Does the neuro - theological model promote a atheistic bias - Mathew Gough 2013 (original) (raw)

Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience

Religious studies, 2003

In this paper, I consider V. S. Ramachandran's in principle agnosticism concerning whether neurological studies of religious experience can be taken as support for the claim that God really does communicate with people during religious experiences. Contra Ramachandran, I argue that it is by no means obvious that agnosticism is the proper scientific attitude to adopt in relation to this claim. I go on to show how the questions of whether it is (a) a scientifically testable claim and (b) a plausible hypothesis serve to open up some important philosophical issues concerning interpretive backgrounds that are presupposed in the assessment of scientific hypotheses. More specifically, I argue that 'naturalism' or 'scientific objectivism' in its various forms is not simply a neutral or default methodological backdrop for empirical inquiry but involves acceptance of a specific ontology, which functions as an implicit and unargued constitutive commitment. Hence these neurological studies can be employed as a lever with which to disclose something of the ways in which different frameworks of interpretation, both theistic and atheistic, serve to differently structure and give meaning to empirical findings.

Neurological Approaches to Religion: An Assessment of Four New Publications

Reviews in Religion & Theology, 2008

Religion may be studied from several different angles, and is no longer private territory of theology or religious studies. It has become a copious topic for human and social sciences in the twentieth century; now is the turn of biological and cognitive sciences, applying different methodologies and their own approaches.

The metaphysical mind in its physical environment: Religious implications of neuroscience

HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies, 2002

that the phenomenon of religion and religious experience are more than mere brain functions. The place of religion and the continued importance of religion and religious experience are confirmed. The metaphysical mind in its physical environment 1012 HTS 58(3) 2002 cluster of disciplines dealing with mental functioning: motor control, perception, recognition, language, memory and reasoning. 2 One branch of cognitive science deals with computer modelling of mental processes (Murphy 1998:14). Other important fields of study include behavioural neuroscience which tries to understand the neurobiological substrates of behaviour while cognitive psychology deals, among other things, with human learning and memory. Arbib (1999:81) distinguishes brain talk, mind talk and spirit talk. Brain talk speaks of lesion data, anatomy, neurophysiology and neurochemistry. Mind talk speaks of intention, action, perception, consciousness, and responsibility. Together they are regarded as neuroscience embedded within cognitive science. Spirit talk is construed as mind talk or God talk, or as something that regards our identity as being rooted in our relation with God. Although these approaches can be distinguished, they cannot be separated. Mind-brain sciences must take the whole person in its environment and different contexts into account to avoid reductionism. This seems to be an unattainable task. Such is the nature of complex systems, and the human person embodies ultimate biological complexity. 3 However, neuroscientific models for religious experience abound and challenge theologians to respond. HTS 58(3) 2002

Challenges Facing the Neurological Study of Religious Behavior, Belief, and Experience

Method & Theory in the Study of …, 2008

Th e neurological study of religious behavior, belief, and experience faces many challenges related to research conception, experimental design, and interpretation of results. Some of these problems are common to other types of neurological study of behavioral and cognitive phenomena. Others are distinctive to the specifically religious domain of behavior, belief, and experience. Th is paper discusses eight of these problems and three key strategic principles for mitigating them. It then proposes an eight-step framework for research into the neurology of religious behavior, belief, and experience that implements the three strategic principles and addresses all eight of the problems.

Evolutionary Neurotheology and the Varieties of Religious Experience ( Extended Version ) *

2002

My goal is to outline an evolutionary neuropsychological foundation for spiritual and religious experiences. Central to this account are concepts from archetypal psychology, which, on the one hand, explain the structure of common religious experiences, but, on the other, are grounded in ethology and evolutionary biology. From this it follows that certain religious phenomena are objective, in that they are empirical, stable, and public. As a consequence, certain theological claims can be objectively confirmed or refuted. However, it would be a mistake to assume that this approach reduces religious experiences to the “merely psychological” or considers them inessential epiphenomena in a materialist universe. On the contrary, I will show that it demonstrates the compatibility and even inevitability of transcendental religious experience—and its crucial importance—to biological beings such as ourselves. (Along the way I will advance some concrete hypotheses about the possible role of sp...

Searching for Neurobiological Foundations of Faith and Religion

Studia Humana

Considering that the brain is involved in human thinking, feeling and behaviour, we must also ask the question of whether finding neural correlates of religious experience is not just a matter of time. The questions ‘if’ and ‘how’ human brain responds to or generates religious experience capture the interest of researchers from various fields of science. Their joint efforts and scientific discourse lead to implementation of bold interdisciplinary research projects, with a far-reaching goal of explaining the mystery of faith and religion. Studies conducted at the meeting point of empirical and theological sciences raise controversies and criticism. Examples include the discussions on natural and theological experiments, collectively called neurotheology.

Philosophical Hazards in the Neuroscientific Study of Religion

The Neurology of Religion. Cambridge University Press, 2020

I am tasked with addressing philosophical hazards in the neuroscientific study of religion. As a philosopher concerned with the well-being of neuroscientists studying religion, I am inclined to begin with the philosophical hazards of philosophy. I am well aware of the extraordinary difficulties of both tasks, for the hazards are many and it is easy to miss the forest for the trees or the trees for the forest. Instead of focusing on one issue in great detail, I shall hang a number of warning signs around a forest of issues that identify various philosophical hazards which deserve particular caution when it comes to neuroscience and religion. Since I am aiming for breadth over depth, my brief remarks on each issue shall be synoptic, non-exhaustive, contentious and suggestive for additional consideration and reflection. To redress such deficits, I have provided references for further reading. The target of explanation for us is religion, the means by which it is to be investigated, studied, described and explained is by neuroscience. What hazards might a philosopher draw attention to here? My central claim is this: The most fundamental philosophical hazard for the neuroscientist studying religion to avoid vigilantly is the failure to appreciate adequately the unified and integrated whole that is religious, namely the human person. Human persons are religious, not their minds or brains. Neuroscience can only provide a partial explanation of religion insofar as the brain can only be but a partial – even if a sine qua non – factor in anything approximating a complete description and explanation of human persons, including those who are religious. Claims to explanatory comprehension that outstrip these limitations imperialistically exceed what is reasonable and true. The investigation of human persons and religion should be holistic and aim to illuminate, explain and integrate the vast multi-level interconnections to be found from subpersonal level attributes like molecules, genes, organelles, cells, organic systems (e.g. cardiovascular, immune, endocrine, neuronal and glial systems), organs, organisms, to the ways these causally and constitutionally enable but neither eliminate nor provide explanatory substitutes for the complex personal level psychosomatic, rational, social and historical factors that figure into the lives of human persons. The other hazards I shall introduce and discuss are the following: 1) Hazard of the Unreflective Conceptual Framework 2) Hazard of theoretical models of psychological discourse 3) Hazards of the mind–body and mental–physical dichotomies 4) Hazards of the Mindless Body 5) Hazards of the Private Mind 6) Mereological Fallacy 7) Hazard of the Disappearing Person 8) Hazards of Mind, Body, Self Reification 9) Hazards of Cartesian and Lockean Personal Identity 10) Hazard of Simplified and Hasty Mind–Body Positioning 11) Hazards of Crypto-Cartesian Consciousness 12) Hazard of Zombie Neuroscience 13) Hazard of causal monism 14) Hazard of extreme reductionism 15) Hazards of the Computational and Representational Theories of Mind 16) Hazard of scientism 17) Hazard of naturalised epistemology 18) Hazards of naturalised religion 19) Hazard of Numinous Neural Localisation 20) Hazards of Identifying Hazards

Neuroscience and Religion: Surveying the Field

Macmillan, 2016

Scientific and religious communities have long been at odds over scientific attempts to explain religious experience. Since the beginning of the modern era, a number of scientists interested in religion and spirituality have sought a rigorous understanding of how these types of experiences manifest themselves in the brain and in human behavior. According to this view, our deepest beliefs and most elevating experiences can be understood in scientific terms-in particular, in terms of neuroscience studying "brain anatomy, brain function, and brain chemistry" (Tiger and McGuire 2010, 113). Yet others doubt that science has a legitimate role in exploring the nature of religion or spirituality. From their perspective, scientists should not attempt to explain the ineffable at all, and they regard such efforts as a challenge to the values and experiences that they consider most personal and sacred. Aldous Huxley, one of the most prophetic science fiction authors of his generation, wrote in 1958, "That men and women can, by physical and chemical means, transcend themselves in a genuinely spiritual way… seems rather shocking. But, after all, the drug or the physical exercise is not the cause of the spiritual experience; it is only its occasion." As a seasoned explorer of the boundary between chemistry and spirituality, Huxley believed that the "chemical means" of spiritual experience do not invalidate the psychological value of the state itself. In that case, efforts to better understand those means is especially important for the scientific study of those experiences. It should be possible to undertake a scientific approach to religious and spiritual experience without reducing those experiences strictly to chemical reactions. And even if such reductionism were possible, other disciplines would likely still provide a valuable grammar for describing and understanding various aspects of religion and spirituality. At the same time, any social, cultural, or personal conception of the divine or of a higher power 277 COPYRIGHT 2017 Macmillan Reference USA, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210

Brain Science and the Biology of Belief: A Theological Response

Zygon?, 2003

Exploration of brain pathways involved in religious experience has been the focus of research by Andrew Newberg and colleagues. Although the import of this work sheds new light on the human capacity to experience divine reality, the theological implications drawn from this research are vague and lack an appropriate methodology to provide critical distinctions. This paper offers a theological response to Newberg's work by highlighting several aspects of this research including the relationship between theological judgments and empirical observations, the uniqueness of human transcendence, and the appropriateness of measuring mystical experience.