Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction (original) (raw)
Related papers
Reasoning About Necessity and Possibility: A Test of the Mental Model Theory of Deduction* 1
Journal of Experimental …, 1999
This article examined syllogistic reasoning that differs from previous research in 2 significant ways: (a) Participants were asked to decide whether conclusions were possible as well as necessary, and (b) every possible combination of syllogistic premises and conclusions was presented for evaluation with both single-premise (Experiment 1) and double-premise (Experiment 2) problems. Participants more frequently endorsed conclusions as possible than as necessary, and differences in response to the 2 forms of instruction conformed to several predictions derived from the mental model theory of deduction. Findings of Experiments 2 and 3 showed that some fallacies are consistently endorsed and others consistently resisted when people are asked to judge whether conclusions that are only possible follow necessarily. This finding was accounted for by the computational implementation of the model theory: Fallacies are made when the first mental model of the premises considered supports the conclusion presented.
Believability and syllogistic reasoning
Cognition, 1989
This paper is about syllogistic reasoning, i.e., reasoning from such pairs of premises as, All the chefs are musicians; some of the musicians are painters. We present a computer model that implements the latest account of syllogisms, which is based on the theory of mental models. We also report four experiments that were designed to test this account. Experiments 1 and 2 examined the strategies revealed by the participants' use of paper and pencil as aids to reasoning. Experiment 3 used a new technique to externalize thinking. The participants had to refute, if possible, putative conclusions by constructing external models that were examples of the premises but counterexamples of the conclusions. Experiment 4 used the same techniques to examine the participants' strategies as they drew their own conclusions from syllogistic premises. The results of the experiments showed that individuals not trained in logic can construct counterexamples, that they use similar operations to those implemented in the computer model, but that they rely on a much greater variety of interpretations of premises and of search strategies than the computer model does. We re-evaluates current theories of syllogistic reasoning in the light of these results.
Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning
Cognition, 2014
In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive s...
Modeling Human Syllogistic Reasoning: The Role of “No Valid Conclusion”
Topics in Cognitive Science, 2020
Syllogistic reasoning, that is the drawing of inferences for categorical-quantified assertions, is one of the oldest branches of deductive reasoning research with a history exceeding 100 years. In syllogistic reasoning experiments, "No Valid Conclusion" (NVC) is one of the most frequently selected responses and corresponds to the logically correct conclusion for 58% of the syllogistic problem domain. To date, NVC is often neglected in computational models or just treated as a by-product of the underlying inferential mechanisms such as a last resort when the search for alternatives is exhausted. We illustrate that NVC represents a major shortcoming of current models for human syllogistic reasoning. By introducing heuristic rules for predicting NVC, we demonstrate that simple extensions of the existing models result in substantial improvements in their predictive performances. Our results emphasize the need for better NVC handling in cognitive modeling of human reasoning and provide directions for modelers on how to enhance their approaches.
Necessity and contingency in reasoning
Acta Psychologica, 1976
An experiment was designed to investigate whether subjects perform the conditional falsification problem better on sentences they consider as contingently true than on sentences they consider as necessarily true. Subjects had to generate their own sentences out of which the experimenter selected a necessity and a contingency sentence for the falsification task. Instead of the usual four-card presentation the task was performed by means of an interview which was recorded on tape. Results show that subjects performed significantly better on contingency sentences than on necessity sentences. However, the overall rate of insight was low: eight out of 22 subjects gained complete insight. It is hypothesised that subjects' tendency to look for confirming evidence may be explained as a consequence of cognitive self-reinforcement.
Cognitive Uncertainty in Syllogistic Reasoning: An Alternative Mental Models Theory
2001
In this paper we propose a mental models theory of syllogistic reasoning which does not incorporate a falsification procedure and clearly specifies which conclusions will be generated and in what order of preference. It is assumed the models constructed vary in terms of the number of uncertain representations of end terms, and the directness of the representation of the subjects of valid conclusions. These key factors determine which quantified conclusion will be generated, as well as the varying tendency to respond that "nothing follows". The theory is shown to provide a close fit to meta-analysis data derived from past experiments.
Effects of Belief and Logic on Syllogistic Reasoning
Experimental Psychology (formerly "Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie"), 2006
Studies of syllogistic reasoning have demonstrated a nonlogical tendency for people to endorse more believable conclusions than unbelievable ones. This belief bias effect is more dominant on invalid syllogisms than valid ones, giving rise to a logic by belief interaction. We report an experiment in which participants' eye movements were recorded in order to provide insights into the nature and time course of the reasoning processes associated with manipulations of conclusion validity and believability. Our main dependent measure was people's inspection times for syllogistic premises, and we tested predictions deriving from three contemporary mental-models accounts of the logic by belief interaction. Results supported recent "selective processing" theories of belief bias (e.g., , which assume that the believability of a conclusion biases model construction processes, rather than biasing the search for falsifying models (e.g., or a response stage of reasoning arising from subjective uncertainty (e.g., . We conclude by suggesting that the eye-movement analyses in reasoning research may provide a useful adjunct to other process-tracing techniques such as verbal protocol analysis.
In search of counterexamples: Test procedures, validity and deductive rationality in human reasoning
Two studies are presented in which reasoners were explicitly asked to test/validate conditional inferences. The results of both experiments show, first, that people are more likely to look for an alternative, a falsification (as compared to a confirmation) of the inferences. Second, falsification rates are generally lower for the logically valid (vs. invalid) inferences. Third, confirmation-rates are generally higher for denial inferences. Deductively valid inferences are inferences that follow necessarily and not just possibly. Experiment 1 (N = 96) showed that increasing the impetus on this logicality constraint increases the tendency to look for falsifications. Experiment 1confirmed that people who test an inference by searching for an alternative are more likely to make a logically correct evaluation of these inferences. Experiment 2 confirmed, the other way round, that those people who are more likely to reject the logical fallacies are more likely to test their inferences by searching for an alternatives. The results are presented and discussed in relation to contemporary theories of human reasoning.
Journal of personality and social …, 1983
Subjects completed a belief questionnaire that contained propositions of the form "X implies Y." In some cases, the questionnaire items included both premises and the conclusion of a syllogism of the form "A implies B, B implies C, A implies C" (e.g., "Taking vitamin C will increase resistance to infection," "Increasing resistance to infection will prevent colds," and "Taking vitamin C will prevent colds"). In other cases, one or more of these propositions was omitted. Later on, subjects were asked whether each of several propositions had or had not appeared in the form they completed earlier. Correct recognition of a statement that had actually been contained in the questionnaire was not appreciably affected by other statements in which beliefs were reported. However, false recognition of a statement that had not been contained in the questionnaire was substantially increased by reporting beliefs in other statements that were syllpgistically related to it. These effects occurred over and above the effect of simply having been previously exposed to the concepts specified in the propositions being recognized and occurred regardless of whether the proposition to be recognized was the conclusion or a premise of the syllogism set. Results we,re interpreted both in terms of the role of syllogistic reasoning in belief processes and in terms of a conceptualization based on Abelson and Reich's implicational molecule theory.