Reward-based Crowdfunding: The Role of Information Disclosure (original) (raw)
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In this paper, we investigate rewards-based crowdfunding as an innovative financing form for startups and firms. Based on game-theory models under asymmetric information, we test research hypotheses about the positive effects of two main campaign features: funding target and number of rewards. Furthermore, we examine how and when these characteristics are effective in attracting crowdfunders, by signaling high-quality projects (target) and by pricing according to backers’ preferences (rewards). Conditional process analysis is applied to a dataset of 1613 projects launched on the Spanish platform Verkami from 2015 to 2018. As expected, our study shows that market size is positively influenced by the target and the number of rewards, separately. Further analysis gives some interesting findings. Firstly, we find significant and positive mediating roles of social networks (in the relationship between target and market size) and of backers’ preferences (between rewards and market size). ...
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Technological Forecasting and Social Change
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Commitment vs. Flexibility in Information Disclosure: the Case of Kickstarter
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An important function of a crowdfunding platform is to reduce the asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and investors. But can the platform be trusted? Investors believe the platform only to the extent that it’s incentives align with their own. Using data from Kickstarter, a leading crowdfunding platform, I develop a statistical test confirming that platform’s incentives undermine credibility of its signals, propose regulations that would curb those incentives, and quantify their welfare consequences. These regulations allow the platform to commit to an information disclosure rule and lead to Pareto improvements. Finally, I show that the platform’s reputation could substitute for commitment and provide a rationale for why this does not occur
RESOLVING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY: SIGNALING, ENDORSEMENT, AND CROWDFUNDING SUCCESS
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This paper draws on information economics to examine when signals and endorsements obtained from multiple information sources enhance or diminish one another’s effects. We propose that signals through startup actions (use of media) and characteristics (crowdfunding experience) can mitigate information asymmetry concerns about project quality and founder credibility, enhancing the project’s likelihood of attaining funding. Further, we posit that while startup-originated signals offset each other’s effects, third party endorsements (sentiment expressed in backer comments) validate and complement startup-originated signals. Empirical analyses based on a comprehensive dataset of crowdfunding projects on the Kickstarter website during 2009-2015 confirm our predictions.
Information Asymmetry and Adverse Wealth Effects of Crowdfunding
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The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 in the U.S. expanded the capital markets so that entrepreneurs can appeal directly to non-traditional small crowd investors for investment funds. The final rules and forms of the JOBS Act became effective in May 16, 2016. Existing literature is thus relatively small but contains ample praises for expected positive consequences of the new crowdfunding laws for the capital markets and for the crowd in general but has only limited analysis on the prospect of adverse wealth effects of crowdfunding for the crowd investors. A limited number of existing studies have highlighted the prospect of a rise in opportunity for fraud as a consequence of information asymmetry between venture capital seekers and crowd investors. This study establishes a new and secondary form of adverse wealth effect of crowdfunding for the crowd in a setting that focuses on information asymmetry between non-accredited crowd investors and accredited traditional i...
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With crowdfunding, an entrepreneur raises external financing from a large audience (the "crowd"), in which each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of sophisticated investors. This article compares two forms of crowdfunding: entrepreneurs solicit individuals either to pre-order the product or to advance a fixed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profits (or equity). In either case, we assume that "crowdfunders" enjoy "community benefits" that increase their utility. Using a unified model, we show that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small compared with market size and prefers profit sharing otherwise. Our conclusions have implications for managerial decisions in the early development stage of firms, when the entrepreneur needs to build a community of individuals with whom he or she must interact. We also offer extensions on the impact of quality uncertainty and information asymmetry.
Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 2020
When traditional financial institutions faced difficulties in the task of assisting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) with capital allocations, crowdfunding can upsurge as an innovative and vibrant vehicle that can support and assist the activity of such MSME’s, by financing their activity and instrumenting the process of risk-sharing. Simultaneously with its enormous growth and popularity, crowdfunding is faced by several key challenges, one of biggest such challenges referring to the problem of information asymmetry that can exist between fundraisers and potential backers. Based on the signaling theory, a research taxonomy has been developed for a comparative analysis between China and the UK. This has been accomplished by retrieving secondary data from the following crowdfunding platforms: Dreamore (Chinese platform) and Crowdfunder (UK platform). The objective of the study is to investigate both the effect and the impact that signals (goal setting, project commen...
Signalling Strategy and Success of Crowdfunding Campaign
International Journal of Business and Society
Improving the funding results of crowdfunding campaigns is a pivotal point for entrepreneurs, investors, and platforms. Building upon previous research in the field of crowdfunding and signaling theory, we propose a logistic regression to identify the determinants of the success of 5228 KissKissBankBank crowdfunding. The main focus is on estimating the role of signalling opportunities provided to project initiators and funders in mitigating the harmful consequences of asymmetric information. Our main results reveal that, as expected, the success of crowdfunding campaigns is promoted by the signal of identity, patience, pointing, reciprocity, intention and interactivity. The ambition signal is a factor that hinders funding success. Contrary to our research hypotheses, the signal of reputation and social capital has a negative impact on the probability of crowdfunding projects' success. The findings provide not only empirical evidence to understanding the importance of the role of...