A political economy of accounting standard setting (original) (raw)

Lobbying in Accounting Standards Setting

Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 2015

The paper explores the effects of lobbying on accounting standards. The study investigates the determinants of lobbying and compares the lobbying activity with application to the FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158 and the IASB Statement of Intent issued in 1990. The research concludes that the major determinants of lobbying in the field of accounting standards are the size of lobbying corporations and the perceived effects of the regulations on the economic well-being of the enterprises. The analysis of the specific cases indicates that both firm-level, industry-level and country-level factors contribute to lobbying decisions across firms.

The political economy of International Accounting Standards (2006)

Review of International Political Economy, 2006

On 1 January 2005, all stock exchange listed companies in the European Union (EU) began using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) written by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This article argues that the IASB's introduction of fair value accounting reflects and reinforces changed relations of production in which the financial sector increasingly dominates the productive sector, nationally institutionalized economic systems are undermined, and new forms of economic appropriation are validated. As a private body, the IASB has been able to rapidly introduce the fair value paradigm with little public debate outside specialized financial circles. In contrast to more functionalist views, this article argues that accounting standards are inherently political. Accounting numbers provide some of the key economic anchors around which social relations are structured. Accounting techniques cannot be reduced to questions of efficiency since they set out to quantify and compare things which, by their very nature, are neither quantifiable nor directly comparable.

The hollow promise of an accounting standard setter

The hollow promise of an accounting standard setter Abstract Purpose -This paper applies a power framework to critically analyse the international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries. Design/methodology/approach -Publicly available data, including comment letters, annual reports, company websites, and IASC/IASB pronouncements, is used to make connections between the key plays involved in the international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries. Findings -Lukes' (1974) conception of power is used to explain the community of interests that developed between the IASC/IASB and extractive industries constituents. This community of interests is shown to have enabled the extractive industries to mobilise its power to paralyse the standard setting body and secure favourable regulation. While the politicisation of accounting standard setting is widely acknowledged, the revelation that economically dominant groups can covertly wield such power is a sobering one in the light of the worldwide promotion and adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. Originality/value -This paper contributes to understanding of the presence of power in the international accounting standard setting process and how it is mobilised by key constituents.

Regulatory competition among accounting standards within and across international boundaries

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2002

Most financial reporting jurisdictions across the world allow a local monopoly in financial reporting standards for publicly held corporations. In the United States, for example, the statutory authority over these standards is vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission, who delegates the task of writing standards to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, retaining an oversight function for itself. In some countries these standards are specified through statutes in varying levels of detail. Few countries permit their corporations to choose among two or more sets of competing standards; monopoly is the reigning norm. This paper examines regulatory competition as a model for writing and implementing corporate financial standards. Under this model, two or more approved standardsetting bodies are allowed to compete for the allegiance of the reporting entities. Each corporation can choose which of the two or more sets of competing standards it wishes to use in preparing its financial reports. Corporations must choose an entire set of standards in toto, clearly mark the reports with the set of standards used to prepare them, and pay a fee to the body who wrote the standards. We examine the consequences of such regulatory competition for the quality and efficiency of standards, quality of information provided to shareholders and other interested parties, and the efficiency of corporate governance and managerial actions. A debate on the merits of monopoly

Political Influences on Accounting Standards: A Discussion of Gaap & Ifrs

Accounting and Finance Studies

Accounting standards, as expressions of public policy, are not constantly impartial in that they inflict benefits on some individuals in society to the disadvantage of others. This has been as a result of the power play between the US GAAP and the proponents of IFRS. This paper presents the political factors affecting the accounting standard setting. The paper discusses the debate between the adoption of accounting principles (IFRS) or accounting rules (GAAP). It presents the convergence of accounting standards and the future of IFRS.

Political Consensus Through Setting International Accounting Standards Case of Ias 22

2014

The study aims to reveal that a valid and effective standard, which formerly issued, may reflect the needs and expectation of few interested powerful bodies due to the neutral comments and dearth of lobbyists in the process of setting the standard. The research investigates the working of the IASB, by exploring the standard setting process specifically in relation to the standard on business combinations which has been on the agenda over an extended period of time. The written submissions in response to 14 issues, proposed in Exposure Draft 61 (1997), to revise IAS 22 “Business Combination” are analysed to understand whether various comments from different interested parties deliberately affect IASB’s decision. The situations in which any of the lobbyists (e.g. Anglo-American bodies) may exert influence are discussed. The results confirm an overall support to the proposed issues by the participants. So there was a satisfactory degree of consensus between the lobbyists involved...

Large Accounting Firms’ Survey Reveals Emergence of “Two Standard” System in the European Union

Advances in International Accounting, 2004

Convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is receiving great attention. In 2005, all listed companies domiciled in the European Union (EU) will be required to prepare consolidated accounts based on IFRS. Individual EU member states are, however, permitted to decide whether IFRS will be required or allowed for non-listed companies or for listed companies' individual accounts. Based primarily on data collected by the six largest international accounting firms during their most recent convergence survey, this paper examines each of the 15 EU member states' convergence plans and their perceived barriers to convergence. The findings indicate that most EU members do not plan to converge national GAAP with IFRS, thereby highlighting the great significance of the large firms' concerns regarding emergence of a "two-standard" system in the EU. The survey indicates the majority of EU countries will continue to require or allow national GAAP for individual accounts. While Belgium is considering requiring IFRS for all consolidated accounts, other EU