Hilary Putnam on the End(s) of Argument (original) (raw)
Related papers
Putnam, Truth, and Informal Logic
Philosophica, 2002
The discourse of Argumentation Theory, like every other vital philosophical discussion, can appear from a distance to be a cacophony of different voices, with every single one speaking at cross-purposes to each and every other. A closer inspection reveals identifiable fault lines running through the field separating some voices from others -the rhetoricians from the dialecticians, for example, and both of them from the logicians -but still not enough organization to make all that noise into a symphony. It would seem a foolish optimism to think that what is necessary is the addition of yet another voice. However, when the voice belongs to Hilary Putnam, philosophically good things happen.
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 2000
"Putnam, Pragmatism, and Dewey." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society (Winter 2000). Recent writings by Hilary Putnam indicate the seriousness with which he has moved toward pragmatism. Putnam has not only characterized his own position as similar to pragmatism, he has written a number of essays presenting the views of the classical pragmatists, especially James, Dewey, and Peirce. "Putnam, Pragmatism, and Dewey" examines fundamental problems with Putnam's recent efforts, especially as they pertain to Dewey's epistemology.
Self-refutations and much more: the dialectical thinking of Hilary Putnam
2001
In the following discussion, I examine what constitutes the dialectical strain in Putnam’s thought. As part of this examination, I consider Putnam’s (1981) criticism of the fact/value dichotomy. I compare this criticism to Putnam’s analysis of the metaphysical realist’s position, a position which has occupied Putnam’s thinking more than any other philosophical stance. I describe how Putnam pursues a chargeof self-refutation against the metaphysical realist and against the proponent of a fact/value dichotomy, a charge which assumes dialectical significance. So it is that the self-refuting nature of these positions is linked to their unintelligibility. My conclusion relates Putnam’s dialectical project to his wider philosophical ambitions, ambitions which are influenced in large part by Wittgensteinian considerations.
Metaphilosophy, 2008
Though in his two most recent books, Hilary Putnam uses the technical language of Analytic philosophy to make his points, he expresses, through it, a strong humanistic perspective. On a battleground occupied largely by realists and antirealists of varying stripes, Putnam tries to establish the integrity of a form of realism that is durable without being rigid and carries with it the best traits of good common sense. By doing so, he does indeed try to put forward his own balanced, reasonable and down-to-earth view of human intelligence. But, moreover, I think he wishes to encourage a particular kind of discourse in philosophy, one that bears the traits of balance, perspective and sanity while, at the same time, encouraging pluralistic diversity. He does not take such discourse for granted either in philosophy or in the world at large. As he declares in his Introductory Remarks to Pragmatism, it is an "open question whether an enlightened society can avoid a corrosive moral scepticism without tumbling back into moral authoritarianism." 1 The urge of these recent works is to develop a context for philosophical dialogue through which one can steer away from rigid ideological extremes. In philosophy, the template for such discourse is the discussion of Realism. But the range and implication of Putnam's work is far greater, as it was for John Dewey, and the interest in the melioristic implications of Pragmatism hold for Putnam as strongly as they do for Dewey. Endowing metaphysical discussion with reasonableness and balance, Putnam hopes to encourage it in other forms of human communication. 2 © Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2001 1 Pragmatism, 2. 2 "For there is, God knows, irresponsibility enough in the world, including irresponsibility masquerading as responsibility, and it belongs to the vocation of the thinker, now as always, to try to teach the difference between the two" (Threefold Cord, 4).
Hilary Putnam y la nostalgia del pragmatismo (English version)
Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica., 2018
The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the relationship between Hilary Putnam and pragmatism. In the first and second sections I comment on Putnam's philosophical shift from " orthodox " analytic philosophy to " neopragmatism, " and take a look at his controversy with Richard Rorty concerning the meaning of pragmatism. The third section addresses Putnam and Rorty's rejection of the Peircean definition of truth as a key issue to account for the differences between neopragmatist philosophers and classic pragmatists. The final section draws some conclusions from the previous discussion as to the " narrative " of contemporary pragmatism.
The Many Faces of Objectivity: A Progressive View of Putnam's Philosophy
Análisis, vol. 5 no. 1, 2018
In this paper I present a positive progressive picture of Putnam's philosophy. According to this way of seeing things, Putnam is a normative cartographer of our linguistic practices who has over time refined his understanding of the concepts of truth and verification and their complex relationship from discourse to discourse. Looked at in this way Putnam is primarily a philosopher of objective normativity, who explores the various conceptions of objectivity with which we operate as well as resisting the excesses of both metaphysics and skepticism which do violence to our ordinary and scientific practices. However, Putnam also sees himself as a philosopher of 'reality' focused on " the realism issue " , a metaphysically inflationary way of thinking that, I argue, stands in the way of his deepest insights.
Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
I discuss Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. i begin by comparing Putnam’s 1971 Philosophy of Logic with Quine’s homonymous book. Next, Putnam’s changing views on modality are surveyed, moving from the modal pre-formal to the de-modalized formal characterization of logical validity. Section three suggests a complementary view of Platonism and modalism underlying different stages of a dynamic mathematical practice. The final section argues for the pervasive platonistic conception of the working mathematician.