Wittgenstein and religious dogma (original) (raw)

The Significance of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Religious Belief

Philosophia, 2021

This article aims to show that Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one's own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein's remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language.

Wittgenstein on Religious Belief

Cambridge Elements Series, 2023

Wittgenstein published next to nothing on the philosophy of religion and yet his conception of religious belief has been both enormously influential and hotly contested. In the contemporary literature, Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. This Element shows that all of these readings are misguided and seriously at odds, not just with what Wittgenstein says about religious belief, but with his entire later philosophy. This Element also argues that Wittgenstein presents us with an important ‘third way’ of understanding religious belief – one that does not fall into the trap of either assimilating religious beliefs to ordinary empirical beliefs or seeking to reduce them to the expression of certain attitudes.

Wittgenstein and the 'Factorization Model' of Religious Belief

Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, 2015

The myths surrounding Wittgenstein's conception of religious belief are tenacious and enduring. In the contemporary literature, for example, Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist (Nielsen 2005), a non-cognitivist ) and a relativist of sorts (Kusch 2011). The underlying motivation for many of these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a 'factorization model' which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent 'factors' -the belief's content and the belief-attitudeappears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In the present contribution I will argue that such a model faces insuperable philosophical and exegetical difficulties, and, consequently, that the conceptions that spring from it are mistaken.

Wittgenstein and the ABC's of Religious Epistemics

This paper continues my development of philosophy of religion as multi-disciplinary comparative research. An earlier paper, “Wittgenstein and Contemporary Belief-Credence Dualism” compared Wittgensteinian reflections on religious discourse and praxis with B-C dualism as articulated by its leading proponents. While some strong commonalities were elaborated that might help to bridge Continental and Analytic approaches in philosophy of religion, Wittgenstein was found to be a corrective to B-C dualism especially as regards how the psychology and philosophy of epistemic luck/risk applies to doxastic faith ventures. This paper aims to further elaborate a basis for improved dialogue between philosophers, theologians, and scholars in special sciences which study religion. I call this basis the Triangulated model the ABC’s of religious epistemics in order to contrast it with the B-C dualist proposal

Worlds or words apart? Wittgenstein on understanding religious language

Ratio, 2007

In this paper I develop an account of Wittgenstein's conception of what it is to understand religious language. I show that Wittgenstein's view undermines the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible -either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a 'doctrineless' form of life. I offer a defence of Wittgenstein's conception against Kai Nielsen's charges that Wittgenstein removes the 'content' from religious belief and renders the religious form of life 'incommensurable' with other domains of discourse, thus immunizing it against rational criticism.

Wittgenstein: Faith and Reason

Kai Nielsen introduced a philosophical account of religion that he called Wittgensteinian Fideism, which he argued could be derived from the writings of several Wittgensteinian philosophers. He defined Wittgensteinian Fideism as a philosophical description of religious forms of life where religious discourse amounts to a self-sufficient, internally coherent language game that is not open to criticism from other modes of discourses, such as the sciences, and he criticized it in particular for disallowing the criticism of the seeming irrationality and incoherence of religious discourse (1967). D.Z. Philips, among others, argued that Nielsen's Wittgensteinian Fideism was not Wittgensteinian at all, for according to Philips, Wittgenstein's account of religious discourse allowed for external criticism. He did not, however, conclude that therefore one can criticize religious discourse for its alleged irrationalities. He acknowledged that there was a "fideistic" element to be found in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion, but he denied the disparagement, the intellectual sin of not using reason, that came with the charges of fideism. I align mostly with Philips's side on the issue, on whether or not the rationality and coherence of religious discourse can be criticized, on whether or not Wittgenstein puts forward a fideistic understanding of religion, and on whether or not that would be a bad thing. My answers to the first and third questions are yes and no, respectively, and I plan to dissolve the second. I hold that the language game of religion is one that does not employ reason as it is used within scientific or empirical matters, but also that this characteristic of religious beliefs does not justify the claim that reason does not apply in religious discourses.

Wittgensteinian Accounts of Religious Belief: Non-Cognitivist, Juicer, and Atheist-Minus

ABSTRACT. Wittgensteinian accounts of religious belief remain popular in certain theological and philosophical circles. Many of these accounts are supposed to deliver No Contradiction: No Contradiction. When atheists deny the beliefs they take to be expressed by such sentences as (a) 'God exists' (b) 'God created the world' (c) 'Jesus rose from the dead' (d) 'We will face a Judgement Day' they fail to contradict the religious beliefs such sentences are used to express. Often associated with No Contradiction is Immunity: Immunity. Even if an atheist were successfully to refute the belief they took such a sentence to express (by providing empirical evidence to the contrary, say), they would fail thereby to refute the religious belief expressed. This paper examines and distinguishes the leading Wittgensteinian accounts of religious belief from John Cottingham, Genia Schonbaumsfeld, and others that might be thought to deliver No Contradiction and Immunity, and finds them unpersuasive.

Wittgenstein on the Grammar of Religious Beliefs

Ludwig Wittgenstein's renewed approach to language and religious belief has significantly influenced the traditional Judeo-Christian approach to religious belief that is highly metaphysical with its doctrinal and dogmatic character. Penetrated into the depth grammar, Wittgenstein claimed that religious language does not give an explanation of supernatural entities as does natural science, which explains natural entities and facts. The meaning of religious language is divorced from its doctrinal footings and finds its meaning in ordinary life situations. This paper is an attempt to expose Wittgenstein's non-metaphysical approach to religious discourses, emphasizing the priority of practice over doctrine by delving into the depth grammar of religious beliefs to find a space for meaningful talk about religion and religious beliefs in the form of life where they are used in religious celebrations and ritual practices. Wittgenstein has made an attempt to bring religious beliefs and discourse to their original home, centered on the life of the community of believers.

Religion as a Wittgensteinian Language Game

Is religion discourse a language game? Or maybe an axiomatic system? How can we combine Wittgenstein's idea of a language game and studies on religion made by polish logician, Josef Bochenski? And what it means for the contemporary philosophy of religion? I present my dissertation written in Jesuit University in Krakow, under the supervision of Piotr Sikora PhD.