Feyerabend's Reevaluation of Scientific Practice: Quantum Mechanics, Realism and Niels Bohr (original) (raw)
Related papers
Studies in History and Philososphy of Science
This paper aims to show that the development of Feyerabend’s philosophical ideas in the 1950s and 1960s largely took place in the context of debates on quantum mechanics. In particular, he developed his influential arguments for pluralism in science in discussions with the quantum physicist David Bohm, who had developed an alternative approach to quantum physics which (in Feyerabend’s perception) was met with a dogmatic dismissal by some of the leading quantum physicists. I argue that Feyerabend’s arguments for theoretical pluralism and for challenging established theories were connected to his objections to the dogmatism and conservatism he observed in quantum physics. However, as Feyerabend gained insight in the physical details and historical complexities which led to the development of quantum mechanics, he gradually became more modest in his criticisms. His writings on quantum mechanics especially engaged with Niels Bohr; initially, he was critical of Bohr’s work in quantum mechanics, but in the late 1960s, he completely withdrew his criticism and even praised Bohr as a model scientist. He became convinced that however puzzling quantum mechanics seemed, it was methodologically unobjectionable – and this was crucial for his move towards ‘anarchism’ in philosophy of science.
https://thesis-journal.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Hajdin-Abazi.pdf, 2019
Feyerabend generally is known most for his discovery on the helpfulness of breaking rules when they become a hindrance and for the legitimacy of the counter-inductive approach as a way to make fundamental changes in science. But his view about the decontamination of old theories and the implantation of new theories‘ conception deserves equal recognition. And, of course, his alternative of open instead of closed exchange is invaluable as epistemological contribution. All this together make Feyerabend‘s viewpoint very distinct, especially to understand the need of openness as a condition to make easy the scientific development. Those three aspects constitute the originality of Feyerabend‘s contribution in the philosophy of science, which will be the focus of this paper. These novelties, as it will be argued, fill respective aspects where previously there were shortcomings, which made possible to clarify epistemologically the understanding and explanation, according to the practice, how the development of science and the growth of knowledge were attained (and as a consequence how they usually go). The approach of the treatise pursues the historical context and the theoretical articulation of Feyerabend‘s view, including some critical reflections. Keywords: legitimacy of counter-rules, open exchange, (de)contamination of evidence, scientific development, growth of knowledge, Feyerabend
The Challenge of Quantum Mechanics to the Rationality of Science: Philosophers of Science on Bohr
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Bohr's work in quantum mechanics posed a challenge to philosophers of science, who struggled with the question of whether and to what degree his theories and methods could be considered rational. This paper focuses on Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos and Kuhn, all of whom recognized some irrational, dogmatic, paradoxical or even inconsistent features in Bohr's work. Popper, Feyerabend and Lakatos expressed strong criticism of Bohr's approach to quantum physics, while Kuhn argued that such criticism was unlikely to be fruitful: progress in science is generally not made through philosophical reflection. Feyerabend's criticism of Bohr gradually weakened, as he gained a more detailed understanding of the development of Bohr's views on quantum mechanics, and this went together with an increasingly critical view of normative philosophy of science and was instrumental to his conversion to 'anarchism'. This paper aims to show that quantum mechanics played a central role in their debates and disagreements on the rationality of science and the possibility of a normative philosophy of science.
Feyerabend, Pluralism and Progress in Science in Against Method 1993 and the Tyranny of Science 2011
2020
The epistemological problem associated with Karl Paul Feyerabend as a philosopher of Science resides beneath the fact that different critics of his works give divers interpretations of them. His works and the accounts they present have no common structure. This plurality and conflictual interpretations of him makes it difficult, if not impossible to pin him to a particular tradition in the Philosophy of Science. For this reason, while some of his critics consider him to be a relativist, to some, he is a Dadaist, a confusionist and an anarchist, yet others think of Feyerabend as the worst enemy of Science. This diversity of interpretation of Feyerabend, in my opinion, only goes to reassure us of our reading of him. That is, Feyerabend is closely associated with pluralism than anything else. My aim, in this paper is thus propose a thesis and attempt a justification. The thesis is that my reading of Against Method, 1993 and The Tyranny of Science, 2011 , justifies the thesis above. Thi...
Riffing on Feyerabend: Direct Observation, Paraconsistent Logic and a Research Immanent Account of the Rationality of Science, 2023
Feyerabend's work, particularly his early papers contain important insights into the nature of science and scientific progress. I discuss his insights into the limits of empiricist foundationalism and positivism. I explain how the work of a number of philosophers has borne out Feyerabend's claims in startling and interesting ways. Nevertheless, I criticise Feyerabend's move from his attack on universal method to relativism. I point out that Feyerabend never confronted a well-developed research immanent view of the rationality of scientific change, which shows the limitations of the arguments in Against Method.
This book is a penetrating effort to demonstrate the importance of Danish philosopher Harald Heffding's philosophy of nature and science for the physicist Niels Bohr. Based on two earlier studies which appeared in the Danish Yearbook 0/ Philosophy for 1979 and in SHPS in 1988, this book gives extensive evidence for Heffding's influence on Bohr by pointing to the following kinds of links between the two thinkers: -indirect biographical links: e.g., via the friendship of Bohr's father Christian Bohr with Heffding's: both were professors at the University of Copenhagen and members of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, and furthermore, the physiologist and the philosopher regularly met at each other's houses to discuss matters of scientific and philosophi. cal importance such as, for instance, the methodology of biology; and in particular, the conflict between the mechanical and the teological explanation of life (d. 12f£.); -direct biographical links: after enrolling at the University of Copenhagen in 1903 Bohr took part in a course on 'propaedcutic philosophy' taught by Heffding. Furthermore, on
Feyerabend - Philosophy, Science & Society.pdf
Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) was one of the foremost twentieth-century philosophers of science. Although he attained infamy by embracing cultural relativism and by providing a searing critique of the claims of science, there has been, to date, no comprehensive critical study of the major themes in Feyerabend’s philosophy. This book rectifies that situation. The book traces the evolution of Feyerabend’s thought, beginning with his attempt to graft insights from Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning onto Popper’s falsificationist philosophy. The component parts of Feyerabend’s ‘model for the acquisition of knowledge’, the normative aspect of his project, and its roots in a Popperian conception of epistemology, are identified and critically evaluated. Feyerabend’s early work emerges as thoroughly post-Popperian, rather than as a contribution to the historical approach to philosophy of science with which he is usually associated. In his more notorious later work, notably the 1975 book Against Method, Feyerabend claimed that there was, and should be, no such thing as the scientific method. This ‘epistemological anarchism’ and Feyerabend’s attendant relativism are examined here in the light of his recognition that Against Method was a collage constructed out of his earlier thoughts. The roots of epistemological anarchism are exposed, and the weaknesses of Feyerabend’s later thesis of incommensurability are brought out. Throughout the book, the influence of Feyerabend’s thought on contemporary philosophers is tracked. The author draws attention to Feyerabend’s exciting but divided legacy. On the one hand, contemporary scientistic philosophers have used his earlier views in a vigorous defence of an uncompromising ‘eliminative’ materialist view of the mind. On the other hand, thinkers influenced by Feyerabend’s later work have begun a humanistic critique of science, scientific myth-making, and scientific claims to knowledge. The book will be of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students of philosophy, methodology, and the social sciences.