“The man is in God”. Is Hegel really Atheist? Misunderstanding in the Hegelian school: C . F. Göschel, in: Hegel-Jahrbuch (2015), pp. 85-88. (original) (raw)
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The Heythrop Journal, 1980
In this article I propose to consider the two points upon which the force of the charge of atheism rests, namely, Hegel's understanding of the relation of finite and infinite, and the respective positions of religion and philosophy in the Hegelian system. Obviously, these two 'points' encompass the entire dialectic; finite is a moment in the infinite dialectical whole, philosophy is the Aufhebung of religion. Then I shall briefly consider the charges of Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach, and turn back to Hegel and examine how he can best be defended, concerning myself in particular with the preface and introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit' and the closing sections of the Encyclopaedia.2 A final sharpening of the issues will be attempted through a consideration of one modern exchange of views.3 In the second part of the paper I will broaden out the discussion, using a reading of Tillich's essay 'On the Two Types of Philosophy of Religi~n'.~ With this as a background, I will attempt to make a case for Hegel, drawing out some of the implications of his general approach for modem systematic theology.
God, Incarnation, and Metaphysics in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion
Sophia, 2014
In this paper, I draw upon the ‘post-Kantian’ reading of Hegel to examine the consequences Hegel’s idea of God has for understanding his metaphysics. In particular, I apply Hegel’s ‘recognition-theoretic’ approach to his theology. Within the context of this analysis, I focus especially on the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ. First, I argue that Hegel’s philosophy of religion employs a distinctive notion of sacrifice (kenotic sacrifice). Here, sacrifice is conceived as a giving up something of oneself to ‘make room’ for the other. Second, I argue that the idea of kenotic sacrifice plays a fundamental role in Hegel’s account of Christ. Third, I conclude by sketching some of the consequences of Hegel’s idea of a God who renounces his own divinity for an idealistically conceived metaphysics. My main thesis is that the notion of incarnation is conceived by Hegel as the expression of a spirit that advances only insofar as it is willing to withdraw and make room for the other. A kenotic reading of the Hegelian notion of the incarnation is also useful in terms of a clarification of the dispute between ‘left Hegelians’ and ‘right Hegelians’ concerning the status of the idea of God in Hegel’s philosophy.
This paper examines Hegel's claim that philosophy " has no other object than God " as a claim about the essentiality of the idea of God to philosophy. on this idealist interpretation, even atheistic philosophies would presuppose rationally evaluable ideas of God, despite denials of the existence of anything corresponding to those ideas. This interpretation is then applied to Hegel's version of idealism in relation to those of two predecessors, leibniz and Kant. Hegel criticizes the idea of the Christian God present within his predecessors in terms of his own heterodox reading of the Trinity in order to resolve a paradox affecting them – the " paradox of perspectivism " .
God and the Self in Hegel: Beyond Subjectivism
God and the Self in Hegel proposes a reconstruction of Hegel’s conception of God and analyzes the significance of this reading for Hegel’s idealistic metaphysics. Paolo Diego Bubbio argues that in Hegel’s view, subjectivism—the tenet that there is no underlying “true” reality that exists independently of the activity of the cognitive agent—can be avoided, and content can be restored to religion, only to the extent that God is understood in God’s relation to human beings, and human beings are understood in their relation to God. Focusing on traditional problems in theology and the philosophy of religion, such as the ontological argument for the existence of God, the Trinity, and the “death of God,” Bubbio shows the relevance of Hegel’s view of religion and God for his broader philosophical strategy. In this account, as a response to the fundamental Kantian challenge of how to conceive the mind-world relation without setting mind over and against the world, Hegel has found a way of overcoming subjectivism in both philosophy and religion.
Hegel and Religion: Avoiding Double Truth, Twice
Hegel Bulletin, 2012
When I was first studying Hegel, I encountered quite divergent readings of his views on religion. The teacher who first presented Hegel to me was a Jesuit, Quentin Lauer at Fordham University, who read Hegel as a Christian theologian providing a better metaphysical system for understanding the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. When I studied at Yale University, Kenley Dove read Hegel as the first thoroughly atheistic philosopher who presented the conditions of thought without reference to any foundational absolute being. Meanwhile, also at Yale, John Findlay read us a deeply Neo-Platonic Hegel who taught about absolute forms held in a cosmic mind. In giving my own reading, I want to talkabout the ways Hegel redefines both metaphysics and religion. I would like to approach these issues by way of the medieval controversy over double truth, which was a previous conflict between religion and science.In the thirteenth century, Aristotle's scientific and philosophical texts we...
In Philebus, Plato depicts Socrates and Protarchus (pages 24a to 26d) engaged in the question of how the finite is equated with the determined, and the infinite is presented as that which has no limits, as the undetermined. This discussion will be an explicit reference for Hegel both in his Shorter Logics and in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. In the former, Plato’s Philebus is used as a reference on the question of determination and actuality, as it is presented in §89 to §95 of the Doctrine of Being, the first part of the Hegelian treatment of Logics. Those paragraphs deal with the specific question of determinate being and here, Hegel affirms tow things: first, that the distinction between the finite and the infinite is a nullity; second, he criticizes the idea that, within the unity of the finite with the infinite, the latter remains as the negative aspect. However, Plato’s text is also explicitly quoted in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, specifically in the Lectures of 1824, in a section called “The Transition to the Speculative Standpoint of Religion”. What Hegel calls the “speculative standpoint”, is precisely the only point of view in which one can grasp the truth of religion, namely, the relation between God and men, that is, of the infinite and the finite. In addition to that, in the very same Lecture, Hegel defines the Incarnation of God [Menschwerdung Gottes] as the “speculative midpoint” of the Christian religion (HEGEL, 2007, v1 p. 245). Following this path, therefore, it is possible to argue that Hegel uses Plato’s Philebus again, in the Lectures, to expose what he calls the “speculative standpoint of religion” as the dialectics between the finite and the infinite within God’s own being. Here, the narrative on the Incarnation of God presented by Hegel is analysed as culminating point in the process of determination and actualization of the concept of God. The aim of this article is to explore the possible relations between those two uses in order to find a common Hegelian approach between logics and religion and, therefore, to explore a possible interpretation on the logics of the Incarnation of God.
Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2022
The paper examines the meaning of a Hegelian expression: “the ascension of the human spirit to God”, which was formulated in the philosopher’s 1829 summer course dedicated to the proofs of God’s existence. We argue that the Hegelian formula describes a double movement: the first one refers to the departure of thinking from the Phenomenon and its arrival to the Ideal, and the second one describes the opposite movement, in which thinking crosses the barrier between the Ideal and the Phenomenon. Keywords: Proofs of the God’s existence, Phenomenon, Ideal, Necessity, Accident.
Some Metaphysical Implications of Hegel's Theodicy
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2012
This paper examines Hegel’s claim that philosophy “has no other object than God” as a claim about the essentiality of the idea of God to philosophy. On this idealist interpretation, even atheistic philosophies would presuppose rationally evaluable ideas of God, despite denials of the existence of anything corresponding to those ideas. This interpretation is then applied to Hegel’s version of idealism in relation to those of two predecessors, Leibniz and Kant. Hegel criticizes the idea of the Christian God present within his predecessors in terms of his own heterodox reading of the Trinity in order to resolve a paradox affecting them – the “paradox of perspectivism”.