The Problem of Evil - A Socratic Dialogue (original) (raw)
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Joshua Ishaya Mamza , 2023
If God is good and wants to eliminate evil, but cannot, he is not omnipotent; but if God is omnipotent and can eliminate evil, but does not, he is not good. Read to find out By Joshua Ishaya Mamza
What the Problem of Evil Properly Entails
Social Sciences Research Network, 2022
It is sometimes thought that the Problem of Evil entails the inexistence of God. However, this is not the case: it only entails the inexistence of an omnipotent-benevolent god, of which the God of Classical Theism is an example. As for ‘limited’ deities such as that of process theology, or malevolent deities such as that of dystheism, the problem of evil is not a problem at all.
ON THE QUESTION OF GOD & THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
2024
Being a term paper submitted to the Department of Philosophy and religious studies, Dominican University, Samonda Ibadan, in partial fulfilment of the Requirements for B.A. Degree of philosophy
The Problem Of Evil: A Case Against The Omnipotence And The Goodness Of God
2017
Evil is the opposite of good. This phenomenon has unleashed serious threat to human existence. The problem is that it is difficult to understand and even to deal with. Evil is a subject that has defied solution politically, socially or religiously. This paper examined the issue of the origin, effect and ways of dealing with evil for a better society. The research adopted the historical and literary methods of research. Various views are examined. Findings affirmed that God created evil as well as good. However, this view challenged the omnipotence and the goodness of God. The research identified bloodshed, corruption, demonic activities, human trafficking, child abuse and child dumping/abuse and many others as social vices associated with evil. This research recommends that man should learn to live with it, overcome it with good, while religious groups should lead in the campaign to end evil and/or reduce its effect on society.
Theodicy, God and the Problem of Evil
The term "theodicy," originating from the Greek words "Theos" meaning God and "dike" meaning justice, addresses the challenge of reconciling the existence of evil with the attributes of omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience attributed to God 1. Alvin Plantinga succinctly defines theodicy as the "answer to the question of why God permits evil." 2 Essentially, theodicy concerns the examination of God's role, whether active or passive, in the world He fashioned, which is confronted with the presence of evil and suffering. Philosophically engaging with theodicy involves grappling with the problem of evil, an inquiry undertaken by figures such as Irenaeus, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas who, while acknowledging God as the Creator, confront the challenge of reconciling His existence with the presence of evil. Conversely, others, like Antony Flew and Plato in his Timaeus, either discredit God's role as Creator or question His attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and paternal love.
The present study aims to analyze the relationship between God and the problem of evil from the perspective of inter-, multi-, and transdisciplinary methodology. After a brief introduction in which the ontological, social, economic or political implications of evil are shown, follows a historical excursion of the idea of divinity, both in its religious and philosophical sense. Chapter God and the model of realities presents the experimental research on the divine entities, made by Charles Tart and Stanislav Grof on subjects in psychedelic-induced states of consciousness. The second part of the study focuses on the problem of evil. Thus the following issues are addressed: the problem of evil in the history of religions, the problem of evil in patristic literature, the problem of evil in philosophy, the theodicy process and theodicy as quidistic discourse.
The Problem of Evil: Exonerating God
Boston Catholic Journal, 2022
No single factor is invoked more often in people turning away from God, or in their failing to believe in Him, than the occurrence — note that I do not say “existence” *— of evil, especially as it manifests itself in suffering. The occurrence of evil appears incompatible with God, or at least a coherent conception of God as both — and simultaneously — absolutely good and absolutely powerful. That God and the occurrence of evil should coexist appears logically contradictory and ontologically incompatible. The one is effectively the abrogation of the other. The existence of God, it is argued, precludes (or ought to preclude) the occurrence of evil and the occurrence of evil precludes (or ought to preclude) the existence of God. While we can readily adduce empirical evidence, that is to say, tangible instances, of evil to discredit the existence of God, the availability of evidence to corroborate the existence of God, on the other hand, is so exiguous that even when such instances are invoked they are deemed extraordinary events in the affairs of men; indeed, events so far from commonplace that we call them miraculous — that is to say, inexplicable interventions conditionally attributed to God in the absence of alternate explanations that may yet be forthcoming. Whether or not this is a sufficient, if concise, summary, the general implication is clear: evidence of evil overwhelmingly exceeds evidence of God. If sheer preponderance is the criterion to which we appeal, God loses. Evil comes as a scandal to the believer who asks, “How can this be, given the existence of God?” To the disbeliever no such scandal arises — only scorn for the believer who is left in perplexity, unable to deny the existence of God on the one hand while equally unable to deny the occurrence of evil on the other. We appear to be consigned to either nihilistic resignation in the one camp (evil is somehow ontologically inherent and rampant in the universe although we cannot explain why), or an unreasoned and therefore untenable affirmation of the existence of God — despite the contradictory concurrence of evil — in the other. Both appear to be damned to perplexity. Neither has satisfactorily answered the question implicit within every occurrence of evil: “Why?” 2. The Problem ... and why we must respond to it Before we begin our attempt to arrive at an answer to the problem of evil, we must first clearly summarize and completely understand the nature of the problem itself. While this may appear obvious, all too often our efforts to make sense of the experience of evil in our lives and in the world fail to adequately address implicit or unstated premises apart from which no answer is either forthcoming or possible. Failing to follow the premises, we fail to reach a conclusion. Instead, we reflexively seize what is incontrovertible (the occurrences of evil) and, understanding nothing of its antecedents, satisfy ourselves that it is entirely a mystery — in other words, utterly incomprehensible to us — in fact, so opaque to our ability to reason it through (which we do not) that we throw up our hands in either frustration or despair, declaring that either it is the will of God in a way we do not understand, or that there can be no God in light of the enormities that we experience. In either case — whether we affirm that God exists despite them, or deny that He exists because of them — we confront the experience of evil as an impenetrable mystery. Such a facile answer, I suggest, is not a satisfactory state of affairs at all.