God is in the details (original) (raw)
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The uncanny accuracy of God's mathematical beliefs
Religious Studies, 2019
I show how mathematical platonism combined with belief in the God of classical theism can respond to Field's epistemological objection. I defend an account of divine mathematical knowledge by showing that it falls out of an independently motivated general account of divine knowledge. I use this to explain the accuracy of God's mathematical beliefs, which in turn explains the accuracy of our own. My arguments provide good news for theistic platonists, while also shedding new light on Field's influential objection.
Philosophia, 2007
In “Can Models of God Compete?”, J. R. Hustwit engages with fundamental questions regarding the epistemological foundations of modeling God. He argues that the approach of fallibilism best captures the criteria he employs to choose among different “models of God-modeling,” including one criterion that I call the Descriptive Criterion. I argue that Hustwit’s case for fallibilism should include both a stronger defense for the Descriptive Criterion and an explanation of the reasons that fallibilism does not run awry of this criterion in virtue of its apparent inability to make sense of debates among models of God extant in religious communities. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.
Simulation hypothesis might reveal God's hand
Far from the vestiges of science fiction, gameplay, and philosophy, the simulation hypothesis is not just a theory deeply rooted in Eastern and Western philosophies and religious traditions, it might bridge the ever-widening gap between religion and science and perhaps explain the biggest mystery of all-what is reality?
Mathematical Models in Theology. A Buber-inspired Model of God and its Application to "Shema Israel"
Journal of Applied Logics — IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications, Special Issue Concept of God, Guest Editors: Stanisław Krajewski and Ricardo Silvestre, vol 6 (6), pp. 1007-1020.. , 2019
Mathematical models representing religious issues can be seen as far-reaching logical examples of theological metaphors. They have been used since at least Nicholas of Cusa. Although rarely appreciated today, they are sometimes invoked by modern theologians. A novel model is presented here, based on projective geometry and inspired by an idea stated by Martin Buber. It models God and transcendence, especially in the framework of one central Jewish prayer. Actually, it models our relation to God rather than God as such, which is more in keeping with the approach of Judaism as well as negative theology in general. Models can help us understand some theological concepts and aspects of the traditional vision of the relationship of the world and its creator. The model presented here can also be used for the purpose of visualization in prayer: it can be used as a tool assisting meditation during the Jewish prayer involving the well-known verse Shema Israel “Hear, oh Israel, . . . ” (Deut. 6:4), often designated as the Jewish credo. Yet, mathematical models can be as misleading as every other metaphor. Is the model presented here a model of the Biblical God, the God of Judaism, or just of the “Buberian God”? Do the shortcomings of mathematical models annul their usefulness? Keywords: Model, mathematical model, metaphor, theology, projective geometry, projective hemisphere, Martin Buber, Eternal Thou, Jewish prayer Shema Israel, meditation. THIS IS THE FINAL VERSION OF A PAPER INCLUDED AT THIS SITE.
Proponents of design arguments attempt to infer the existence of God from various properties or features of the world they take to be evidence of intelligent design. Thus, for example, the fine-tuning argument attempts to infer the existence of a divine designer from the improbable fact that life would not be possible if any of approximately two- to three-dozen fundamental laws and properties of the universe had been even slightly different. Similarly, the argument from biochemical complexity attempts to infer the existence of a divine designer from the improbable fact that living beings frequently instantiate what proponents call irreducible specified complexity. In this essay, I argue that we are justified in making design inferences only in contexts where there is already strong independent reason to think that there exist intelligent agents with the ability to bring about the occurrence of the relevant entity, feature, or property. Only in such contexts is there sufficient information to justify assigning a probability to the design hypothesis that is higher than the probability that we are presumably justified in assigning to the chance hypothesis. Accordingly, design arguments implicitly presuppose that some other argument for God’s existence justifies assigning a probability to the design hypothesis that is larger than the probability we can assign to the chance hypothesis. What this means, contra the intentions of proponents, is that design arguments for the existence of God cannot stand by themselves.