Why Dispositions Are Not Higher-order Properties (original) (raw)
Related papers
Dispositions manifest themselves: an identity theory of properties
Synthese, 2021
The aim of this paper is to motivate a view on dispositions according to which dispositions and their manifestations are partially identical, the DM identity theory. It sets out by extrapolating the desiderata of a dispositionalist account of properties. It then shows that the previous theories are burdened with different problems, whose common cause, so the argument goes, is the separation assumption, which almost all share. It states that dispositions and their manifestations are numerically distinct. The paper then explores whether the separation assumption can be abandoned and shows that there are precursors of a DM identity theory. The DM identity theory is then outlined in its central features and it is outlined how they can fulfil the desiderata of dispositionalism.
The Identity Theory of Properties
The identity theory is meant to solve certain alleged problems with dispositional essentialism, notably that the latter struggles to characterise powers as fundamental and intrinsic properties, and also fails to make sense of the discrepancy between our understanding of properties in the manifest vs. the scientific image. However, proponents of powers still have misgivings about the identity theory. They wonder how it can deal with the apparent independent variability of qualities and dispositions, i.e. that objects with different qualities seem able to have the same powers, and the observation that one and the same power seems able to give rise to a variety of behaviours. Many enough also find that the identity theory still hasn't conceptually made sense of the identity of quality and power. Some also find it to be more of an epistemic rather than metaphysical theory. In this paper, I respond to these misgivings, arguing they are misguided.
The Dispositional Nature of Phenomenal Properties
Topoi, 2018
According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties of the phenomenal sort are essentially different from physical properties, and cannot be reduced to them. This being a quarrel about properties, I draw on the categorical / dispositional distinction to discuss this non-reductive claim. Typically, non-reductionism entails a categorical view of phenomenal properties. Contrary to this, I will argue that phenomenal properties, usually characterized by what it is like to have them, are mainly the manifestation of dispositional properties. This paper is thus divided into two parts. In the first part, after tracing a working distinction between categorical and dispositional properties, I argue that there is a form of incoherence looming behind the idea of taking phenomenal properties as categorical. In the second part, I argue in favor of the view that phenomenal properties are dispositional properties with an essential manifestation. This interpretation allows us to broaden dispositionalism so as to include the sciences of mind, thus ultimately favoring a physicalist view on the mind.
2018
Clear criteria for the identity of dispositions are still lacking, and this has been presented as one of the main challenge raised by such entities. It is of prime importance to identify or distinguish dispositions such as diseases or risks. This article first introduces conventional ways to refer to a disposition (such as “fragility”) and canonical ways (such as “disposition to break in case of a strong shock”). This raises the issue of how should exactly be defined a “disposition d to R when TR”, where R is a realization specification and TR a trigger specification. Two ontological frameworks are distinguished. The first framework, which has been largely used so far in the literature on dispositions, interprets d as a disposition which can only be triggered by instances of TR, and can only be realized by instances of R. The second, new framework introduces the notion of “minimal trigger” and “maximal realization”, and interprets TR as a parent class of a class of processes that ha...
Metaphysica, 2013
One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (John Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration Strategy”—i.e. the strategy of claiming that what were formerly thought of as distinct entities are actually a unified entity, partially considered. By evaluating its use in other debates, I uncover a multi-layered prima facie case against the use of the Partial Consideration Strategy in the dispositional/categorical properties debate. In closing, I describe how the Partial Consideration Strategy can be reworked in a way that would allow it to sidestep this prima facie case.
Particulars, Positional Qualities, and Individuation
Philosophy of Science, 1977
In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay-a bare particular-does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay-a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premise that only particulars can ground individuation as deeply as is required, it follows that Bergmann and Hausman have not proved particulars are necessary and that positional qualities are insufficient for individuation.
A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties
2015
This essay presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoff s. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a uni ed framework.