Lobbyists before the US Supreme Court (original) (raw)
Related papers
Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S. Supreme Court
American Politics Research, 2009
Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law.
Friends of the Circuits: Interest Group Influence on Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals*
Social Science Quarterly, 2010
Objective. Though there is an extensive literature focused on the participation and efficacy of interest group amici curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court, there is little rigorous analysis of amici curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Here, we systematically analyze the influence of amicus curiae briefs on U.S. Court of Appeals decision making to provide insights regarding both judicial decision making and the efficacy of interest groups. Methods. We use a probit model to capture influences on appellant success in the courts of appeals from 1997-2002. Results. We find that amicus briefs filed in support of the appellant enhance the likelihood of that litigant's probability of success, but that amicus briefs filed in support of the appellee have no effect on litigation outcomes. Conclusion. Amici can help level the playing field between appellants and appellees by serving to counter the propensity to affirm in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Interest groups are everywhere in U.S. politics (Bentley, 1908) and they are armed with a plethora of tools for the pursuit of their goals in a host of venues. They are, to borrow from Schattschneider (1960), ready, willing, and able to redefine the scope of the conflict as necessary in furtherance of their objectives. Notwithstanding the image and the myth of the judiciary as
Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the US Supreme Court Revisited
2012
Abstract: We reevaluate the influence of amici curiae on the US Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari. Using expanded data on four representative Court terms, we find that at the same time that the number of amicus filings on certiorari have grown--and perhaps owing to it--the influence of those briefs on the probability of the Court granting certiorari has steadily declined between 1968 and 2007.
The Determinants of the Number of Amicus Briefs Filed Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–2001
Justice System Journal, The
Amicus curiae activity represents the primary form of democratic input into the federal judi ciary. We add to the scholarly understanding of this most important means of interest-group activity by examining the factors that influence the number of amicus curiae briefs filed in a case before the U.S. Supreme Court. We employ a theoretical framework that I) focuses on the desire of groups to achieve long-lasting policy goals, 2) addresses the low-information envi ronment at the Court, and 3) recognizes the role of uncertainty in influencing group behav ior. Using data from 1953 to 2001, we examine how these case-and Court-specific factors lead to a change in the number of amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court. We find varying degrees of support for each of the three frameworks, thereby providing insight into why cer tain cases attract more interest-group amicus activity than others.
Interest Group Participation, Competition, and Conflict in the US Supreme Court
Law & Social Inquiry, 2007
The authors extend their thanks to Tom Brunell, Wendy Martinek, and the anonymous reviewers for their lucid comments and critiques of earlier versions of this article, and Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill for generously sharing their data with us. Collins thanks the National Science Foundation for its financial support under grant SES-0350416. Naturally, we assume all responsibility for errors in fact and/or judgment. A previous version of this article was awarded the 2003 CQ Press Award from the Law and Courts section of the American Political Science Association. LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 956 1. In addition to these methods of participation in the judiciary, groups may also pursue planned litigation campaigns (e.g., Wasby 1995), act as intervenors (e.g., Lowman 1992), and seek to influence the Court by authoring law review articles favorable to their causes (e.g., Epstein 1985). 2. We use the term "organized interests" in a very broad sense. Included are businesses, trade and labor organizations, public interest law firms, governments, unions, and the like (Caldeira and Wright 1990). As such, we adopt Schlozman and Tierney's (1986, 11) view that organized interests are a "variety of organizations that seek joint ends through political action."
Deriving Interest Group Ideology from Participation on Amicus Curiae Briefs
American Review of Politics, 2011
Many interest groups are known to be ideological actors. Some interest groups self-identify as liberal, progressive, or conservative, while others arguably possess ideologies which can be inferred from their policy platforms, rhetoric, or allies. To date, few attempts have been made to identify and quantify interest group ideology. This paper attempts to demonstrate interest group ideology by recovering one- and two-dimensional ideological mappings from group participation as amici curiae in cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court from 1999-2003. The results demonstrate that groups patterns of cooperation and disagreement across cases and years generate a valid and reliable ideological mapping and provides some initial evidence of ideological structuring of lobbying coalitions in amicus briefs.
Justice System Journal, 2014
Past research indicates that amicus briefs influence the Supreme Court's decision to issue a writ of certiorari, however we know relatively little about the reasons that lead interest groups to file such briefs. We seek to explain how organized interests make decisions about whether or not to file amicus curiae briefs during case selection, and examine the factors that influence the total number of amicus briefs filed in each case. We find that certain factors influence amicus activity during this early stage of decision-making including the presence of the solicitor general as amicus curiae, case salience, and the issue areas involved in litigation.
The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content
Social Science Research Network, 2013
We address fundamental questions about the ability of interest groups to shape public policy by examining the influence of amicus curiae briefs on U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion content. We argue that the justices will incorporate language from amicus briefs into their opinions based on the extent to which the amicus briefs contribute to their ability to make effective law and policy. Using plagiarism detection software and other forms of computer assisted content analysis, we find that the justices adopt language from amicus briefs based primarily on the quality of the brief 's argument, the level of repetition in the brief, the ideological position advocated in the brief, and the identity of the amicus. These results add fresh insight into how interest groups influence the development of federal law by the Supreme Court. A previous version of this research was presented at the 2013 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. We are grateful to participants on that panel, especially Lee Epstein, Tim Johnson, Richard Posner, Amy Steigerwalt, and Art Ward, for their thoughtful comments on this project. We also extend our thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their very useful feedback.