Socrates’ Proto-Liberal Feminism: Toward a Rereading of the Republic with a View to Necessity (original) (raw)
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Plato’s “Republic” is generally held to promote equal education for men and women but to fall short of any sort of liberal feminism, since several passages demean women, and the education of women serves not their ends as individuals but the ends of the militaristic city. Based on (i) previously-unnoticed evidence of Socrates’ concern with gender in the transition from the “true,” “healthy” city to the unhealthy, “luxurious” city in Book 2 and (ii) an analysis of the different reasons given for the various roles of women in the first two “waves” of Book 5, I argue that Plato’s Socrates is in fact a visionary liberal feminist. It has not been noticed that in describing the citizens’ way of life in the “healthy” city in Book 2 Socrates suddenly emphasizes women’s (whether by nature or by Greek convention) domestic roles without ever mentioning women; in doing so, he hints that the needs men have for women is the topic he thinks should next be discussed in his and his interlocutors’ search for what justice is, since they have so far ignored it. When Glaucon interrupts to demand luxuries for the “men,” he ignores Socrates’ concern with women as autonomous exchange partners and goes on to endorse only women’s roles that provide men with pleasure and service. Subsequently “purifying” the city of luxury does nothing to remedy this omission. It is not until Book 5 that someone else – Polemarchus – finally notices that women’s roles in the city require further study. In response, Socrates derives proposals concerning women from various principles introduced earlier in the city in speech. By identifying these principles and their different origins (was it Socrates or Glaucon who first introduced them?), I distinguish elements of the treatment of women in Book 5 which Socrates would endorse from those he would not, for which Glaucon (and to some extent Adeimantus) is responsible. In the first wave, Socrates proposes equal education for women based on the principle in the “healthy” city that every individual should do what they are better at relative to others. In the second wave, Socrates proposes abolishing the private family based on Glaucon’s premises that the citizens should be managed like herd animals (see 372d, 451c) and that they should do so looking only to the interests of the city, not of the individuals within it. These premises are not compatible with Socrates’ own principles of autonomous exchange and specialization in the “healthy” city. These conclusions are supported by exhaustive philological analysis, which reveals that throughout the “Republic” Socrates quietly but consistently portrays men as ambitious, foolish, and obliviously unjust as compared to women, while by contrast he always refers to human beings as limited, imperfect beings. In sum, I seek to show that Socrates systematically hints at and wants to discuss how men should consider women to be equal, autonomous partners in exchanges of every kind (domestic, political, and pedagogical), but that such a discussion is repeatedly hindered by the androcentrism and misogyny of Glaucon and others. The Republic is a radical critique of ancient Athenian patriarchy that anticipates second wave feminism in the twentieth century.
Socrates - Platonic Political Ideal
This essay articulates the differences and suggests the similarities between the practices of Socratic political speaking and those of Platonic political writing. The essay delineates Socratic speaking and Platonic writing as both erotically oriented toward ideals capable of transforming the lives of individuals and their relationships with one another. Besides it shows that in the Protagoras the practices of Socratic political speaking are concerned less with Protagoras than with the individual young man, Hippocrates. In the Phaedo, this ideal of a Socrates is amplified in such a way that Platonic writing itself emerges as capable of doing with readers what Socratic speaking did with those he encountered. Socrates is the Platonic political ideal. The result is a picture of the transformative political power of Socratic speaking and Platonic writing both.
Socrates' Virtuous Practice of Athenian Politics
College of Dupage, 2023
This essay explores Socrates' unique involvement in Athenian politics, and we observe that Socrates' philosophical advice for politicians in the apocryphal dialogue Alcibiades I, which is grounded in the dialectic practice of "cultivation of the soul," embraces the belief that even if the entire city is blessed with having the most perfect technological/technē and scientific knowledge/epistēmē, "possessing all the sciences put together," it would still represent an impoverished state. For according to Socrates, there is no hope or "chance of getting any things well and beneficially done" if we do not have, in the first instance, the philosophical understanding/phronēsis of "good and evil" to inform and guide all of our so-called technical efforts and inspire our scientific achievements (Charmides 174d). In relation to Socrates' understanding of the philosopher and polis and what is required in order to envision and potentially establish a just and virtuously functioning city, what we find in three of Plato's dialogues might be classified as an "idealized" state and practice of politics in the Republic, a "paradigmatic" political model in the Statesman, and a "philosophical-propaedeutic" view of politics in the Alcibiades I. The problems associated with fully reconciling Socrates' practice of philosophy with politics are explored by Charles Griswold who claims that scholars searching for such a reconciliation often mistakenly do so by offering readings that suggest a legitimate "blueprint" for politics can be found in and drawn from the dialogues. There are also readings, he points out, that issue warnings against attempting to enact such a blueprint. Such approaches expose the difficulty or even impossibility of demanding that Socratic philosophy rise to the level of instituting a praxis of politikē, and so caution should be exercised when dealing with this issue, and it is essential that interpreters embrace the literary or dialogic dimension of the portrayal of Socratic philosophy in the dialogues. This so-called "dramatic-philosophical" dimension, as Griswold contends, breaks open a "horizon for reflection on ethics as well as politics," and in doing so, allows us to approach these issues in a more authentically Socratic manner, namely, "as open to question." Contrary to viewing this issue in terms of an "open question," J. A. Corlett argues that scholars seeking a consistent and cohesive view of Socratic politics often focus on the seeming inconsistency between Socrates' claims in the Apology regarding his disobeying the law insofar as it is unjust and potentially harmful to the life of a philosopher and Socrates' bold support of an individual's legal obligation in the Crito. Corlett finds no such contradiction to exist, and he argues against what he claims is the false assumption that the Crito espouses a Kantian or deontological conception of the laws and then portrays Socrates' unquestioned duty to them, whether or not the laws and the political institutions establishing them are corrupt and unjust. Corlett convincingly shows that it is Plato's creative/literary portrayal of the laws/nomoi that represents an authoritarian view, which is to say that it is the personified laws that express the conviction that it would be unethical and unjust to "disobey the legal authority of even a wrongful conviction." But this is not Socrates' position.
Socrates on the Human Condition
In his third speech in Plato’s Apology, Socrates consoles those jurors who voted for him by telling them that “death is one of two things”—either annihilation or a transfer to another place. In either case, he says, death would be an “advantage.” Scholars have understood this passage and several others to be found in Plato’s early or Socratic dialogues, as an indication that Socrates accepted that virtue is necessary for happiness (VNH). For Socrates, and all the rest of us who lack virtue, the consequence is that death is an advantage because we can never actually achieve happiness in life. In this paper, I review the textual evidence for attributing VNH to Socrates, and claim that the attribution is mistaken: Socrates did not hold such an extreme view about the human condition, and should be understood, instead, as holding the far more plausible view that human beings who do not achieve complete virtue may nevertheless enjoy some degree of happiness if they make it their mission to “become as wise as possible.”
Is Socrates a Model for the Rest of Us
Is Socrates a Model for the Rest of Us?, 2005
A revised version of a chapter in Craig de Paulo, Patrick Messina, and Marc Stier, eds. Ambiguity in the Western Mind, (Peter Lang, Inc. International Academic Publishers, 2005). The philosopher who, on the standard interpretation, seeks above all others to escape ambiguity is Plato. The world of forms is, after all, portrayed as a attractive realm precisely because everything is just what it is and nothing else. Yet, at the same time, Plato presents his philosophy is a literary form that, if only we could recognize it as such, is highly ambiguous in nature. In recent years, the importance of the dramatic character of the Platonic dialogue has been widely recognized. Scholars have paid greater attention to who says what to whom and under what circumstances. The irony of having an ironist—Socrates—as one’s main spokesman has been duly noted. This essay on Plato’s Symposium follows a very few contemporary philosophers in taking this new way of interpreting Plato one step further. He takes seriously the challenge that is put to Socrates in the Symposium, a challenge that touches not just or mainly his philosophy but his way of life. Along with other new interpreters of Plato, the essay suggests that Plato’s ideas may be found in not just in Socrates’ words but in the speeches of other characters in the Platonic dialogues. Stier, however, goes further in suggesting that, however noble it is, Socrates’ life may not be the Platonic model for the rest of us human beings. The picture presented of Socrates in the Symposium suggests that he is too different from even the best of other human beings to serve as a model for us. Socrates is a profoundly strange creature, whose qualities suggest that he has partly escaped from the usual circumstances of human life, circumstances that are best presented in Aristophanes account of how we were mutilated by the gods. As a result, Socrates escapes from human eros as well. Yet because he lives among us, and seeks to understand us in order to understand himself, Socrates must pretend to share a common nature with us. The ambiguity of Socrates position—and the danger that accompanies that ambiguity—is revealed when Alcibiades burst into the drinking party and tells tales about his mentor / tormentor. As the drama ends, the ambiguity of Socrates position is shown to parallel the ambiguous nature of the dialogue itself, in which tragedy and comedy are intertwined.
Necessity and Philosophy in Plato's Republic
Lexington Press, 2024
Necessity and Philosophy in Plato’s Republic offers an interpretation of the concept of necessity in what is perhaps Plato’s most read dialogue. The word “necessity” (anagkē) appears hundreds of times in the text in many grammatical forms, about as often as the frequently studied term “good.” Yet, there exists little commentary on the ontological status of necessity. According to the author, when the reader analyzes the Republic through the lens of necessity, a novel interpretation emerges. On the one hand, the concept of necessity articulated in the Republic is original, insofar as it includes phenomena not commonly attributed to necessity. Namely, necessity governs not only those motions which do not vary and cannot be otherwise, but also those that wander randomly by erotic desire and by chance. Necessity in the Republic, thus, occasions a rethinking of what this crucial concept might mean for us. On the other hand, interpreting the Republic through the lens of necessity allows a reading of Plato to develop that emphasizes the structures of finitude in human life and the limits of reason. The book argues, therefore, that philosophy remains subtended and limited by necessity in unavoidable ways.
Social justice and happiness in the Republic: Plato's two principles
History of Political Thought, 2001
In the Republic, Socrates says that social justice is ‘doing one’s own’, i.e. ‘everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is naturally best suited’. One would ordinarily suppose social justice to concern not only the allocation of duties but also the distribution of benefits. I argue that this expectation is fulfilled not by Plato’s conception of social justice, but by the normative basis for it, Plato’s requirement of aiming at the happiness of all the citizens. I argue that Plato treats social justice as a necessary but not sufficient means to happiness that guarantees only the production of the greatest goods; ensuring that these goods are distributed so as to maximize the happiness of the whole city requires a direct application of Plato’s happiness principle, which I interpret individualistically and then use to explain women’s equality in work and education.
Socrates on the Impossibility of a Reasonable Politics
How can such a good man be so wrong? How can Socrates the man be so impressive in his main political acts, and yet so misguided (even naïve) as a political theorist? To resolve this paradox many try to isolate Socrates’ political philosophy from his practice. He was, we are told, simply concerned with a different set of political questions than those that interest us; and when we see this, the paradox dissolves, his views are largely rehabilitated, and any appearance of a contradiction is removed. In this paper, I take on three tasks. First, I explore three versions of the isolationist strategy, those offered by Karl Popper, Richard Kraut and Rachana Kamtekar. Second, I argue that although these accounts make progress, they do not ultimately resolve the paradox. Third, I suggest a rival (“accommodationist”) view that aims to reconcile Socrates’ personal behavior with his theoretical commitments by embracing a strongly pessimistic account of Socratic politics. On this interpretation, Socrates’ fundamental political concern is with the very possibility of a good, well-functioning society that is responsive to both reasons and the well-being of its citizens. His worry is that the demands of a reasonable politics are high, unlikely to be met, and perhaps necessarily so. This pessimism explains the apparent disconnect between Socrates’ theory and his practice, and also why Socratic politics initially seems to have an unusual (and “isolated”) focus. It also casts light on why Socrates is sometimes thought to be a founder of political thought, and why his views are of enduring interest.