Real Modern Freedom (original) (raw)

THE MACHIAVELLIAN CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AND THE BEGINNING OF A REPUBLICAN ORDER

Brolly. Journal of Social Sciences , 2019

In the essay “What is Freedom?”, Hannah Arendt argues that freedom is the meaning, the “raison d’être” of politics and that political life from which it is absent is meaningless (Arendt 1977, 161). Hardly anyone denies the importance of freedom for any human or political society. It is no novelty either that freedom is a highly contested conception, the meaning of which is bound up with numerous controversies and disagreements. Yet, it is customary to distinguish between the “negative” and “positive” concepts of liberty in accordance with the dualistic framework presented by Isaiah Berlin in 1969. Notwithstanding its popularity, this categorization is at very least problematic. This paper elaborates on the Machiavellian understanding of freedom, which arguably cannot fit in Berlin’s categorization. Besides, it draws parallels with Hanna Arendt’s understanding of political freedom and argues that the complexity of her conception challenges the validity of Berlin’s framework.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY AND 'RATIONAL FREEDOM' -IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

Chapter 9 of the PhD thesis Marx and Rational Freedom by Dr Peter Critchley This chapter builds upon this presentation of Marx to criticise contemporary democratic, liberal and communitarian theory. The first section argues that the claims made by contemporary democratic theorists to have gone beyond Marx are misleading, remaining aspirational rather than becoming actual. None of the various alternative construals of democratisation in contemporary perspectives are persuasive in the context of the state and capital as inherently anti-democratic blocks of centralised, monopolised power, particularly given the 'erasing' of liberal society by contemporary corporate capitalism (McDermott 1991:13/4). The contemporary emphasis upon the institutional separation of the state from civil society as a condition of democracy will be shown to be mistaken, reintroducing the public-private dualism and reinforcing the state as the unitary public. Purportedly novel concepts thus unravel as the antinomies at the heart of the 'rational' tradition are reinstated, rendering democracy thin and attenuated. In the second section, Marx's communism as a 'true' public life is employed to resolve the central issues in the liberal-communitarian debate. This section critically evaluates communitarian attempts to furnish liberalism with a more historically and socially sensitive basis than that available in individualist and neutralist perspectives. The argument is that although the various communitarian approaches move in the right direction in recognising that the moral priority of the individual requires a positive moral vision of community, embracing conceptions of human flourishing and of the good life, communitarian perspectives nevertheless fit the contours of the modern liberal division of social space between public and private. In contrast, Marx has been shown in this thesis to have challenged this dualistic framework as a condition of 'true' individuality and community, developing a more complex, socio-relational conception of the conditions and contexts of human well being than is possible on liberal premises, individualist or communitarian.

REASON, FREEDOM AND MODERNITY vol 1 Democratic Theory

"Volume 1 DEMOCRATIC THEORY The argument will consider the work of a number of postmarxist democratic theorists in order to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of the state-civil society dualism at the heart of Marx’s critical project. The common theme uniting contemporary radical, democratic and liberal thinkers is the need to ensure the institutional separation of the state from civil society. Contemporary liberal and democratic works are characterised by an emphasis upon pluralism, the necessity for the state, the delimitation of the state power in the interests of individual liberty, and an overall hostility towards attempts to replace representative democracy by direct democracy. The overemphasis upon institutional separation as a condition of democracy is shown to be mistaken. Instead, democracy is shown to be capable of being achieved only as the result of a singular process in which the power of control alienated to the state and capital is practically reappropriated and reorganised by society as a social power subject to conscious democratic control within everyday life. Power is restored to human proportion and dimension. The faith that democratic theorists place in the state codification of rights is thereby rendered problematical. Individuals capable of exercising power in their everyday life no longer require the protection of rights."

Freedom and the Imaginary Dimension of Society

the Iranian Yearbook of Phenomenology

The notion of 'freedom' has gained an emblematic character in contemporary political discourse. It is, commonly, viewed as the central value and political goal of modern societies. Similarly, human rights documents conceive of freedom as their founding principle with universal validity. In contradistinction to this prevalent approach to freedom, this paper aims to demonstrate that freedom is, primarily, a political signifier with social-historical variability. One cannot, therefore, simply and uncritically assume that freedom has (or should have) universal validity or transhistorical significance. In the first section of this paper, the structure of the contemporary liberal discourse on freedom is discussed and called into question. In light of Arendt's interpretation of freedom and through her analysis of the public domain, I reflect on the social-historical variability of the meaning of freedom and its inextricable nexus with a particular form of society. In the second section and drawing on Castoriadis, the notion of 'freedom' is approached in view of human signifying practices and imaginary dimension of society. This examination reveals in what way freedom––in the sense of a central social imaginary signification––contributes to the institution of an autonomous mode of society and determines the affective disposition and intentional vector of its inhabitants.

Pre-Freedom as an Obstacle for Political Freedom

It is no wonder then that the term " freedom " was firs t and foremost attached in the ancient w orld to the distinction between slaves and free persons. As fo r Greeks, to be free often indicated not to be a slave or, in other words, not to be constrained by the conditions o f slavery. This was the most frequent meaning o f the word even in A risto tle ' s Politics: when A risto tle used the word " free, " he usually employed it in the sense o f the opposite to being a slave.1 On the other hand, in the modem context, although, the concept o f liberty is wide and indeterminate, and its very indeterminacy is part o f our understanding o f the term, at least in one principle is common that is called being constrained as Thomas Hobbes believes that freedom is absence o f obstacle in a material perspective.2 Therefore, tw o m ajor things can be said about the place o f libe rty in respect o f solution. F irstly, some scientists lik e Plato believe that slavery is a natural course. Thus there has been no solution to free slaves. As Plato wished to found his city on the principles o f justice and virtue, not a free c ity. Secondly, the early modern period was the՜ moment at which the value o f lib e rty significantly increased. As some scientists like Locke and Rousseau, th eir works were often led in defense o f liberty against p o litica l and social authorities. However, the form o f p olitical regime and position o f p o litic a l authorities can be a big obstacle fo r freedom; the a ll obstacles fo r freedom can not be relevant to p olitical systems. Therefore, it has to be considerable other issues like the pre-freedom that can be a major problem fo r freedom. By the virtue o f this view the paper w ill set a new notion. Political freedom: In the fie ld o f political philosophy, a vast literature has already emerged about Political freedom that is known as a verity o f conceptions lik e negative freedom, positive freedom, internal freedom, external freedom and so on. (See,

Three Paradigms of Modern Freedom

European Journal of Political Theory, 2009

Freedom occupies centre stage among the fields that went through various realignments due to 'the critique of the subject' and the keener perception of contingency in 20 th century thought. In this refiguring of freedom, attention has tended so far to focus on the work of individual thinkers such as the later Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty. But there is little awareness that a whole new scheme of thought has taken shape over time, cohering around a shared nexus of premises and responses to particular stakes.

REASON, FREEDOM AND MODERNITY vol 8 Political Structures

These final two volumes (8 and 9) seek to tie together the themes of true democracy, social control and self-mediation, affirmative materialism, community and communist individuality within a conception of commune democracy. This volume defends Marx’s early definition of ‘true democracy’ as entailing the dissolution of the state and of (capitalistically organised, inegalitarian, unpluralist) civil society as a single process. The argument delineates Marx's definition of democratisation, seeking its realisation outside of and against the abstract form of the state. This is where the conception of the proletarian public sphere (or spheres) becomes important and its absence in socialist theory and practice becomes evident. Such a notion entails not the end of politics but its realisation in the everyday affairs of the demos within a conception of self-government. Making a distinction between the state and government, it is possible to develop the anti-statist character of democracy without thereby being committed to an antipolitical stance. By recognising plural identities and enabling participation the notion of the communist public sphere comes into its own as a political society.

Political Freedom Cannot Be a Single Freedom

Introduction: Freedom in general may be the word familiar to most, but it is a concept still misunderstood and misused at a time, when dictators, single-party regimes, military coup leaders and so forth alike assert popular support by claiming the mantle of some concepts like democracy, freedom, etc. Yet the idea of freedom has prevailed through a long and turbulent history in practice and theory as well. It is no wonder then that the term " freedorh " was first and foremost attached in the ancient world to the distinction between slaves and free persons. As for Greeks, to be free often indicates not to be a slave or, in other words, not to be constrained by the conditions of slavery. This is the most frequent meaning of the word even in Aristotle's Politics: when Aristotle used the word " free, " he usually employed it in the sense of the opposite to being a slave.1 On the other hand, in the modem context, although, the concept of liberty is wide and indeterminate, and its very indeterminacy is part of our understanding of the term, at least in one principle is common that is called being constrained as Thomas Hobbes believes that freedom is absence of obstacle in a material perspective. Although the history of freedom concept may be helpful to perceive the concept of freedom in different terms, writer, in this paper, attempt to analyze the term in another view externally and internally, not historically. Based on this view, to better understand the concept of freedom in general and the concept of political freedom in particular, it seems the division of political freedom in two different concepts in area of political philosophy can be helpful. In the course of describing, developing, and clarifying such freedom in the political sense it is necessary to think about this issue deeply. To do this, we need to go back to a much more basic level of discussion of political freedom than is usual in discussions of the general issues of that. In other words, it can be vital to locate and consider the various elements of the freedom in the political sense and examine their interrelationships. In doing this it is important_to go beyond the conceptual boundaries imposed by automatic acceptance of traditional or usual assumptions. We need to explore whether other means of political freedom may exist or be developed in addition to the means of control relied upon internal and external concepts.