Fictional and Aesthetic Objects: Meinong's Point of View (original) (raw)
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In formal, logico-semantic terms, the concept of an object, individual or thing is widely thought to be exhaustive. Whatever we may say or think – it is supposed – our thought or talk is always thought or talk of objects. Here, I briefly sketch out and defend a rival view: like that of a property, the concept of an object is best understood in terms of that which it excludes. Object-concepts correspond to count nouns; but count nouns are just one of two great categories of nouns, the other being that of non-count nouns. Both count nouns, and the concept of an object, are inseparable from reference and identity – but non-count nouns are not; and they are not a vehicle for thought or talk of objects in the first place.
Objects as Intentional and Real
1991
In a recent paper, G. Küng has maintained that in addition to what he considers the three standard theories concerning the relationship between an intentional and a "corresponding" real object, a case might be made for a fourth. According to this new theory, the intentional and the real object are simply one and the same thing, in the sense that should it exist, the intentional object is the real object 1 . In this paper, I hope to show that Küng is right when he says that this theory is preferable to the others, because of its greater explanatory power and because it avoids the perplexities which those theories give rise to. I hold, however, that the thesis of the identity of the intentional and the real object stands in fundamental need of being completed to make it really convincing. Indeed, an objection to it immediately comes to mind: how is it possible for an intentional object -something apparently mental or subjective -to be identical with a real one, generally considered mind-independent or objective? I think that it is only through an appropriate ontological move that a definite answer to this problem may be provided. In actual fact, Küng attempts to support its version of the theory with a Meinongian ontology, according to which objects as such are beyond being and non-being 2 . It seems to me, however, that in dealing with the above problem, Küng does not employ such an ontology satisfactorily. But whether this is or not the case, I will hereafter try to show that the thesis of the identity of the intentional and the real object may be retained if we also attempt to outline an anti-realist ontology different from the ultra-realist doctrine of Meinong's -namely, an ontology of objects as basically objects of discourse.
The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects
Philosophy Compass, 2010
The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the 'obvious' sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the standard arguments against the existence of ordinary objects-including those based on problems with causal redundancy, parsimony, co-location, sorites arguments, and the special composition question. Section 2 goes on to address what it is about the contemporary approach to metaphysics that invites and sustains this kind of controversy, and helps make evident why debates about ordinary objects lead so readily to debates in metametaphysics about the nature of metaphysics itself.
CREATURES OF IMAGINATION AND BELIEF 1. Being and Existence
2015
Meinong is notorious for his|in the prevailing opinion: bizarre and clearly untenable|view on being and existence. Not only did he argue that there are things that do not exist, but on his view this has as a consequence for example that there is a certain nonexistent entity which can be referred to as \the present king of France", and in his theory of objects1 he actually went so far as to recognize impossible abstract entities like The Round Square. No wonder that this theory as a whole has few adherents today.2 However, because of Meinong’s notoriety, the very distinction between being and existence has come to share the bad reputation of his more extravagant ontological claims and is commonly labeled \Meinongian", even though Meinong was neither the rst nor the last philosopher to make it. It is really a very old and digni ed distinction, which has a tendency to recur in new versions as philosophical positions shift. Aristotle distinguished between dierent senses of the...
Are There Ideal Objects?: The Controversy Between Kotarbiński and Ingarden
2020
As is well known in his later philosophy Brentano rejected all entia rationis and maintained that only things exist. This thesis, known as "reism", was latter defended in the Polish branch of the Brentano School by Tadeusz Kotarbiński. To demonstrate the correctness of this thesis he had to show that there is no need to accept objects that are not things into our ontology. The rejection of ideal objects was in this respect crucial and he attempted to show that these are in fact contradictory, and thus unable to exist. The young Roman Ingarden was convinced that we cannot completely get rid of ideal objects. Consequently in a paper of 1923 he tried to show that Kotarbiński's arguments could be refuted. This text is devoted to the study of this controversy. Our aim is to show, on the one hand, that it forced Ingarden to reformulate the theory of intentionality inherited from Brentano and, on the other hand, that this reformulation would become satisfactory only with the thesis of the "doublesidedness" of purely intentional objects in 1937. Keywords Tadeusz Kotarbinski • Roman Ingarden • Franz Brentano • Ontology Ideal objects • General objects • Paraphrase Brentano's philosophical methodology and doctrine was introduced at the end of the nineteenth century in Poland by Kazimierz Twardowski-this was the beginning of the so-called Lvov-Warsaw School. In this respect his Habilitation thesis On the Content and Object of Presentations (1894) played a major role. Apart from the famous distinction between the content and the object of a presentation and the general theory of objects, this book also dealt with the problem of general presentations, and thus with their objectual correlates: general objects. According to Ingarden, from this point of view, Twardowski's thesis was
A Meinongian minefield? The dangerous implications of nonexistent objects
Human Affairs, 2012
Alexius Meinong advocated a bold new theory of nonexistent objects, where we could gain knowledge and assert true claims of things that did not exist. While the theory has merit in interpreting sentences and solving puzzles, it unfortunately paves the way for contradictions. As Bertrand Russell argued, impossible objects, such as the round square, would have conflicting properties. Meinong and his proponents had a solution to that charge, posing genuine and non-genuine versions of the Law of Non-Contradiction. No doubt, they had a clever response, but it may not adequately address Russell’s concern. Moreover, as I argue, genuine contradictions are inherent to the set of all nonexistent objects. And such contradictions lead to even further absurdities, for example, that nonexistent objects have and lack every property. Unfortunately, such implications of the theory make it too treacherous to adopt.