TRUMAN DOCTRINE (1946); DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (1991) & THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2002): THE MACKINDER & SPYKMAN DIALECTICS REVISITED (original) (raw)

The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine and Security Policy: From the Cold War to Current Perspectives

The United States military is currently viewed not only as the most formidable and well-equipped armed force in the world, but one with a complex political role as well. The union of political and military responsibilities in light of U.S. security might seem obvious given recent events such as the Persian Gulf War, the Somalia operation and the restoration to power of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti. However, the embodiment of a highly skilled military within a carefully designed, politically flexible security framework is a comparatively new development in the U.S. The road to this accomplishment was long and difficult, and included thoroughgoing reform of U.S. military doctrine and security policy in the 1970s and 80s. By the time change had been fully instituted in the early 1990s, the international environment was changing rapidly, and evaluation of the framework was again necessary.

The Disputed Importance of Process in the Making of American Grand Strategy, 2009

Orbis, 2010

One of the recurring themes in the academic and policy literatures discussing American grand strategy is the importance of the strategy-making process. Often times, scholars and former practitioners alike deplore the lack of a more coherent and disciplined intra-governmental decision-making process. The adjective ''dysfunctional'' is a perennial favorite among critics of the making of U.S. grand strategy, and there is a strong tendency to draw a causal link between a failure of ''process'' and a failure of strategy. In other words, poor strategic decisions (or, to be more precise, decisions whose results in retrospect appear to have fallen short of initial expectations) are often at least partially blamed on the lack of a more elaborate process. Consequently, a small cottage industry of think tank reports, Congressionally-mandated commissions, and policy-oriented research is devoted to offering periodic recommendations on how to improve the organizational structure of the national-security making apparatus so as to facilitate the development of more successful strategies. 1 Shortly before joining the Obama administration, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, one of her senior aides, warned that ''it is both remarkable and disturbing that the United States has no truly effective strategic planning process for national security.. . [and that] there is no integrated planning process from which to derive the strategic guidance necessary to protect national interests and achieve U.S. objectives.'' 2 Such criticisms of U.S. strategy-making have a long Review Essays 1 For a few recent examples, see Michèle A.

The US geopolitical code and its global objectives during the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency

http://www.penseejournal.com/archive/index.php/?volume=76&issue=3, 2014

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the geopolitical code and global objectives of the United States in the context of its efforts of preserve its world leadership position in the post-Cold War era. To examine this relationship, the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency has been selected as a notable period during which the US geopolitical code and that country’s actions, in particular prosecution of the Iraq War, were redefined. Modelski’s long cycles are applied to analyze the US geopolitical position within the international system, as well as to understand more about its desire to continue its world leadership. Geo-economics as a recent concept is also used to help analyze the US geopolitical code and the intentions behind its foreign policy. The resultant analysis suggests the US geopolitical culture, and as a result that state’s geopolitical code, prescribes the necessity for the US to project the Iraq War and control the Persian Gulf in order to continue its world leadership position. It would be done by defining a global threat and also implementing a worldwide response to that threat, and thus, the ‘War on terror’. Keywords: Long Cycles of world leadership, Geo-economics, US geopolitical code, US world leadership, George W. Bush’s presidency, Iraq War

Grand Strategies and Security of the United States

Since 1823, United States have followed three grand strategies. These three strategies, which include Continentalism (1823-1945), Realist Internationalism (1945-1991) and Liberal Internationalism (1991-2001), were used to provide security against external threats based on the existent definition of enemy and threat from 1823 to 11th September 2001. Events of September 11th affected the main assumptions of the strategies were followed by United States previously. The article is to explain the mentioned strategies and the changes in their assumptions.

How to Last Alone at the Top: US Strategic Planning for the Unipolar Era

Journal of Strategic Studies, 2011

This article investigates how key actors within the US defence policy community realigned their interests to forge a new consensus on the redirection of US defence strategy following the ‘peace shock’ they faced with the collapse of bipolarity. This consensus centred on the idea that achieving US security in the ‘age of uncertainty’ demanded overwhelming US military power, which was widely interpreted as necessitating military capabilities to fight multiple major theatre wars simultaneously against regional ‘Third World’ adversaries. This helped to preserve many of the principal pillars of US Cold War defence policy through deflecting calls for more radical organisational changes and deeper cuts to defence budgets.