rest of the Eurozone's banks as a result of their large exposure to not only their home country's sovereign debt, but also to the debt securities of other member states. Measuring each bank's precise exposure to every sovereign issuer became a key issue for credit analysis in the attempt to assess the potential impact of a selective sovereign default if worse came to worst. Yet finding that information in a timely manner is hardly an easy task, as banks are not required to disclose it. Building on the efficient market hypothesis in the presence of informed traders, we tested the sensitivity of each of the largest Eurozone private banks' CDSs to sovereign CDSs using a simple autoregressive model estimated by time-series regressions and panel regressions, comparing the results to news releases to assess its reliability. Eventually, we used the Oaxaca Blinder decomposition to measure whether the unconventional monetary policies, namely the LTRO and the OMT, that the ECB has implemented to stem the crisis have helped banks directly or whether banks were actually helped by the reduction in sovereign CDS spreads.

Bank and sovereign debt risk connection:[draft december 2012]

Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banks' and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to incentive problems and liquidity risk (in the form of liquidity based banks' runs) which provides a link between endogenous bank capital and macro and policy risk. Our banks also invest in risky government bonds used as capital buffer to self-insure against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk.

Bank and Sovereign Debt Risk Connection

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012

Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banks' and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to moral hazard and liquidity risk (sudden deposit withdrawals): banks invest in risky government bonds as a form of capital buffer against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk. JEL classification: E5, G3, E6.

Bank-sovereign risk spillovers in the Euro Area

Applied Economics Letters, 2020

This paper investigates the cross-sectional spillovers between banking and sovereign risk in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries. Average 'distance-todefault' based on all publicly listed banks headquartered in a particular country is used as an indicator of banking risk, while 10-year sovereign yield as the measure of sovereign risk. Using spillover measure proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), we find evidence of clustering among banks and sovereigns in peripheral and central countries. Except for peripheral countries banks, rest of the clusters are well isolated from each other.

Feasibility Check: Transition to a New Regime for Bank Sovereign Exposure?

ERN: Commercial Banks (Topic), 2017

Excessive sovereign debt exposures of banks contributed to the gravity of the financial and sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, as well as to the slow and asymmetric recovery of European countries. Various policies that improve banks’ resilience were introduced in recent years, however the regulatory regime for the sovereign debt exposure of banks has not changed. We identify four criteria that a new regime for bank sovereign exposures should fulfill: (1) attenuate the home bias to the domestic sovereign, (2) break the doom loop, (3) avoid a flight-to-quality of assets, and (4) mitigate risk spillovers. We assess the implications for banks’ balance sheets for five policy proposals, based on simulations on a sample of European banks. We show that none of the proposals would fulfill all four criteria in the absence of a safe asset. We conclude that a new regime for bank sovereign exposure should be conditional on restoring the value of sovereign bonds as a safe asset.

Regulatory Problems of Commercial Banks in the Context of the European Sovereign Crisis

Transition Studies Review, 2012

This study aims to find whether regulatory measurement of banking risks proposed by the Basel Committee provide a framework that allows an adequate reflection of these risks in banks' capital requirements. The analysis is carried through the prism of financial crisis that started in 2007 and current sovereign crisis in some European countries. In the study we investigated the problems attached to Standardized Approach and risk measurement of a financial instrument based on the rating of issuer. As a result we revealed contradiction in the current regulation, according to which risk free assets provide a better return than riskier assets. We found evidences of the gaps attached to Standardized Approach, which in current sovereign crisis can become problematic not only for commercial banks, but also for the issuers of financial instruments in which commercial banks have investments. Finally, we offered a different method of risk measurement that, we argue, provides a better measurement of banking risks as such.

Sovereigns and Banks in the Euro Area: A Tale of Two Crises

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

Institute of Applied Economics (IREA) in Barcelona was founded in 2005, as a research institute in applied economics. Three consolidated research groups make up the institute: AQR, RISK and GiM, and a large number of members are involved in the Institute. IREA focuses on four priority lines of investigation: (i) the quantitative study of regional and urban economic activity and analysis of regional and local economic policies, (ii) study of public economic activity in markets, particularly in the fields of empirical evaluation of privatization, the regulation and competition in the markets of public services using state of industrial economy, (iii) risk analysis in finance and insurance, and (iv) the development of micro and macro econometrics applied for the analysis of economic activity, particularly for quantitative evaluation of public policies. IREA Working Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. For that reason, IREA Working Papers may not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. A revised version may be available directly from the author. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IREA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.