The symmetries of the Hempelian model of explanation (original) (raw)
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The consensus in the majority of the philosophic and scientific community is that the scientific project is in its essence concerned with affording explanation and understanding of natural phenomena. We set out to examine the mechanism by which science affords explanation through the presentation and evaluation of two influential models for scientific explanation presented in the 2 nd half of the 20 th century: the Deductive-Nomological (DN) model pioneered by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, and the Unificationist model as presented and defended by Philip Kitcher. We consider four objections against the DN model, and three against the unificationist model, concluding: that the DN criteria for scientific explanation are indeed necessary but insufficient for explanation, that the unificationist criteria as they stand are neither sufficient nor necessary for explanation, and that both models fall short of a complete model for explanation due to their reluctance to accept the concept of causation as one independent of explanation.
Carl Hempel, "Two Models of Scientific Explanation"
9 0 5-1 9 9 7) classic account of explanation is widely known as the "cover ing-law model. " It includ es two species : the Deductive-Nomological Expla nation and the Probabilistic-Statistical Explanation . Since its introduction in the semi nal pape r co-autho red by Hempel and Paul Oppenh eim (1948), the model has been intense ly debated and criticized in the philosophy of scien ce literat ure. For although certain experiments are always necessary to serve as a basis for reasoning, nevertheless, once these experiments are given, we shou ld derive from them everything which anyone at all could possibly derive; and we shou ld even discover what experiments rema in to be done for the clarification of all furt her doubts. That would be an admira ble help, even in political science and medicine, to steady and perfect reasoning concerning given symptoms and circumstances. For even while there will not be enough given circumstances to form an infallible judgment, we shall always be able to determine what is most pro bable on the data given. And that is all that reaso n can do.
Outlines of a theory of structural explanations
Philosophical studies, 2017
This paper argues that in some explanations mathematics are playing an explanatory rather than a representational role, and that this feature unifies many types of non-causal or non-mechanistic explanations that some philosophers of science have been recently exploring under various names (mathematical, topo-logical, etc.). After showing how mathematics can play either a representational or an explanatory role by considering two alternative explanations of a same biological pattern—''Bergmann's rule''—I offer an example of an explanation where the bulk of the explanatory job is done by a mathematical theorem, and where mechanisms involved in the target systems are not explanatorily relevant. Then I account for the way mathematical properties may function in an explanatory way within an explanation by arguing that some mathematical propositions involving variables non directly referring to the target system features constitute constraints to which a whole class of systems should comply, provided they are describable by a mathematical object concerned by those propositions. According to such ''constraint account'', those mathematical facts are directly entailing the explanandum (often a limit regime, a robustness property or a steady state), as a consequence of such constraints. I call those explanations ''structural'', because here properties of mathematical structures are accounting for the explanandum; various kinds of mathematical structures (algebraic, graph-theoretical, etc.) thereby define various types of structural explanations.
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9, K. Bennett and D. Zimmerman (eds.), 2015
This chapter explores an objection to explanatory universalism, the doctrine that the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is true or everything has an explanation. This objection is a direct argument to the conclusion that the PSR yields the existence of an omni-explainer, i.e. something that explains everything. The objection crucially relies on the assumption that explanation is dissective in its explanandum place, and its conclusion conflicts with the irreflexivity of explanation. So the chapter considers two responses to the mentioned objection. The first response consisting in restricting the irreflexivity of explanation is criticised in connection with topics in the metaphysics of grounding. The second response consisting in denying that explanation is dissective is vindicated. Finally, the chapter argues that a plausible revised version of the principle that explanation is dissective, the PSR, and the irreflexivity of explanation together yield a striking picture of our universe.
Because without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics
The Philosophical Review, 2018
The consensus in the philosophy of science, at least since the 1980s, has been that Hempel's covering law model fails largely because it ignores the central role of causation in scientific explanation. Most subsequent work on scientific explanation has focused on understanding how causal (Salmon 1984; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008) and mechanistic (Craver 2007) explanations work. Some have even asserted, perhaps in incautious moments, that all scientific explanations are causal (Sober 1984; Lewis 1986). Lange's collection of expanded, mostly previously published essays, packed with numerous, beautiful examples of putatively non-causal explanations from biology, physics, and mathematics, challenges this increasingly ossified consensus and, in so doing, launches a new field of philosophic investigation. Lange defines non-causal explanations negatively as those that don't work "in virtue of describing the world's network of causal relations" (xi). He identifies three types: explanation by
Explanation and Causality: a List of Issues
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2015
After a concise description of issues concerning the causal and the deductive-nomological models of explanation, the flaws in the alternative view centred on relevance-to-context are examined. The paper argues for the need of a wider spectrum of options which takes into account both the Local/Global and the Internal/External aspects in order to determine the sense and the adequacy of any explanation. As a test for this argument, some specific problems are considered about the range of causal bonds, the admission of top-down causation, the appeal to emergence, the shift from explanation to explainability, the equivalence classes referred to as "cause" and "effect". Finally, the paper deals with the comparison between inequivalent explanations and lists three remaining issues to complete the picture.
Viewing-as Explanations and Ontic Dependence
Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
According to a widespread view in metaphysics and philosophy of science (the " Dependence Thesis "), all explanations involve relations of ontic dependence between the items appearing in the explanandum and the items appearing in the explanans. I argue that a family of mathematical cases, which I call " viewing-as explanations " , are incompatible with the Dependence Thesis. These cases, I claim, feature genuine explanations that aren't supported by ontic dependence relations. Hence the thesis isn't true in general. The first part of the paper defends this claim and discusses its significance. I argue, for example, that many mathematical explanations are apparently compatible with Dependence, so the existence of counterexamples is interesting and non-obvious. The second part of the paper considers whether viewing-as explanations occur in the empirical sciences, focusing on the case of so-called fictional models (such as Bohr's model of the atom). It's sometimes suggested that fictional models can be explanatory even though they fail to represent actual worldly dependence relations. Whether or not such models explain, I suggest, depends on whether we think scientific explanations necessarily give information relevant to intervention and control. This paper is about a certain mathematical phenomenon, and its implications for a widely held view about the metaphysics of explanation. I'll say more about the mathematical phenomenon shortly. The widely held view is this: Dependence Thesis: All explanations reflect relations of ontic dependence between the items appearing in the explanandum and the items appearing in the explanans. I plan to argue that a family of mathematical cases, which I'll call " viewing-as explanations " , are incompatible with the Dependence Thesis. These cases, I claim, feature genuine explanations that aren't supported by ontic dependence relations. Hence the Dependence Thesis—which has achieved something approaching consensus status in metaphysics, philosophy of science and elsewhere—is not true in general. The paper is organized as follows. §1 briefly describes the tension between Dependence and viewing-as explanations, and §2 presents some further examples from the mathematical literature. §3 looks more closely at the Dependence Thesis, the challenge posed by the mathematical cases, and several possible responses to the challenge. §4 considers whether viewing-as explanations are possible in the empirical sciences, focusing on the case of so-called fictional models. §5 briefly argues that the counterfactual approach to explanation also has trouble accommodating view-as cases. Finally, I offer some concluding remarks in §6.
An epistemic analysis of explanations and causal beliefs
Topoi, 1990
Causation and explanation are obviously connected. A sterling task for a philosopher of science is to lay bare the connection. The dominating tradition has been that an explanation is a form of inferential relation between the sentences included in the explanans and the explanandum. This tradition can be traced back to Aristotle: