Updating the philosophical concept of form (morphé) as the embodied structural and teleological informational program in human beings (original) (raw)
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ENCOUNTERING MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A JOURNEY THROUGH ST. THOMAS’ MODIFIED HYLOMORPHISM
Synopsis “Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit raises to the contemplating of truth: and God has place in the human heart a desire to know the truth - in a word, to know himself - so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves.” These are the beginning words of John Paul II’s 13th Encyclical ‘Fides et Ratio’. Here Pope highlights the idea that each human being has a desire to know himself. This same conception can be traced back from Socrates’ words ‘Know thyself’. This is the main search or main theme in almost all Indian Philosophical schools. This self-knowledge is well-known in the realistic sense also because this will help one to lead a meaningful life. When we ask the question ‘who are we?’ two words may come to our mind i.e., mind and body. Body as the physical part of us doesn’t have anything to do with our curiosity, because it physically perceivable. The word ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ always fascinates our thoughts, because this word itself has some mysterious content where we could not reach with our external eyes. This scientific paper on ‘Encounter Mind-body Problem: A Journey through St. Thomas Aquinas’ Modified Hylomorphism’, is a research through the philosophy of mind with an aim to find an amiable answer to the question of mind-body problem. St. Thomas Aquinas was an Italian friar of the thirteenth century and he is known as Catholic Theologian more than as a medieval philosopher. So the title of the scientific paper may lead to the question ‘why should anyone wish to study the philosophy or psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas to solve a purely philosophical problem. This question can be answered by the terms that is used in the title itself i.e., ‘Modified Hylomorphism.’ The term hylomorphism is traced back to Aristotle’s doctrine of Hylomorphism i.e., reality is constituted by form and matter. In the deeper sense it means that human beings are composed of soul as form and body as matter. In his psychology Aquinas takes doctrine of Hylomorphism and gives it a Christian colouring and makes it acceptable to Christian dogmas. So Aquinas’ modified hylomorphism could be best possible theory which could answer this philosophical issue. In first section of this research paper I have made a historical analysis on mind-body problem. First of all let us make clarity to the term ‘mind.’ In philosophy, religion, psychology, and cognitive sciences the term ‘mind’ has a number of usages. We glance over at least four of them which carry the four senses of the ‘mind-body problem. Firstly, we may use the term ‘mind’ as Descartes had used the term ‘mens’, to refer mental properties such as thought, sense, belief, desire etc. Secondly, we may employ the term ‘mind’ to refer to a person’s intellectual capacities and capabilities. Thirdly, we may speak of a person’s mind as being by means of which he thinks. Fourthly, the term ‘mind’ may used to designate or denote a spiritual substance and individual thing of an immaterial nature. In this philosophical enquiry I would like to take the term ‘mind’ as that consist of both the first and last usages together. For him human being is not composed of two substances such as body and soul, but they together constitute a substance i.e., human being. For example, in the case of understanding something, neither the soul alone nor body alone understands, but it is the whole human being who understands. So he calls them ‘incomplete substances.’ He says in his commentary on St. Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians’ (15:17-19): “My soul is not me (anima mea non est ego).” Here he denies Plato’s notion of human being as soul. According to Aquinas “what I am, what you are, what everyone else is, is nothing less than a human being. And he refuses to identify the individual with the individual’s soul, as Descartes’ was to do.” Aquinas considers human soul as the principle of one’s intellectual activity and it is incorporeal and subsisting substatial form which can either exist in union with or independent of matter. It here we can find the reall distiction between human soul and animal soul, because animal soul is non-subsisting substantial form in Aquinas’s own words i.e., it can exist only in union with matter. Human being’s soul is not in the body as a hand in the glove or it is not united to body as an organist is united with the musical instrument. The examples mentioned above are instances of accidental union. It is not applicable in the case of soul and body. Rather human soul is joined with its body in substantial union. In his master piece Aquinas gives answer to the question where the mind is located? Here he says that the power of soul can be exercised in all parts of body; in respect to sight it is in the eye, in respect to hearing it is in the ear and so on. The comparison between Aquinas’ modified hylomorphism with the dualistic and monistic philosophies of mind held that Aquinas’ conception of mind is in the middle position between monism and dualism. So his theory is free from the major demerits of both theories and the typical mind-body problem is inapplicable here. Because there is no interaction between the mind and body. When we speak of interaction let us make clear that there are mainly two reasons to hold that in Aquinas conception of mind there is no interaction between mind and body. Firstly, in this conception soul does not drive the body; instead, the soul structures the body that determines the organization of the body and its action or behavior. Secondly, in this conception, soul and body are unified by their interaction in a human being. So the mind-body problem ‘how immaterial, non-physical and non-spatial mind interact with spatial, physical and material body?’ cannot be attributed to Aquinas philosophy of mind. A human being for Aquinas is a complex of prime matter and substantial form. So there is no problem of dual properties, because human being is seen here as compound being. Even though his theory had more clarity, he failed to answer the questions of separateness, individuation and continuation of the soul after death, etc. Though these questions are relevant; Aquinas contributions to the philosophy of mind are worthy of philosophical investigation. Aquinas’ errors in the separateness, continuation and individuation of the soul after death could be answered by the Peter Inwagen by proposing a ‘naked kernel’ model of survival of the person. He states that at the time of disintegration of human body ‘naked kernel’ remains for the minimal material continuity of the person. Peter Inwagen takes the term ‘naked kernel’ from St. Paul’s First Letter to Corinthians chapter 15, versus 37 which state that “as for what you sow, you do not sow the body that is to be, but a bare seed, perhaps of wheat or some other grain.” Peter Inwagen interprets these words to give a best possible answer to the question of continuity of the soul after death. He states that as in the case of wheat which is sown will be transformed into new crop, and yet this is continuation at the resurrection and the corrupted body will transform into uncorrupted heavenly body. This model of survival of the person solves Aquinas’ errors. The insight that I have received from this research paper is that the veil that covers the concept of mind is never removed. The term ‘Mind’ still remains mysterious. This reality does not discourage us; rather it shows us that there is something more to find out. So let us sharpen our thoughts and reason, and begin our intellectual research on ‘Mind.’ As Blessed John Paul II instructed, let us use our faculties of faith and reason in this journey to find out our own human nature, which is our basic thirst. `
Beyond the Bodily View and Psychological View of Human Beings: Human Beings are Rational
Journal of Philosophical Investigations , 2023
We are... So, to reframe the inquiry: who are we on a metaphysical level? Which aspects of ourselves are the most universally representative of who we are? How do we fare in the face of the passage of time? For decades, philosophers have debated the concept of diachronic personal identity, which focuses on the question of what keeps us alive. An intricate debate has developed between those who hold the body view (animalism) and those who hold the psychological view (memory) on the question of who we are. The two groups will eventually become so firmly set in their views that they will be unable to compromise. Hylomorphic animalism, or the view that humans are rational animals, living bodies made of prime matter and a rational soul, is an alternative answer to this divisive question that I propose in this study, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and Aquinas. We only survive if matter and rational souls do.
Neuroscientific findings in the light of Aquinas’ understanding of the human being
Neuroscience is one of the most propulsive of all sciences and very often, directly or not, it tries to answer the question: What is man? However, neuroscientific research does not acknowledge the concept of man as a unity of body and soul. The modern scientific research paradigm therefore rests on physicalism, while theologians are turning towards non-reductive physicalism. In this paper, we will highlight a few key points of the theory of philosopher and theologian Nancey Murphy, which is based on the deconstruction of Aquinas’s thought about the human soul and its reduction to the physical. We aim to show that she neglected the full scope of Aquinas teachings. In the second part of this paper, for the scientific paradigm of humans we shall propose new-old hylomorphism, and try to complement certain points of such a system with modern neuroscientific views. The aim of this work is to offer advice for the interdis ciplinary cooperation between neuroscience, philosophy and theology alongside the guidelines of Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism.
The Nature of Human Persons: Metaphysics and Bioethics
The New Bioethics
This monograph rigorously argues for a Thomistic (after the thirteenth century theologian and philosopher St Thomas Aquinas) account of the human person. Each chapter addresses different stages of human existence, considering the metaphysical and philosophical issues arising from these. Dualist and materialist accounts are considered, and Eberl's Thomistic position is carefully elucidated. Eberl argues that the Thomistic account is as a via media between dualism and materialism, combining the strengths, whilst avoiding the weaknesses, of both camps. Chapter One: 'What Am I?' sets the scene. The desiderata for an account of the human person are delineated and justified, and the reader is introduced to the distinct, but closely related, concepts of 'human being' and 'person'. Eberl outlines the many different ways these two terms are used and shows that whilst some thinkers will use them as synonyms, others will use them to refer to very different concepts. Ultimately, Eberl settles on the term human person to allow for the possibility of non-human persons. During this chapter, the outline of the rest of the book is laid out. Chapter Two: 'This is Us' sets out Eberl's Thomistic account of the human person in broad strokes. Along the way, cerebral transplant thought experiments, in which one person's cerebrum is transplanted into a different person's body (I shall return to this topic later), and dicephalic twins are considered. Chapter Three: 'I Think, Therefore … ' introduces the reader to two contemporary alternative dualist accounts, substance dualism and emergent dualism, with Swinburne's substance dualism and Hasker's emergent dualism being used as quintessential representatives of each. Both views are considered and critiqued. Chapter Four: 'Thou Art Dust' introduces the reader to one reductive and three non-reductive materialist alternatives: animalism, constitutionalism, four-dimensionalism and the embodied mind theory. Olson's animalist approach is considered as a representative reductive physicalist account. Baker's constitutionalism, Hudson's four-dimensionalism and McMahan's embodied mind account are the three non-reductive materialist accounts considered. In the process of doing this, teletransporter thought experiments and their correct interpretation are also considered. Chapter Five: Starting Out then applies these accounts to the beginning of human life and the various questions and issues raised therein. Eberl argues that his Thomistic account is superior based on the arguments of previous chapters. He shows how, according to his Thomistic account, a human person comes into existence at conception. In doing this, he also spends quite some time carefully engaging with the new bioethics, 2020, 1-4
FROM GIVEN TO CONSTRUCTED HUMAN NATURE
Facta Universitatis, Series: Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History, 2019
This paper starts from the thesis that dominant conceptions of human nature correspond to the basic frame of ideas that is characteristic for the period in which it appears. This work differentiates three teachings on human nature. The first viewpoint emphasizes the immutability and determination of human nature. This conception is supported by social inequalities within a society. It appears in societies with irreconcilable social differences. The conception of a teleologically directed human life emphasized a route through which humans accomplish their nature or gain salvation. This conception is widely accepted from the Christian perspective. The third conception describes the paths of free design, construction and change of human identity. This conception appears in the modern age, dominated by the idea of creating the new. The development of such ideas is the result of technological domination and the establishment of virtual reality spaces. We dealt with certain interpretations of human nature in order to show that our understanding of ourselves is always contextually determined.
Three Quests for Human Nature: Some Philosophical Reflections
The notion of ‘human nature’ has long since captured the interest and imagina- tion of philosophers, theologians, and scientists; as such, it appears that the study of human nature is one amenable to inter-disciplinary cross-fertilization. However, it is not obvious that there is a single coherent project being undertaken, neither between nor within disciplines. Rather, we argue that there are three main quests for human nature – the quest for universal human nature, the quest for human unique- ness, and the quest for innate human nature – and that different philosophical, theo- logical, and scientific enterprises emphasize (or, indeed, neglect) different quests. Furthermore, these different intellectual enterprises may differ more fundamen- tally, namely in their very object of enquiry, the definition of the theoretical term ‘human being.’ For scientists, the term ‘human being’ is often treated as being coter- minous with the term Homo sapiens; that is, ‘human being’ is a biological category, a species. This definition is now, rightly or wrongly, taken for granted by philosophers and theologians, but it is not necessarily the most appropriate. It remains an open question whether, for any given philosophical and/or theological project, the bio- logical concept Homo sapiens is the most appropriate way to understand the term ‘human being.’ This paper considers these issues by scrutinizing two cases – from evolutionary psychology and theological anthropology – in each case examining the adequacy of the biological concept Homo sapiens for its purpose, as well as the viability of each of the three quests for human nature.
After the Lived Body (Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 49, 4, p. 445-468)
There is no question more urgent for phenomenology than the question of "one's own body" [corps propre], as it has come to be called since Husserl. But neither is there a question that has been more neglected by contemporary phenomenologists. At first sight, this claim seems incongruous given the nearly exponential production in the literature around this topic for more than thirty years, as much in the history of philosophy as in various efforts to cross the phenomenological perspective with contributions from cognitive sciences. The trouble is that this ample literature does not pose any of the preliminary questions relevant to adopting the concept of one's own body or lived-body (Leib) in phenomenology; for the most part, it takes this concept as self-evident and limits itself to considering the ways in which the concept of the lived-body may "fertilize" more positive scientific approaches. The legitimacy of the concept of Leib itself and of its legacy within the phenomenological tradition is never questioned as such.
2014
ABSTRACT: Wholeness of vital processes in both, internal and external dimension is manifested, according to Aristotle’s terminology, by a substantial living form and is a condition of a purposeful behavior. Authors claim that, empirical data concerning animals tool use, and data concerning regulating processes, inside every living organism, cognitively force us to place them within teleological-holistic conceptual frames. According to the authors, teleology requires a renewed revision and specific defining. Although, from one hand, some researchers think that it is an adequate tool used to describe biological purposeful processes, from the other hand it has often been weeded out and replaced by physical concept of function. Biological functionality intuitively links with the concept of wholeness and purposefulness. It should be emphasized, however, that not always simply physical concept of function may coincide with the concept of function in a biological sense, in spite of the fac...