Reason , Society , and the Social Intuitionist Model (original) (raw)

Although Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) of moral judgment does not claim to be a defense of either rationalist or sentimentalist ideas of morality, because it does not seem to include much of a role for personal reasoning, many rationalists have critiqued this model heavily. Specifically, the present paper explores critiques made by Cordelia Fine in 2006, and David Pizarro and Paul Bloom in 2003. Responses by Haidt himself as well as Neil Levy are explored to make the argument that not only can Haidt’s model withstand these critiques, but also suggests that the SIM can be used to defend either a rationalist or a sentimentalist moral position. Further merits of the SIM are also explored, in particular its ideas about social interaction as a key part of moral judgment making, as these social links seem to be both significant and unique to the SIM. While philosophers have traditionally looked at morality (and indeed, psychology as a whole) as fairly individual, it is ...