Slaughter of the singing sentients: measuring the morality of eating red meat (original) (raw)
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Human eating habits are widely distinguished between Vegetarianism and Non-Vegetarianism, where former presumes themselves to be holding no moral risk toward nature and animals as they do not eat animal meats. However, if we examine it closely and thoroughly, every eating habits hold some or other moral risk. My paper is an attempt to unfold different arguments made in support and against the moral concern of Vegetarianism. Although it is impalpable to answer ‘What is morally good to eat?’, our discourse helps to bring forth different arguments to understand the moral concern of our eating habits.
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Winners of the rst prize of the 2012 essay competition for students sponsored by the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP) in cooperation with the Grazer Philosophische Studien* Summary e purpose of this article, which takes the form of a dialogue between a vegetarian and a meat eater, is twofold. On the one hand, we argue for a general characterisation of moral value in terms of well-being and su ering. On the other hand, on the basis of this characterisation, we argue that, in most cases, the moral value attached to the choice of eating meat is negative; in particular, we defend this claim against a number of objections concerning the nature of animal su ering, its moral value, and the moral responsibility of meat eaters. "When we lift our forks, we hang our hats somewhere" (Foer, 2009, 132) " e question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they su er?" (Bentham, 1789, chapter XVII) * e question of the 2012 competition was: "Are we allowed to eat animals?" From the 53 submissions that conformed to the rules of the competition, the jury selected three, one each for the rst, second, and third prize. e authors of the prizewinning essays were permitted to slightly revise and expand their submission for publication. uncorrected proof nicht korrigierte Fahne 258 In what follows, Mechoui, a meat eater, and Kardamon, a vegetarian, discuss the question of eating animals from a moral point of view. Mechoui: ese cheeseburgers are really delicious; are you sure you do not want one? Kardamon: I am sure they taste good; but I am also quite sure that eating animals is morally problematic, to say the least. Mechoui: And apparently you even think that it is bad. How would you defend this position? Kardamon: We could start from the generally accepted idea that su ering is bad (i.e. has a negative moral value) and that well-being is good (i.e. has a positive moral value). On that basis, we could characterise a good behaviour as one which improves the state of someone (towards more well-being or less su ering), and a bad behaviour as one that worsens the state of someone (towards less well-being or more su ering). Mechoui: You are talking about individuals su ering, but some of the individuals that are relevant to our moral question are animals (more precisely, non-human animals). It is not obvious that animals su er in the same way as humans, or even that they su er at all (see e.g. Descartes 1637, part V; Nagel 1974; Wittgenstein 1953, 174). Kardamon: Animal su ering is indeed a controversial issue. Let us rst consider the claim that animals do not su er at all. It seems that a necessary and su cient condition for being able to su er is to be a sentient being, and that a necessary and su cient condition for being a sentient being is to be equipped with a sufciently developed nervous system. us, since at least some animals meet this condition, at least some animals can su er. Mechoui: What you are saying suggests not only that at least certain animals can su er, but also that other individuals, like plants, cannot su er. Kardamon: Exactly. And this is why, for instance, it is not incoherent to choose not to eat animals on ethical grounds, while still eating vegetables. Let us now consider the claim that animals can su er, but not in the same way as we do. People who endorse this position seem to suggest that there is