Reinforcing national security and regional stability : the implications of nuclear weapons and strategies (original) (raw)

Nuclear Weapons Reinforce Security and Stability in 21 st Century Asia

Global Asia, 2009

coNTINUING EMPhASIS oN non-proliferation and calls for elimination of nuclear weapons notwithstanding, it appears likely that nuclear weapons will persist and influence national security policies and strategies of major powers, as well as certain second-tier powers and isolated states in the foreseeable future.1 Initial anticipation in the West especially in the arms control and nonproliferation community of the decreasing security relevance of nuclear weapons was ill-founded. The effort in the last decade and a half to arrest and reverse the spread of nuclear weapons has not been any more successful than earlier ones. Leaders and governments in nuclear weapon states, their allies, and aspirants to the nuclear club believe that their nuclear forces or those of their allies can advance national security. Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and strategic defense have entered or reentered the security thinking of the old, new, and prospective nuclear weapon states and their allies in ...

Journal for Studies in Management and Planning Nuclear Deterrence: More Nukes for Stable Peace

Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity-a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. It was widely believed that nuclear weapons were an important factor in maintaining the "long peace" between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. India had sighted it's not so friendly neighbour China as a reason for its nuclearisation. While Pakistan in turn sighted threat from India for going nuclear. Is nuclear deterrence oblique encouragement for nuclear proliferation? Moreover, deterrence in the twenty-first century may be far more difficult than it was in the past, and having the right mix of nuclear capabilities to deal with the new challenges will be crucial. New nuclear powers, characteristics of rivalry, are considered unlikely to maintain stable deterrence. This paper attempts to address the question that has nuclear deterrence theory led to more nuclearisation. And whether it is actually relevant in maintaining stability especially in contemporary scenario?

The Credibility of Nuclear Deterrence: Peace and Strategic Stability in South Asia

Open Regional Studies, 2023

When there is anarchy in the international political system, uncertainty and fear can seep into the relations between states, leading to a spiral of power, competition, and even war. This anxiety forces some states to modernize their military forces and increases security risks for other states. In addition to international competition, regional power dynamics force states to modernize their militaries to maintain regional balances of power and state security. One of the most precarious regions in the world in this respect is South Asia, where three nuclear powers, China, India, and Pakistan, reside border to border. Chinese economic and military power is a source of strategic convergence for India, the USA’s most significant deliberate partner. Strategic competition between excessive regional powers creates a strategic dilemma for small states in South Asia, such as Pakistan. The geographical contiguity between India and Pakistan makes the region a nuclear flashpoint. To ensure the state’s survival, above and beyond nuclear weapons, Pakistan cannot contest India’s conventional military superiority. The hypothesis of this study is that Pakistan can assure its security by maintaining credible nuclear deterrence instead of trusting in diplomacy or traditional military power alone. This study explores how minimal credible deterrence has historically played a role in ensuring security and strategic stability in bilateral relations between South Asia’s nuclear powers. Keen and close observation of further Indian military modernization and doctrinal transformation is essential if Pakistan is to establish a comprehensive strategy for national security.

Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Security in South Asia

2011

In the new issue of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Working Papers series, Peter Topychkanov analyzes South Asian regional strategic security issues, the role of nuclear weapons in Indo-Pakistani relations, the external and internal factors shaping these countries’ nuclear postures, and security-enhancing efforts emanating from inside and outside the region. Topychkanov describes the strategic security situation in South Asia as rather unstable. Among the issues are: a high risk of conflict between India and Pakistan caused by cross-border terrorism, accidents with nuclear weapons in both states, the Kashmir dispute, and the problem of sharing water from the Indus river. Major efforts to enhance regional security must be made by India and Pakistan. The author also argues that third countries, international organizations, and nonproliferation regimes can play a positive role as well. According to Topychkanov, both nuclear optimists and pessimists agree that nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia will not lead to a deliberate outbreak of large-scale war. Neither Indian nor Pakistani leaders wish to initiate a conflict that could end in a nuclear exchange with disastrous consequences. Still, a catastrophic conflict could occur even though neither the Indians nor the Pakistanis intend to start a nuclear war, and all measures must be taken to prevent it. The author concludes that India and Pakistan should be engaged in nonproliferation regimes on a nondiscriminatory basis (IAEA, NSG, MTCR, etc.). Engagement would be in the interest of India and Pakistan and would set a good example for the nuclear threshold states. The incentives of nuclear cooperation must be made conditional on acceptance of NPT commitments and IAEA safeguards by recipient states.

Nuclear Strategy and Regional Stability in Southern Asia

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2017

The essay aims to explain interconnections between international security, domestic politics and nuclear strategy of China, India and Pakistan. Most of the scholarship has been unable to probe the deep interconnections that inform the nuclear strategy of these three countries. The literature is based on a generalisation of the superpowers' Cold War nuclear experience and an analysis of the other nuclear powers' arsenal is made through the conceptual and theoretical categories offered by such literature. This article argues against using cold war experiences as a basis for conceptualizing regional powers' nuclear strategies. It begins with a discussion on Posture optimization theory, applying it to understand nuclear strategies of the three Southern Asian nuclear powers and seeks to understand the nature of strategic competition between them and its effect on their respective nuclear postures.

13. The Impact of New Capabilities on the Regional Deterrence Architecture in North-East Asia

2021

The development of technology and the new capabilities that make use of it have had a major impact on the security environment and strategy. The ‘nuclear revolution’ is a major example, which has been supported by the combination of two deterrence concepts: punishment and denial. A strategy that emphasises deterrence by punishment is based on the view that nuclear weapons are ‘absolute weapons’—weapons that are too destructive to ever be used for military purposes—and that their role is limited to deterrence by retaliation.1 Based on this view, the minimum second-strike (i.e. assured destruction) capability required to destroy critical infrastructure such as an adversary’s capital would be enough to deter the adversary, which has the advantage of keeping the cost of deterrent force structure relatively low.