Financial Modernization Legislation in the United States. Background and Implications (original) (raw)
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There have been major changes in the banking system structure and several new banking laws over time that have had major impact on banks in the USA. In response to the 1980s and early 1990s crisis, and the more recent mortgage market meltdown that began in the summer of 2007, the banking industry and regulations governing banks changed profoundly and rapidly with even more changes likely to take place. It is therefore important to delineate the nature of these changes, particularly in comparison to the pre-crisis character of the US banking system and regulatory environment. In particular, this article discusses the regulatory changes that have emerged in response to the decline in the role of banks in firms' external financing, and the rise in noninterest-generating activities; the blurring of distinctions between banks and other depository institutions, and between banking companies and other financial intermediaries; the growing complexity of banking organizations, both in a corporate hierarchy sense, and with respect to the range of activities in which they can engage; the more intense globalization of banking; and the subprime mortgage market meltdown that triggered a credit crunch and liquidity freeze that led to the worst recession in the USA since the Great Depression.
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Financial markets in transition; or, the decline of commercial banking
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Banking law and regulation in the United States have customarily restricted the nonbanking activities of banks and the banking activities of nonbanking firms, producing a separation of banking from commerce. While such separation is surprising in a free market system that, in general, permits private firms to engage in any lawful business, it is understandable in an historical and institutional context. Proposals for change raise a wide range of economic and other issues. This paper identifies, catalogues, and elaborates these issues to provide a framework for informed judgment and further investigation. It begins with a review of early restrictions on bank activities in the United States and contrasts U.S. developments with those in several other countries in which banks have not been separated from commercial and industrial firms. It, then, reviews relevant issues arising in the financial sector, commercial sector, related to central banking and supervision, and socio-political concerns. It concludes that limited banking, as it exists in the United States, and universal banking, as it exists in other countries, have differential benefits and costs. Summary evaluation based on standard cost benefit analysis, however, presents serious difficulties. Considerable uncertainty remains about effects in a number of areas. Many of the costs and benefits are not quantifiable, and some that are quantifiable are incomparable. A careful review of all existing evidence, identification of gaps, and further investigation is needed. 14 This section and the following section draws on Shull, 1994.
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Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2005
Abstract: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 marks the end of Depression era regulations like the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. These acts have restricted banks from securities and insurance underwriting business. This paper examines the impact of the GLBA on the banking industry. We find that the banking industry has a welfare gain from this law. We investigate two different categorizations of the banking industry. We find that Money Center banks followed by the Super Regional banks benefited most from this deregulation. On the other hand, banks that had Section 20 investment subsidiaries gained more than other banks in the second category. The results also show that the exposure to systematic risk for different categories of banks decreased after the passage of this law, which implies that the GLBA is fairly successful in containing the risk that accompanied the act and also created diversification opportunities. For Money Center banks, Super Regional Banks, banks with a section 20 subsidiary and banks with a new financial subsidiary, a shift in the exposure to systematic risk can explain the overall cross sectional variation in return from the deregulation. In both categorizations we find that larger banks gained more, while the overall explanatory power of profitability is not conclusive.
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 2001
SummaryInitiated by the seminal work of Diamond/Dybvig (1983) and Diamond (1984), advances in the theory of financial intermediation have sharpened our understanding of the theoretical foundations of banks as special financial institutions. What makes them “unique” is the combination of accepting deposits and issuing loans. However, in recent years the notion of “disintermediation” has gained tremendous popularity, especially among American observers. These observers argue that deregulation, globalisation and advances in information technology have been eroding the role of banks as intermediaries and thus their alleged uniqueness. It is even assumed that ever more efficiently organised capital markets and specialised financial institutions that take advantage of these markets, such as mutual funds or finance companies, will lead to the demise of banks.Using a novel measurement concept based on intermediation and securitisation ratios, the present article provides evidence that shows...
Banking and commerce in the United States
Journal of Banking & Finance, 1994
This review traces the changing relationship between banking and commerce in the United States, from the earliest banks through recent developments. The relationship is characterized by policy-imposed restrictions on both the 'nonbanking' activities of banks and the 'banking' activities of commercial and industrial firms. The substance of the policy has varied over the years with changes in the demarcation between 'banking' and 'nonbanking' as the result of market adaptations by banks, other firms and government, the functioning of a fragmented regulatory system, and congressional 'loopholes' that have periodically been closed when widely exploited. Persistent constraints on common control of banks and other commercial firms, and repeated government suppression of major departures from separation, has been striking in an economy that generally rewards entry into new activities to meet market demands. The roots of the policy can be found in concerns about the extension of government influence through the private banking firms which it supports to the detriment of non-affiliated commercial and industrial firms; i.e., in classic economic liberalism.