Beyond Radical Interpretation: Individuality as the Basis of Historical Understanding (original) (raw)
2009, European Journal of Philosophy
AI-generated Abstract
D'Oro critiques Davidson's radical interpretation theory, arguing it fails as a historical interpretive model due to its inability to accommodate significantly different beliefs. The paper explores how Davidson's principle of charity overlooks cultural discrepancies and ultimately hinders understanding historical agents' motivations and beliefs. By contrasting Davidson's approach with Collingwood's perspective, the discourse emphasizes the necessity of interpreting historical figures within their own contextual frameworks.
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