Thomas Aquinas Holds Fast: Objections to Aquinas within Today’s Debate on Divine Action (original) (raw)
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2016
In this paper I suggest a reason why the Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of providence is attractive to contemporary philosophers of religion in the English-speaking academy. The main argument states that there are at least four metaphysical principles that guided discussions on providence and divine action in the created world, namely divine omnipotence and transcendence, divine providential action, the autonomy of natural created causes, and the success of reason and natural science. Aquinas’ doctrine, I hold, is capable of affirming these four principles without rejecting any of them, as it is in the cases of other doctrines. In addition, I present and answer some objections raised against Aquinas’ thought, and briefly expand on how Aquinas’ ideas on providence are used today to tackle issues regarding contemporary science, such as evolutionary biology, quantum mechanics, and big bang theory.
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Theology and Science, 2009
This article evaluates and considers two important philosophical contributions to the discussion considering divine action in the work of Thomas Aquinas and John Polkinghorne. Aquinas argues that God employs both primary and secondary causality, in that God causes some events directly by divine power and others by means of secondary causes. Polkinghorne argues that this approach makes God the author of evil and opts instead for a ''kenotic approach'' to divine action, wherein God chooses to ''empty'' God's self of complete divine control. We think that these views can complement each other and need not represent mutually exclusive alternatives.
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Attempts to solve the issue of divine action in nature have resulted in many innovative proposals seeking to explain how God can act within nature without disrupting the created order but introducing novelty in the history of the universe. My goal is to show how Aquinas' doctrine of providence, mainly as expressed in his De Potentia Dei, fulfils the criteria for an account of divine action: that God's action is providential in the sense that God is involved in the individual and particular here and now.
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The paper deals with the problem of divine causation in relation to created agents in general and human rational agents in particular. Beyond creation and conservation, Aquinas specifies divine contribution to created agents' operation as application in the role of the first cause and the operation of the principal cause employing an instrumental cause. It is especially the latter which is open to varying interpretation and which might be potentially threatening to human freedom. There are different readings of what it is for the secondary agent to "act through the power of the principal cause". Either the divine cause causes only the existence of the effect of the secondary cause, or it also causes the cause to operate in the sense that it determines its outcome. The latter seems to contradict human freedom. Both readings of Aquinas were developed in the latter half of the sixteenth century within scholastic philosophy and theology.
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2014
In the first part of this paper I argue that even if at first Alvin Plantinga’s reasons for allowing special divine action seem similar to those of Thomas Aquinas, particularly in De Potentia Dei for allowing miracles, the difference in their metaphysical language makes Aquinas’ account less prone to the objections raised against Plantinga’s. In the second part I argue that Plantinga errs when recurring to quantum mechanics for allowing special divine action, making God to be a cause among causes. Thomas Aquinas, by speaking of primary and secondary causality when referring to God’s activity, avoids taking this step, evading the conclusion that God could be seen as a cause among causes. Aquinas, however, maintains in a statement which goes beyond Plantinga’s, that God’s providence requires the universe to be indeterministic because this indeterministic feature makes the universe more perfect.
Aquinas’s Real Distinction and Its Role in a Causal Proof of God’s Existence
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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Studium. Filosofía y Teología, 2019
The main goal of this paper is to compare how Thomas Aquinas expressed his doctrine of providence through secondary causes, making use of both Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic principles, in the seventh article of the third question of his Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei and his Super Librum de Causis Expositio, in which he intends to solve the problem of the metaphysical mechanism by which God providentially guides creation. I will first present his arguments as they appear in the disputed questions, followed by a presentation of his thought on the matter in his commentary of the Liber de Causis, and concluding with my comparative analysis of Aquinas’ solution to the issue of God’s providential activity in nature.