The plight of the sense-making ape (2014) PREPRINT (original) (raw)
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Orangutans' Use of Contiguous Versus Distal Social and Non-social Cues in an Object-choice Task
International journal of comparative psychology / ISCP; sponsored by the International Society for Comparative Psychology and the University of Calabria
In this experiment, orangutans' ability to use social versus non-social cues on an object-choice task was examined. In addition, the role of spatial proximity was investigated, by matching the distance between the cue and the target object across both social and non-social conditions. Subjects took significantly fewer trials to learn to use social cues (a finger touching the target object and an experimenter's face hovering above the target object) than non-social cues (paper markers). There was no statistical difference between their performance with cues that were physically contiguous with the target object and those that were distal spatially, regardless of whether the cue was social or non-social in nature. Evidence for spontaneous cue use was strongest for the social-contiguous condition (a finger touching the target object). These results suggest that spatial proximity alone cannot explain apes' performance on these types of tasks. Although subjects may have diffi...
Evolutionary psychology of spatial representations in the hominidae
2006
Comparatively little is known about the inherited primate background underlying human cognition, the human cognitive “wild-type.” Yet it is possible to trace the evolution of human cognitive abilities and tendencies by contrasting the skills of our nearest cousins, not just chimpanzees, but all the extant great apes, thus showing what we are likely to have inherited from the common ancestor. By looking at human infants early in cognitive development, we can also obtain insights into native cognitive biases in our species.
Rhesus Monkeys Attribute Perceptions to Others
Current Biology, 2005
and cannot see. Our work builds on the recent insight Yale University that primates will most likely exhibit sophisticated ToM New Haven, CT 06520 abilities in experimental scenarios that mimic the natural situations for which these abilities have evolvednamely, competitive foraging situations [16, 17]. Despite robust failures in previous ToM tasks [1-2, 18], chimpan-Summary zees have succeeded in reasoning about another individual's potential visual knowledge when vying for food Paramount among human cognitive abilities is the cain competitive interactions [6, 19]. Results like these pacity to reason about what others think, want, and raise the possibility that macaques (as well as other see-a capacity referred to as a theory of mind (ToM). monkey species [20]) may possess a similar ability and, Despite its importance in human cognition, the extent therefore, that gaze-sensitive neurons in macaque corto which other primates share human ToM capacities tex may support sophisticated ToM reasoning. has for decades remained a mystery. To date, primates In the present six experiments, we ask whether free-[1, 2] have performed poorly in behavioral tasks that ranging rhesus monkeys from the Cayo Santiago popurequire ToM abilities, despite the fact that some malation reason about what a human competitor can and caques are known to encode social stimuli at the level cannot see. The monkeys in this population are naturally of single neurons [3-5]. Here, we presented rhesus curious about the foods that human experimenters bring macaques with a more ecologically relevant ToM task to the island [21]
Animal Cognition, 2014
Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques' understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the covers' orientation. The macaques could use a board's inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeys' performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain.
1997
As the cognitive revolution was slow to come to the study of animal behavior, the vast majority of what we know about primate cognition has been discovered in the last 30 years. Building on the recognition that the physical and social worlds of humans and their living primate relatives pose many of the same evolutionary challenges, programs of research have established that the most basic cognitive skills and mental representations that humans use to navigate those worlds are already possessed by other primates. There may be differences between humans and other primates, however, in more complex cognitive skills, such as reasoning about relations, causality, time, and other minds. Of special importance, the human primate seems to possess a species-unique set of adaptations for ''cultural intelligence,'' which are broad reaching in their effects on human cognition.
Understanding of and reasoning about object–object relationships in long-tailed macaques?
Animal Cognition, 2013
Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques' understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the covers' orientation. The macaques could use a board's inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeys' performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain.
Apes communicate about absent and displaced objects: Methodology matters
Animal Cognition, 17: 85-94, 2014
Displaced reference is the ability to refer to an item that has been moved (displaced) in space and/or time, and has been called one of the true hallmarks of referential communication. Several studies suggest that nonhuman primates have this capability, but a recent experiment concluded that in a specific situation (absent entities), human infants display displaced reference but chimpanzees do not. Here, we show that chimpanzees and bonobos of diverse rearing histories are capable of displaced reference to absent and displaced objects. It is likely that some of the conflicting findings from animal cognition studies are due to relatively minor methodological differences, but are compounded by interpretation errors. Comparative studies are of great importance in elucidating the evolution of human cognition; however, greater care must be taken with methodology and interpretation for these studies to accurately reflect species differences.
Apes communicate about absent and displaced objects: Methodology matters (2014).
Displaced reference is the ability to refer to an item that has been moved (displaced) in space and/or time, and has been called one of the true hallmarks of referential communication. Several studies suggest that nonhuman primates have this capability, but a recent experiment concluded that in a specific situation (absent entities), human infants display displaced reference but chimpanzees do not. Here, we show that chimpanzees and bonobos of diverse rearing histories are capable of displaced reference to absent and displaced objects. It is likely that some of the conflicting findings from animal cognition studies are due to relatively minor methodological differences, but are compounded by interpretation errors. Comparative studies are of great importance in elucidating the evolution of human cognition; however, greater care must be taken with methodology and interpretation for these studies to accurately reflect species differences.
Primate cognition: from ‘what now?’ to ‘what if ?’
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003
The 'social brain' hypothesis has had a major impact on the study of comparative cognition. However, despite a strong sense, gained from both experimental and observational work, that monkeys and apes differ from each other, we are still no closer to understanding exactly how they differ. We hypothesize that the dispersed social systems characteristic of ape societies explains why monkeys and apes should differ cognitively. The increased cognitive control and analogical reasoning ability needed to cope with life in dispersed societies also suggests a possible route for human cognitive evolution. This hypothesis is supported by behavioural and neurobiological data, but we need more of both if we are to fully understand how our primate cousins see the world.