Canada and the Origins of the Arctic Council: Key Documents, 1988-1998 (original) (raw)

2021, Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) no. 18

Sweden and the United States-gathered in Ottawa to sign a document that shaped the future of intergovernmental collaboration in the High North. The Ottawa Declaration created the Arctic Council as a forum to promote environmental protection and sustainable development, with particular emphasis on the economic circumstances of Indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents. The structure of the Council was innovative, involving Indigenous peoples' organizations as "Permanent Participants" who participate in all aspects of the Council's work (albeit without a vote) and thus affirming the central role of Arctic Indigenous peoples in regional affairs. As historian John English explains in his book on the origins of the Council, 1 Canada spearheaded efforts to build a new circumpolar organization that eventually subsumed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and incorporated its scientific working groups into its structure. The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation convened an early panel that called for an Arctic regional forum with substantial Indigenous representation and a mandate "to make the circumpolar region into a domain of enhanced civility-an area in which aboriginal peoples enjoy their full rights, and where national governments that speak for southern majorities accord progressively greater respect to the natural environment, to one another, and, in particular, to aboriginal peoples." 2 This concept was revolutionary, particularly in its effort to elevate the role, stature, and decision-making power of Indigenous peoples at the international level. 3 The documents in this volume chart the origins of the Arctic Council through a Canadian lens from its origins in discussions about arms control, circumpolar environmental cooperation, and Indigenous leadership through to its operationalization in 1998. Prominent non-governmental thinkers opened and then seized a policy window as the Government of Canada came to embrace the idea of an intergovernmental council that could grapple with a wide range of environmental, economic development, and maritime policy issues. The documents also reinforce how the Arctic Council is an outgrowth of the AEPS, announced by the eight Arctic states in 1991, and how Northern leaders saw in the Arctic Council the shape of a new North, working across national boundaries to solve problems of regional importance. Accordingly, Canada played a major role in pushing for a human dimension to the Council and in the creation of the Sustainable Development working group, acting on Northerners' wishes to have its mandate extend beyond a narrow science focus. v activities on Indigenous practices. 36 An Arctic Council with an open mandate would allow for consensus-building on "issues of mutual concern" and "provide a voice for aboriginal and other northern peoples most directly affected by decisions made about the Arctic," the discussion paper posited. These issues included "co-operation on environmental, resource development, aboriginal and military issues." 37 Griffiths continued to revise and redraft his "proposal for action," various versions of which he circulated for review and comment in the first half of 1990. 38 "Our intention in this report," Griffiths wrote, "is to consider the proposition [for an Arctic Council] in detail, and put forward an action plan that deals with all major aspects of an institution for comprehensive cooperation in the circumpolar Arctic." His vision sought to transform the Arctic from a region dominated by the "military-strategic" concerns of "southerners" to "a region of enhanced cooperation and civility" where southerners respected "the circumpolar environment and … Arctic populations." Its twenty-one tasks for the proposed Arctic Council intended "to promote civil cooperation and reduce the force of military cooperation," promote sustainable development and the role of Indigenous peoples in policy processes, and provide "a forum for discussion of Arctic military matters by all concerned." 39 Canada's role in leading political negotiations to institutionalize circumpolar relations also reflected a particular understanding of the Arctic in environmental and human terms (rooted in Indigenous subsistence-based livelihoods) that deeply influenced the region-building process. 40 The collapse of the Soviet Union had shifted attention towards new security concerns, particularly the protection of the Arctic environment. Canadian scientists uncovered extensive evidence of transboundary pollutants, such as fertilizers and pesticides, deposited in the Arctic region, and Western officials sought to address extensive pollution and radioactive waste in the Soviet Arctic that affected the entire Arctic basin. 41 Accordingly, Canada enthusiastically embraced an initiative proposed by the Finnish Government in 1988 to conduct international discussions about environmental problems in the region. Following a meeting in Rovaniemi in September 1989 that confirmed the Arctic states' support, two working groups formed to examine in detail the state of the Arctic environment and assess existing international legal instruments. Canada hosted a follow-up preparatory meeting of senior ministers from the eight Arctic states on circumpolar environmental issues in Yellowknife in April 1990 (doc. 3). These highly successful meetings highlighted a growing acknowledgement of pressing regional environmental issues and the need for enhanced scientific research cooperation, as well as the possibility of new forms of post-Cold War cooperation that transcended the East-West divide. 42 The various non-governmental organizations backing the Arctic Council Panel's reports arranged briefings in Ottawa with political parties, policy-makers, vii which might serve as the best model for the proposed Council, his report offerings insight into the various structures that the Panel considered when crafting and then refining its proposals. While specific elements of the Council remained undetermined, the broad idea continued to gain traction in high-level Canadian political circles. On 27 September 1990, while working on the final drafts of his report with Kuptana, Griffiths had a telephone conversation with Larry Hagen, the foreign minister's speechwriter. Clark was scheduled to speak at a Canada-Soviet conference with a prominent Arctic emphasis, and Hagen wanted material to include. Griffiths obliged, including proposed language and a near final draft of his report with Kuptana (see doc. 8). 44 Accordingly, during a 28 November 1990 speech in Ottawa, the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced the government's intention to propose an Arctic Council (doc. 7) at the ministerial meeting on an Arctic environmental accord to be held at Rovaniemi in June: The Government believes that now is the time to move forward to establish that Arctic Council. Canada intends to promote an Arctic Council to the seven other Arctic countries-Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the United States and the Soviet Union. We will raise the proposal at a ministerial meeting in Finland next spring on environmental cooperation. Canada is willing to host a small secretariat for this Council and contribute to sustaining it from the outset. 45 Clark emphasized that "with the Cold War over, and with our own concepts for security changing to address non-military threats to our future, let us move forward" and use an Arctic Council as a mechanism to engage the Soviet Union. He envisaged that "the agenda of the Arctic Council should be flexible, allowing for growth with success, as confidence grows." The Council could tackle an urgent need for sustainable development and social development, while providing Northerners and non-Arctic states an outlet to be heard. 46 "The moment was a great one," Franklyn Griffiths recalled. "Looking back on it, I say we performed an act of political ventriloquy." 47 This provided a high-level political push to the Arctic Council Panel's work. While Griffiths and Kuptana continued to refine their report (doc. 8) in October and November 1990, members of the Panel continued to meet informally with federal and territorial government officials. This laid the groundwork for an intensive round of consultations that the Panel conducted with the Prime Minister's Office and officials from the Departments of External Affairs and Indian Affairs and Northern Development that winter. The summary of Arctic Council Project activities from January-June 1991 (doc. 9) provides an in-depth narrative outline of what happened during these months. For example, participants in a 25 January roundtable in Ottawa heard academic, federal and territorial government perspectives on possibilities for circumpolar cooperation. assured," Panel members highlighted. "Further, we believe that the Arctic Council initiative could form the basis for new dialogue and cooperation between the federal government and Canada's Arctic aboriginal peoples." Griffiths and Kuptana also published a scathing opinion editorial in the Globe and Mail on 8 April, accusing the government of being "timorous and outdated" in apparently conceding to an open agenda that would exclude security issues and a position that might "confine native participation to representation on national delegations and to some form of observer status for international aboriginal organizations." 48 On 14 May 1991, the Arctic Council Panel published its major framework report "To Establish an International Arctic Council" (doc. 13) based on the extensive consultative program that it had conducted in the Canadian North. "The creation of an international Arctic Council does present challenges, but none that are insurmountable," the Panel insisted. Its prime concern was with "what kind of instrument will be created"-practical issues related to the objectives, structure, decision-making rules, and mandate of...