Hume on the Principles of Natural Philosophy (original) (raw)
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my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by enlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object." (TI.3.13: 149) David Hume's conclusion that "all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom" has a considerable impact on how one interprets Hume's views on the role and ability of human reason. If reason is reducible to habit or custom we have to ask if Hume's own use of reason is similarly reducible. Likewise, how can Hume put forward his positive "science of man" when this "science" is actually a version of "custom"? Or better put, how does Hume's view of custom affect how one interprets the apparent tensions that exist between his skeptical philosophy and his positive naturalism?
Agentes morais e a identidade da filosofia de Hume
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia, 2011
The standard interpretion of Hume's philosophy presents him both as a radical skeptic regarding rational claims about the adequate foundation of our belief system and as a naturalist who maintained that our beliefs (though rationally ungrounded) cannot be given up in ordinary life, due to natural drives and sentiments. This paper purports to show that Hume's naturalism can and should be interpreted as a method for addessing philosophical concepts (ideas and beliefs,to use Hume's jargon) that incorporates unreflected elements ofordinary life (such as natural sentiments and drives) and assigns to them the same theoretical status that abstract processes such as reasons and arguments have. A philosophy that warrants unreflected mechanisms in the treatment of philosophical problems is what Hume calls a "true philosophy". Such philosophy is compatible with the more radical forms of skepticism, because the unreflected mechanisms that bring about ideas are imune to doubt. To ilustrate the theses put forth here and so as to render my characterization of naturalism more persuasive, I describe briefly and in broad terms at the end of the paper Hume's view of moral agency.
The Science in Hume's Science of Man, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18, 2020/3.
This paper sketches a recently emerging divide between two interpretations of Hume's methodology and philosophy of science. On the first interpretation Hume relies on an inductive methodology and provides a (Newtonian) dynamic theory of the mind, and his philosophy of science reflects this methodology. On the second, Hume relies on inferences to the best explanation via comparative analysis of instances, and offers an anatomy of the mind relying on a chemical and organic imagery. The paper also aspires to lean the reader's sympathies toward the latter interpretation while outlining some of its potential consequences for the character of Hume's psychology, the limits of associationism, and his empiricism.
Hume, The Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Tradition
The Humean Mind, 2018
Hume's work has an observable role in the historical development of science after his time. To show this, I shall focus on the relation between Hume and two major figures in the history of natural science: Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Albert Einstein (1879-1955). Both of these scientist read Hume. Their evaluation of him was also most positive. Inquiring into the relations between Hume and the two scientists evidences that Hume’s philosophical positions did have a partial constructive role in the formation of modern biology and physics.