Cambodia-China Relations Based on the Mutually Beneficial Interests: China, the ‘Most Trusted Friend’ beyond Doubt (original) (raw)

Cambodia-China Relations Based on the Mutually Beneficial Interests:

China, the ‘Most Trusted Friend’ beyond Doubt 1{ }^{1}

ABSTRACT

China was recently described by the Prime Minister Hun Sen as Cambodia’s “most trusted friend”. This claim might be proved by a flood of China’s aid as well as her sharp growing trade and investments in the last decade, which put China the biggest donor and the largest investor. However, Cambodia-China relations stretch much longer than what we see at the present and might be even more complex in the old days. Hence, I begin to examine how their connections have developed over time, especially at each cross section of the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. Then, I will study closely what made these two countries approach each other and became the strategic partners in Southeast Asia by classifying each party’s interests into economic and strategic characteristics. This classification might, on one hand, project a clear picture of Cambodia’s unequal status in the relations, and, on the other hand, illustrate its growing independence from China’s influence. After all, the paper discusses how this bilateral relationship might have the implication on Cambodia’s domestic politics and vice versa .From Cambodia’s perspectives, I argues that their current relations might widen the economic inequality and make the situations of human rights worse in Cambodia so this pair of consequences would, in turn, have domino effects on their future relations through the declining strategic interests of Cambodia’s government, particularly from the post-national election 2013 onwards.

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1. 1{ }^{1} This research paper was written by Mr. CHANDARA KHUN in mid-2013 to fulfill a requirement of ILAP682 (Special Topic: China’s Foreign Policy). It aims to go insight into deep understanding of China’s presence in Cambodia, and her ultimate intention in both national and regional context. ↩︎

INTRODUCTION

China has been argued as the ‘good performer’ and the ‘most trusted friend’ of Cambodia in terms of investment and aid. Since the early days of the peace talks between the People Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the pro-Sihanouk rebellions backed by Beijing, China gradually began her investment and poured a huge package of aid into Cambodia. Infrastructure and energy, the most prioritized sectors by Cambodia’s government, have met China’s assistance. Most importantly, China’s policy of non-interference might be even an attractive option for Cambodia beside her supports during the political crises. Until recently, their relations therefore seem to be thicker and their confidence also appears to be highly upgraded.

However, Cambodia-China relations might not be smooth as it is today. China begun her early contact with Cambodia and got a first impression from this small country in the 1950s. Since then, the two countries have gradually improved their good relationship between the government and the government as well as leaders and leaders. Yet, this sweet relationship between government and government has not lasted for long and begun its irritation until their breakups in 1972 and 1979. During the separation periods, China appeared to spend more than two decades to restore their relations as high as it used to be in the recent past.

Departing from this flexible and complex history, the paper begins initially to look at the early cooperation between Cambodia and China and, specially, to find out how their relations have changed over time since the 1950s till the present. Then, their mutual beneficial interests are subject to a careful study to explore how stable their relations might be and would be by classifying economic from strategic interests. This paper concludes the strategic interests of Cambodia in the bilateral relationship might be reduced to a greater extent when the domestic politics of the country changes in response to the popular dissatisfaction and, in turn, its coming state reforms. As a consequence of the popular dissatisfaction to the government’s

policy, the breakthrough of the election result might greatly influence the domestic politics and redirect Cambodia’s foreign policy towards China as well.

LITERATURE

The rise of China as an economic power might be perceived by some countries in Southeast Asia as an opportunity for cooperation and development. Regardless of its demography, Cambodia becomes a strategic partner and has a strong bond with China in terms of trade, investment and aid. This close relationship might lead the West to suspect China’s growing presence in the region as a threat because Cambodia appears to act on behalf of China’s interests in the region. Yet, we do not know of any focal and extent research, or very a few if any, that examines why China and Cambodia are in a position to restore and improve their complex relationships until the highest level, and what are the impacts of Cambodia-China links on Cambodia’s domestic politics and vice versa. Therefore, this paper comes in place to study all these questions in details from Cambodia’s perspectives.

Cambodia-China relations are flexible and complex over a timeframe. Their relations seem to run smoothly from the early contact though it sometimes might be irritated. Most importantly, a turning point in this relationship happens to take place aftermath of the Khmer Rouge collapse by the Vietnamese’s invasion. All of these factual accounts might explain the insight into why China, a faithful friend of the Khmer Rouge and other rebellion groups against the puppet regime installed by Vietnam, becomes the ‘most trusted friend’ of Cambodia’s government led by the same regime with whom she used to challenge in the previous decades.

Nayan Chanda 2{ }^{2} observes the Cambodia-China relations from the mirror of history and emphasizes China’s shifts in direction of her foreign policy at each cross-section, especially during the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. Nevertheless, these evolutionary relations might not be reasonably understood without acknowledgment of China’s regional

[1]

1. 2{ }^{2} Nayan Chanda. “China and Cambodia: In the Mirror of History.” Asia-Pacific Review 9, no. 2 (2002): 1-11. ↩︎

policy from Gary Klintworth 3{ }^{3} on China’s Indochina Policy and Donald Hugh McMillen 4{ }^{4} on China in Asian International Relations, which put this study back as far as the 1950s. Moreover, whereas Milton Osborne 5{ }^{5} attempts to dig hidden reasons behind the Cambodia’s government option for China by pointing at its neoliberal-oriented politics, poor back ground of human rights and democracy, Laura Rena Murry 6{ }^{6} argues socio-political environment for the reason why Cambodia becomes a target of Chinese investors, particularly ‘the party-and government-connected facilitation’.

Cambodia and China share mutually both economic and strategic interests. Jin Sato describes China as a 'good performer 7{ }^{7} for Cambodia in terms of aid. As Cambodia plans to boost its economy growth in order to keep pace with the economy of Southeast Asia and aims to prepare itself for the regional economic integration by the end of 201582015^{8}, the infrastructure and the electricity seem to be the main boosting factors. Yet, all of these needs have not been covered in the agendas of the traditional donors but China as an emerging donor. In return, Cambodia is also noticed by Jin Sato as an inland bridge 9{ }^{9} connecting China with the region through many sub-regional economic frameworks of the Greater Mekong region and Subregion.

Sigfrido Burgo and Sophal Ear also notice China might benefit from Cambodia’s geographical connectedness to other coastal parts of the region through the port of Sihanoukville 10{ }^{10}. The Sihanoukville port in the Sihanouk province appears to be a wellsituated geopolitical location in the Gulf of Thailand for China’s naval bases to reinforce her stronghold in the region in the time of crisis and safeguard her claimed areas of South China

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1. 3{ }^{3} Gary Klintworth. “China’s Indochina Policy” Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, no. 178 (1989).
   4{ }^{4} Donald Hugh McMillen, “China in Asian International Relations,” International Journal 38, no. 2 (1983).
   5{ }^{5} Milton Osborne. “Cambodia: The End of Politics?” Southeast Asian Affairs (2007): 117-32
   6{ }^{6} Laura Rena Murray. “Target Cambodia.” In World Policy Journal: World Policy Institute, 2012.
   7{ }^{7} Jin Sato et al. ““Emerging Donors” from a Recipient Perspective: An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia.” World Development 39, no. 12 (2011): 2100
   8 “ASEAN Economic Community”, ASEAN Secretariat, accessed 19 September 2013, http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community, paragraph 1.
   9{ }^{9} Jin, p. 2096.
   10{ }^{10} Sigfrido Burgo and Sophal Ear. “China’s Strategic Interests in Cambodia: Influence and Resources” , Asian Survey 50, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 620-624, 629. ↩︎

Sea enriched with oil, gas and other submarine resources. Also, it not least to say the port strategically positions at a mid-way of the sea lanes between Africa and Asia since China’s oil and gas have been regularly transported from Africa and the Middle-East.

Moreover, based on their mutual beneficial interests, Milton Osborne 11{ }^{11} infers Cambodia’s strategic interests from its poor background of human rights and democracy as well as corruption while David Zweig and Bi Jianhai 12{ }^{12} define energy and natural resources are among the priorities of China’s foreign policy to meet her development and growing population. Yet, the concerns of the West on human rights are not subject of China’s considerations to hand her loans and grants to Cambodia. China’s foreign policy for economic and technical assistance to the developing countries appears very likely to distinguish economy from politics 13{ }^{13}. That means profits and interests prevail over politics. Like anywhere else, such as the South Pacific and, perhaps, Africa, China usually does not attach strings or other privileges to her aid and not interfere internal affairs of other sovereign States but ‘One China Policy’ as the only requirement 14{ }^{14}.

Sigfrido Burgo and Sophal Ear believe that Beijing’s ‘sugar-coated relationship’ with Cambodia will not only become thicken between the two governments but also between the government officials and Chinese entrepreneurs 15{ }^{15}. With the unusual relationships, it might be reasonable for Jin Sato to state his doubt on their behaviours towards to the Chinese firms in both their warmly welcoming behaviours 16{ }^{16} and the separate procedures for identifying projects of China’s aid and loans to Cambodia. Unlike the normal procedures used with ‘official development assistance’ (ODA), which normally pass through a strict verification of the Council for the Development of Cambodia before any formal request of the projects is

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1. 11{ }^{11} Osborne, 117-32
   12{ }^{12} David Zweig and Bi Jianhai. “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 25-38.
   13{ }^{13} Fergus Hanson. “China: Stumbling through the Pacific.” in Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan and the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady,(Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 107.
   14{ }^{14} Bertil Lintner. “The South Pacific: China’s New Frontier.” in Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 22
   15{ }^{15} Burgo and Ear, 628-630.
   16{ }^{16} Jin, 2100-2101. ↩︎

issued by Cambodia’s government, most of China’s assistance goes mainly through a direct initiative of each individual State-run and private enterprises 17{ }^{17} of China with each line ministry and a list of projects prepared by the technical ministries will be submitted by the Ministry of Economics and Finance to the Chinese government 18{ }^{18}. Hence, matters of excessive borrowing of soft loans and corruption might be concerns of the future repayment.

The unusual relationship at any governmental level between China and Cambodia might seem to be perceived as means of favoring the private good at the expense of the public good. It might be reasonable for Simon Springer to argue that the neoliberal orders preserved by Cambodia’s current government are mainly fruitful to the elites rather than the general public in overall 19{ }^{19}, so these orders might be identified as the ‘foremost causal factor’ that prevents this country’s democracy and human rights from moving forwards. Therefore, China is the ‘most trusted friend’ for Cambodia in the sense that the former not only helps Cambodia’s government to avoid the pressures from the West regarding the institutional reforms but also to preserve its nepotism. Eventually, many persistent problems including land disputes and economic disparity have never been resolved effectively.

The current social problems might be originally attributed, on one hand, from the land concessions and, on the other hands, from less widespread of the employment. By 2012, the Global Witness reported 2.6 million hectares of land in Cambodia had been leased, which accounts for more than 15%15 \% of the total land, while a third of the population was under a

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1. 17{ }^{17} In China’s domestic and oversea politics, even Chinese firms might be also part of the Communist system. On one hand, in the aftermath of the 1989 event, their economic and political roles were at the attention of some top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For example, is his speech during the eightieth anniversary of the CCP on 01 July 2001, Jiang Zemin recommended the private entrepreneurs be allowed to join the CCP. On the other hand, conversely, the “red capitalists”, who have retired from their posts and “plunged in to the sea” (xiahai) of the private economy but may remain the CCP members, were also growing gradually. Therefore, most of Chinese corporations, notwithstanding of their size and origin, might generally be the promoters of China’s policy abroad. Bruce J. Dickson, “Economics as the Central Task: Do Enterpreneur Matter?” in China’s Leadership in the 21th Century, ed. by David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (United States: An East Gate Book, 2003), 186-203.
   18{ }^{18} Jin Sato et al., 2098
   19{ }^{19} Simon Springer. “Violence, Democracy, and Neoliberal “Order”: The Contestation of Public Space in Posttransitional Cambodia.” Annuals of the Association of American Geographers 99, no. 1 (2008): 138-62 ↩︎

poverty line 20{ }^{20}. Coincidentally, the NGO Forum on Cambodia 21{ }^{21} reported that, between 2008 and 2010, more than a half of the annual land disputes remained unsolved and partly solved while nearly most of them were involved with productive lands (rice fields and fruit tree plantation) and residential areas. Consequently, economic land concessions, forest land concessions and mining land concessions might seem to deprive people of their rights to land property and decent livings because around 80%80 \% of the total population in Cambodia is believed to be farmers whereas livelihoods of a few percentages more depend on forests.

Some forest land concessions might also lead to illegal loggings. The Global Witness seems to have no trust on Cambodian government’s assessments regarding a growing recovery of the national forests 22{ }^{22}. While the 2003 survey of the Forest Administration on Cambodia’s national cover forest found a recovery of the new forests and Prime Minister Hun Sen confirmed the significant increase of the forest cover from 58.6%58.6 \% in 1997 to 61.14%61.14 \% in 2002, the consultant working in the survey and the most recent assessment of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the global forest cover, noted the Global Witness, indicated Cambodia’s forest loss of its primary tropical forest at 29%29 \% between 2000 and 2005232005^{23}.

Moreover, most of the garment works is mainly concentrated in the capital city and its surrounding provinces. More than two thirds of the total garment factories are located in Phnom Penh while most of the rest is allocated to its surrounding provinces such as Kandal, Kampong Speu, Kampong Cham, Takeo and Kampong Chhnang. The problem might happen because, on one hand, peoples in bordering provinces and other rural areas might not have

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1. 20{ }^{20} Global Witness. “Rubber Barons: How Vietnamese Companies and International Financiers Are Driving a Land Grabbing Crisis in Cambodia and Laos.” Global Witness (May 2013): 1, http://www.globalwitness.org/rubberbarons/.
   21{ }^{21} NGO Forum on Cambodia, Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes in Cambodia 2008, 2009, and 2010.
   22{ }^{22} Global Witness, “Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal Logging and the Stripping of Public Assets by Cambodia’s Elite”, Global Witness (June 2007): 17, http://www.globalwitness.org/search/luceneapi\_ node/Cambodia%27s%20Family%20Trees.
   23{ }^{23} Ibid, p.17; see also Interview with a technical advisor to the World Bank Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project, 2003; ‘Address at the Arbor Day Event at the Watershed Area of Kbal Chhay, Sihanoukville’, Prime Minister Hun Sen, accessed 24 March 2007, http://www.cnv.org.kh/2003 releases /090703 arbor day sihanoukville.htm. ↩︎

access to works 24{ }^{24} and, on the other hand, workers in the urban areas might struggle to keep up with their high living cost 25{ }^{25}. It might become even worse for them when the inflation highly increases from year on year, especially the basic commodities for their daily life 26{ }^{26}.

Therefore, the Cambodia-China relations might have an implication on the domestic politics and vice versa. An outbreak of populous outrages in the country might be greatly linked to the direct consequences of the land concessions that might have trapped peoples in both the city and the countryside alike in poverty. This hypothesis might be reasonably proved by the result of this year election in which the Cambodia National Rescue Party, the opposition, gained more supports 27{ }^{27}. Many political analysts appear to be impressed by the election result and to strongly believe a balance of political powers between the Cambodian People Party (CPP) and the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) might have led to the Chinese Communist Party’s concerns in competing for Cambodia with the United States 28{ }^{28}. China’s concerns might not only deal with a more active involvement of the United States in Cambodia’s domestic politics through the CNRP but also the growing independence of the CPP on China’s assistance as a result of the coming state reforms.

I-From Doubtful to ‘Sugar-Coated’ Relations

The early contacts between Cambodia and China might not be thick as it is today but complex. A history of their recent past would be easily understood if it has been discussed in

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1. 24{ }^{24} “Garment Factories and Supply Chains.”, sithi.org. ,accessed 17 September 2013, http://www.sithi.org/temp.php?url=bhr/bhr\_list.php&lg=
   25{ }^{25} Ly Menghour. "Report: Garment Workers in Cambodia Must Get Their Monthly Wages at Least $Us 150 for Their Decent Livings " [Khmer],RFI, 20th September 2013, http://www.khmer.rfi.fr/cambodia/20130920-report-garment-worker-should-get-150-dollars-a-month.
   26{ }^{26} Cambodia’s prices for basic commodities such as rice, meats and gasoline have increased from year to year. In April 2013, while the rice’s price increased by nearly 2%2 \% while beef and gasoline experienced a sharp surge of 18%18 \% and 7.8%7.8 \% respectively. May Kunmakara. “Food Prices up 1.6%1.6 \% in April.” The Phnom Penh Post, 5th 5^{\text {th }} July 2013, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/food-prices-16-pct-april .
   27 “The List on the Result of the National Election in 2008.”, National Election Committee, accessed 17 August 2013, http://www.necelect.org.kh/nec\_khmer/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id= 153&Itemid=386 . “Election Result Declaration by NEC Letter No.09.109/13 dated on 08 September 2013”, National Election Committee, accessed 09 September 2013, http://www.necelect.org.kh/ .
   28{ }^{28} Kong Sothanrith. "China Encourages Cambodia to Speed up Its New Government and Help Cambodia against Any Foreign Invention " [Khmer], VOA, . 21 August 2013, http://khmer.voanews.com/content/ while-urging-cambodia-to-form-new-government-china-pledge-to-support-cambodia-against-foreign-
   power/1734049.html?utm_medium=email; Narim Khuon and Simon Lewis. “Chinese Foreign Minister Endorses CPP Election Win.” The Cambodia Daily, 22 August 2013, http://www.cambodiadaily.com/ elections/chinese-foreign-minister-endorses-cpp-election-win-40497/. ↩︎

the context of government-to-government relations and at each turning point of the Cold-War and post-Cold War periods, which might explain clearly how Beijing reversed her policy towards Phnom Penh. The shifts in direction of China’s policy seem to be not a coincidence but it might happen in parallel with a less immediate threat of Soviet Union and her domestic demands for the economic growth in particular 29{ }^{29}. Ultimately, Cambodia might become one of the target partners for China to search for her economy growth and market expansion in Southeast Asia 30{ }^{30}.

Irritated Relations as a Reflection of the Global and Regional Politics
Initially, China might have come into contact with Cambodia in the context of Indochina. China’s policy in Southeast Asia was to keep her southern neighbors in check and free from another challenging power 31{ }^{31}. The Indochina Union was not only a geopolitical locality for the French colonization but also tacitly represented a block of Communist countries within which Vietnam was a team leader of the Indochina Communist Party. With a fear of the Soviet Union’s influence in the region through a proxy of the Vietnamese 32{ }^{32}, China broke up the Indochinese Communist Party in the mid-1950s in order to reduce Vietnam’s domination in the block 33{ }^{33}.

Unfortunately, China’s misadventure eventually came with a growing Soviet-Vietnamese tie. With a fear of China’s intimidation, Vietnam decided to strengthen Soviet-Vietnamese relations by providing the Soviet Union bases for intelligence-gathering and force-projection capacities in the region and the Indian Ocean in the mid-1978 34{ }^{34}. In the late 1978, Vietnam, in return, got a huge shipment of military equipment that might be used to defense the border fights with China and her ally, the Khmer Rouge 35{ }^{35}. Ultimately, the relations between Vietnam and the USRR were reinforced to another higher level when Vietnam signed a Treaty of

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1. 29{ }^{29} Klintworth, 8.
   30{ }^{30} McMillen, 2-3.
   31{ }^{31} Nayan, 2.
   32{ }^{32} McMillen, 11.
   33{ }^{33} Nayan, 3.
   34{ }^{34} William Bach, “A Chnace in Cambodia.” Foreign Policy 62 (Spring 1986): 78.
   35{ }^{35} Ibid. ↩︎

Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow in November 1978361978^{36}. Immediately with a turn of 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, thrown the Khmer Rouge out of powers and installed the new regime, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 37{ }^{37}.

However, China’s loss of the ground in Cambodia was only temporarily and did not prevent her from reemerging in Asia. China would have not reclaimed her credibility back if the US and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had not supported her actions for a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia 38{ }^{38}. The main reason behind this support might mainly attribute to the US and the regional fears of the Soviet Union. Consequently, it seemed that China, the US and the ASEAN shared common interests to fail Vietnam’s ambition unachievable and to prevent the USSR’s growing presence in the region.

As a neighboring country, Thailand was challenged by the civil war in Cambodia. Many fights broke up over the Thailand-Cambodia borders among Khmer Rouge and pro-Sihanouk insurgents with the PRK led by the CPP. Under the supports of China, these rebellion groups rallied against the presence of the Vietnamese. Also, as a consequence of the civil war, hundreds of thousand Cambodians crossed the borders into Thailand. Eventually, Thailand had no alternative but tacitly supported China and her ally, the Khmer Rouge, over its borders. Thailand’s decision might be backed by the United States because the U.S defense loans and military assistances to Thailand were multiplied by more than three times between 1979 and 1985 from only US$ 30 million to US$ 10239102^{39}.

With a fear of Thailand’s fall into Communism, ASEAN also denied the legitimacy of the Vietnamese’s presence in Cambodia and so denounced the PRK’s recognition. While some of its members including Malaysia and Indonesia were facing the same challenge with their domestic politics, Thailand was surrounded by Communist countries including Vietnam, Laos and ultimately Cambodia. As a consequence, ASEAN was active to promote the supports of

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1. 36{ }^{36} McMillen, 7.
   37{ }^{37} Bach, 78 .
   38{ }^{38} Klintworth,9-10.
   39{ }^{39} Bach, 79. ↩︎

the international community to call for Vietnam’s withdrawal and to deny the UN membership of the PRK installed by Hanoi 40{ }^{40}. In addition, under the cooperation between ASEAN and China, the coalition government of the three guerrillas, Khmer Rouge, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the pro-Sihanouk insurgents (Armée National Sihanoukienne), were forged in 1982 to represent Kampuchea (Cambodia) at the United Nations 41{ }^{41}, so the PRK government was left unrepresented until 1991.

Rebounded Relations as Responses to China’s Domestic politics
Though the year 1989 marked the fall of the Soviet Union, China still faced challenges with her domestic politics and threats to her territorial integrity 42{ }^{42}. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CPP) were, on one hand, shocked by the Tiananmen demonstration in 1989 and, on the other hand, felt a danger of her territorial integrity by the American sympathy towards Taiwan 43{ }^{43}. These situations were perceived as emerging threats to the regime’s legitimacy, so its agenda for economic development and cooperation with Southeast Asia were perceived as the CPP’s central task 44{ }^{44}.

Cambodia might be a better partner for China in terms of the past relationship and sociopolitical situations. During the 1960s, Cambodia-China relations were presumed to reach a high level between the government and government as well as leaders and leaders. Even after the collapse of the monarchy in the 1970, Sihanouk still got continuing supports for his exile government and a warm treat from Chou En-lai 45{ }^{45}. This tightened relationship might seem to be a heritage the predecessor has left for the second constitutional monarchy and Cambodia. Also, if compared to other Southeast Asia countries such as Indonesia, the Chinese were socially highly regarded by Cambodians and well on their way to becoming assimilated in

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1. 40{ }^{40} Nayan, 4.
   41{ }^{41} Bach, 80-82.
   42{ }^{42} Nayan, 5.
   43{ }^{43} Ibid, 5-6.
   44{ }^{44} Dickson, 186
   45{ }^{45} Alain-Gerard Marsot, “China’s Aid to Cambodia.” Pacific Affairs 42, no. 2 (1969): 193-198 ↩︎

Cambodia 46{ }^{46}. These favorable situations might be one of many factors for China to consider Cambodia as a partner.

China’s attempt to choose Cambodia as a partner might be also matched by Cambodia’s domestic politics at the time. In the early post-transitional period, Cambodia was governed by the authoritarian regime with a poor background of human rights and democracy whereas some parts of its territories were still under control of Khmer Rouge. Therefore, Cambodia’s rapprochement with China might have not only solved problems of the West’s calls for human rights and democracy reforms but also prevented Khmer Rouge to climb to powers again 47^{47}.

However, it appears Cambodia’s dependence on China might gradually decline over time in accordance with its domestic politics. In the late 1997, with an introduction of Hun Sen’s policy, the so-called ‘Win-Win’, Khmer Rouge forces were integrated into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) under the control of the government, therefore Khmer Rouge’s threat was never a concern for Cambodia’s government at a later date. Most importantly, though consecutive outbreaks of peasant resistances nationwide have not yet attracted enough attention from the CPP leaders for deep reforms since 2008 because of their high self-esteem 48{ }^{48}, the result of the 28th 28^{\text {th }}-July election shocked the authoritarian leaders with a great loss of votes to the CNRP49\mathrm{CNRP}^{49} and would, in turn, have pushed the new government to revise its policy for state reforms.

II-Mutually Beneficial Interests in Cambodia-China Relations

In this part, the interests might be better understood in the context of economy and strategy. This distinction helps explain how each partner’s interests have changed overtime and what would be potential consequences of these changes. Generally, economic interests

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1. 46{ }^{46} Ibid, 192.
   47{ }^{47} Osborne, 118, 126-129.
   48{ }^{48} Land disputes, unemployment, income inequality and inflation might be the main factors for the outbreak of protests throughout the country and getting worse from year to year since senior officers of the CPP might feel peoples still have a trust and loyalty to them for their rescue from the Khmer Rouge.
   49{ }^{49} Immediately after the declaration of the provisional result of the election, some senior members of the ruling party mentioned about more works and reforms the CPP have to solve in the next government’s mandate. ↩︎

mainly refer to the exact figure of the economic values while strategic interests appear to be impossible for calculation in the exact figure and, indeed, have an abstract economic value. In overall, it appears that China’s interests prevail over Cambodia’s in terms of both economy and strategy tough Cambodia’s strategic interests seem to be flexible, supposed that its domestic politics demand for changes, and China’s might conversely be more stable.

A- Cambodia’s Interests

Cambodia’s government aims to boost economic growth and keeps pace with other neighboring countries for the economic integration in Southeast Asia. The economic development appears to rely on foreign direct investment and exports but it might not happen without an availability of infrastructure and energy. A huge amount of Chinese investments has been poured annually into manufacture and energy while her financial assistance has been allocated to the restoration and reconstruction of the infrastructure. On the top of that, it might be arguably claimed China’s investment and aid to Cambodia generally have no conditions, respond to the real needs of the receiving country and come on the right time.

Economic Interests of Cambodia

China is both the biggest investor and the largest donor to Cambodia. Though China begun her economic relations with Cambodia in the early 1990s, these relations just became apparent in the early 2000s. According to the ‘Investment Approved by CDC by Major Countries (1994-September 2011)’, the total investment put China on the top followed by Korea 50{ }^{50}. Out of US$ 39.886 billion, South Korea’s total foreign direct investment (FDI) in Cambodia took around 10.1%10.1 \% whereas China’s total FDI was more than double of Korea’s at approximately 22.23%5122.23 \%{ }^{51}. Nearly half of the total FDI was poured into tourism and nearly a quarter was invested into industries 52{ }^{52}. In addition, between 1998 and 2009, out of US$ 15,234

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1. 50{ }^{50} Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC),“Cambodian Investment Guide.” (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2012), II-5.
   51{ }^{51} CDC. II-5.
   52{ }^{52} Ibid. ↩︎

million, China’s FDI accounted for 45.6% of the total FDI followed by South Korea at 17.6%5317.6 \%{ }^{53}.

Moreover, China’s assistance might help Cambodia boost its economy growth and speed up its pace with ASEAN members for its smooth integration into the ASEAN Economy Community. As a post-civil war country, Cambodia’s economic growth might be not the only focus but infrastructure and energy might be also at the top priority of the government. According to the 2010 World Bank report, Cambodia has managed to maintain its economic growth averaging over 6%6 \% for the past 5 years, which makes the investment of the infrastructure and energy sectors even more necessary 54{ }^{54}. That means Cambodia needs to have both roads and bridges connecting its neighbors as well as sources of electricity.

China might be the largest aid donor to Cambodia 55{ }^{55}. Between 2005 and 2009, the total figure of aid disbursement put China the largest donor followed by Japan and totaled at US$ 287.6 million 56^{56}. Around 91.87%91.87 \% of the total was in form of loans and approximately 98%98 \% went to transportation 57{ }^{57}. Among the 6 projects of major road restorations between 2001 and 2010, China took three projects under terms of loans at the cost of around US$ 108.9 million while ADB and Japan were responsible for the rest 58{ }^{58}. National Road No.7, one of examples, was rehabilitated under Chinese loans for connecting Kampong Cham province to Sting Treng province where Laos shares the borders at Veun Sai 59{ }^{59}.

Also, both China and Japan heavily invested into major bridge constructions though the China’s projects were achieved under terms of loan 60{ }^{60}. Prek Tamak Bridge ( 1060 m ) in Kandal province, another example, was constructed under Chinese loans for crossing over the Mekong River and connecting Phnom Penh to other national roads towards Vietnam’s

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1. 53{ }^{53} Ouch Chandarany et al, Assessing China’s Impact on Poverty Reduction in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region: The Case of Cambodia (Phnom Penh: CDRI, June 2011), 33-34.
   54{ }^{54} Jin 2093.
   55{ }^{55} China’s aid in the infrastructure increased from US185millionin2010toUS 185 million in 2010 to US185millionin2010toUS 376 million in 2012. Theara, Khoun. “As Foreign Aid Increase, Questions About Conditions.” 17 September 2013 2013.
   56{ }^{56} Ouch, 48.
   57{ }^{57} Ibid.
   58{ }^{58} CDC, IV-8.
   59{ }^{59} Ouch, 52.
   60{ }^{60} CDC, IV-8. ↩︎

borders 61{ }^{61}. It is worth to notice that nearly all of China’s assistance projects in the infrastructure have been agreed upon loan schemes rather than grants 62{ }^{62}.

Another boosting machine of Cambodia’s economy might be an availability of energy resources. Tough electricity seems to be one of the main challenges beside roads and bridges to attract investors into Cambodia, yet the electricity supply currently does not meet the basic demands. That means the 24 -hour supply of electricity has never been assured in the capital city whereas most households in other urban and rural areas have not got access to the electricity. Actually, less than 30%30 \% of households in Cambodia have access to the electricity while the capital city also needs another 50 MW to feed its current demands 63{ }^{63}. According to the ‘Power Development Plan of the Kingdom of Cambodia in 2007’, the electricity demand throughout the country is also expected to rise more than double by 2020, if compared to the demands in 2012, from 1,062 MW to 2,770 MW 64^{64}.

China’s investment into the electricity therefore responds to the real needs of Cambodia. A huge amount of finance has been poured into dam constructions under concessional contracts between the government of Cambodia and the Chinese enterprises. According the Ministry of Industry, Mining and Energy (MIME), out of 18 hydropower, coal and gas projects, at least 7 hydroelectric power projects were granted to the Chinese companies while five of them already begun its operations in 2011 and operations of other two projects were set for 2017 and 2019652019^{65}. If these 7 hydroelectric power plants fully operate, they have capacity to produce electricity at around 1,473 MW, more than 50%50 \% of the total electricity demands by 2020662020^{66}.

[1]

1. 61{ }^{61} Ouch, 52 .
   62{ }^{62} According to a joint report by IMF and WB, China holds the largest amount of bilateral loans in Cambodia, comprising around 66%66 \% of Cambodia’s total debt at the end 2010. Though the exact figure of debts Cambodia currently owns to China has never been released publicly, the total amount varies between US2billionandUS 2 billion and US2billionandUS 6 billion. In this regard, some anecdotal evidence suggests that most China loans have higher interest rates with shorter amortization and grace periods, compared to ADB, WB and Japan respectively. Heng Pheakdey, “Cambodia-China Relations: A Postive-Sum Game?” Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2 (2012): 63-64.
   63{ }^{63} CDC, IV-3.
   64{ }^{64} Ibid, IV-2.
   65{ }^{65} CDC, IV-32
   66{ }^{66} Ibid. ↩︎

Strategic Interests of Cambodia

Phnom Penh-Beijing relations have gradually improved and recently reached a peak. In 2003, the Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly announced China is the ‘most trusted friend’ of Cambodia, which might base on two main reasons. China’s assistance and investment in Cambodia has been acknowledged to have no strings attached and come in the right time. Like other countries 67{ }^{67} such as the Pacific 68{ }^{68} and, perhaps, Africa, China’s foreign policy of financial and technical assistance might not oblige the receiving countries for conditions or privileges and, if applicable, might help her partners during the political crises 69{ }^{69}.

China’s foreign policy towards Cambodia appears to distinguish matters of economy from politics by arguing a respect of Cambodia’s sovereignty. The government of Cambodia has been criticized for violation of human rights, poor democracy and corruption for long time but all of these so-called political issues have never been mentioned by China. To name a few, freedom of expression and press freedom might be strictly controlled by the criminal law through provisions of misinformation and defamation 70{ }^{70} notwithstanding biased media 71{ }^{71}. In addition, most of the basic provisions of the 1993 Constitution for the assurance of the democracy were amended by the CPP for their grip of powers 72{ }^{72}. In 2012, the Transparency

[1]

1. 67{ }^{67} The principles of mutually beneficial interests, equality among the providing and receiving countries, noninterference and non-strings attached are among the eight principles of the Chinese Government for economic and technical assistance to other countries. Hanson, 107.
   68{ }^{68} According the Cook Island News on 14th 14^{\text {th }} September 2004, Zhang Wei, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Wellington, New Zealand, was quoted that “China seeks no self-interest in the South Pacific, noninterference is a fundamental principle underpinning China’s relations with South Pacific countries” and “no strings whatsoever” are attached to Chinese aid; cited in Lintner, 22.
   69{ }^{69} Lintner, 28.
   70{ }^{70} Journalists and human rights activists were arrested on charge of criminal defamation in relation to the “Supplementary Border Agreement” concluded between Cambodia and Vietnam in October 2005. Osborne, 118. 71{ }^{71} Neither State nor private television programs covered the events of the mass demonstrations in the 2013 election and police crackdown on peaceful demonstrators.
   72{ }^{72} The most striking examples were the amendments in 2005 and 2006. The two-third quorum of the meeting and the two-third majority of votes required for the formation of the Parliament and the Government were adjusted to only a simple absolute majority of 50%+150 \%+1; Osborne, 119. Also, see the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, article 82 New, article 88 New (two), article 111 New (two) and article 119 New; “Law Texts.” [Khmer], Constitutional Council, accessed 27 September 2013, http://www.ccc.gov.kh/khmer/anukret.php ↩︎

International also ranked this country at 157 out of 174 corrupted countries covered globally in the survey, just ahead of Laos (160) and Myanmar (172) 73{ }^{73}.

Although Cambodia’s government claims China’s assistance has no conditions in exchange, yet this claim might not mirror the reality. Indeed, China might interfere into Cambodia’s politics whenever her national interests are relevant. For instance, while this year election has been heavily criticized by the voters and the international community, China endorsed the victory of the CPP against the CNRP backed by the United States, and argued to prevent any external interference insisting for an investigation of the election irregularities 74{ }^{74}.

Moreover, most of China’s investment and aid come in the right time for her counterparts 75{ }^{75}.It was not least to notice that China’s investments in Cambodia coincidently surged during the 2003-2004 and 2008-2009 political deadlock by accumulating her annual FDI at an average of not less than 50%50 \% of the total 76{ }^{76}. In addition, in the aftermath of the July 1997 coup by Hun Sen against his co-Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, while the legitimacy of the government became problematic and the West denied its recognition, China eventually welcomed Hun Sen’s State visit and supported this new government with the highest aid package of US$ 218.3 million 77{ }^{77}. Yet, such China’s strategy also happened in Fiji in the aftermath of the December 2006 coup. While Australian and other Western donors were squeezing Fiji’s military government, Chinese aid in Fiji skyrocketed from US$ 900,000 to US$ 135 million 78^{78}.

[1]

1. 73{ }^{73} CDRI Teamwork, Cambodia’s Development Dynamics: Past Performance and Emerging Priorities, ed. Susan Watkins (Phnom Penh: CDRI, September 2013), 70.
   74{ }^{74} Khoun Narim and Simon Lewis. “Chinese Foreign Minister Endorses CPP Election Win.” The Cambodia Daily, 22 August 2013, http://www.cambodiadaily.com/elections/chinese-foreign-minister-endorses-cpp-election-win-40497/.
   75{ }^{75} Like anywhere else, China’s foreign policy might not only benefit her partners with the non-interference policy but also might aim to buy confidence from them.
   76{ }^{76} Ouch, 34.
   77{ }^{77} Nayan, 6-7.
   78{ }^{78} Lintner, 28. ↩︎

B-China’s Interests

Tough China begun her economic relations with Cambodia in the early 1990s, these relations were evident only in the early 2000s. In their bilateral relations, China has both economic and strategic interests in her national and international politics. Economically, China’s business might be lucrative in trade, investment and an exploitation of natural resources. Strategically, China might seem to expect a geographical location of Cambodia for the market expansion and defense in Southeast Asia.

Economic Interests of China

China greatly benefits from Cambodia in areas of the bilateral trades, investments and exploitation of natural resources. A great amount of money has been mainly invested into Cambodia’s garment industries and energy every year. Also, China might perceive Cambodia as one of many potential destinations where China drags natural resources to feed her hungry economy. This country is naturally enriched with precious forests, oil, gas and other valuable mineral sources.

China’s bilateral trades with Cambodia are very lucrative and bring back home millions of dollars. Between 1998 and 2009, China was the biggest investor in Cambodia by accounting for 45.6%45.6 \% of the total FDI79\mathrm{FDI}^{79} but their trade imbalance increased year on year. In 2000, Cambodia’s export to China amounted to US$ 59.49 million and China’s export to Cambodia valued at US$ 164.06 million whereas Cambodia’s import from China jumped to US$ 1095.54 million and China’s import from Cambodia was substantially much lower at US$ 38.83 million in 2008802008^{80}. In overall, the value of Cambodia’s export to China between 2000 and 2008 remained small with the annual average of around US$ 36.3 million while China’s export to Cambodia averaged US$ 509 million per year.

Moreover, China’s investment aims to take profits from Cambodia’s preferential treatment for textile and other products made in Cambodia. The US-Cambodia Trade Agreement on

[1]

1. 79{ }^{79} Ouch, 33-34.
   80{ }^{80} Ibid, 15-16. ↩︎

Textile and Apparel was signed in 1998-99 for market access and labour standards whereas the EU introduced its “Everything but Arms (EBA)” scheme whereby Cambodia benefits quota and duty-free access for all Cambodian exports to the EU market 81{ }^{81}. In addition, China might drag trade barriers and get access to a much bigger market in Southeast Asia. Besides the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 82{ }^{82}, China might also benefit zero tariff rates from Cambodia’s position in the condition of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This target for AFTA has been agreed by the AFTA Council that the target dates will be 2015 for the six original ASEAN Member Countries and 2018 for the newer Members 83{ }^{83}.

Furthermore, Cambodia might be a source of natural resources and energy supplies for China. Based on the government-to-government good relations, most of the Chinese enterprises might seem to have a favorable condition compared to other foreign investors in getting rights to natural resources 84{ }^{84}. China is believed to have a stake in an exploitation of Cambodia’s natural resources such as timbers, minerals, and oil and gas through land concessions, mining concessions as well as oil and gas extraction licenses.

Land concessions appear to be suspicious means for China exploiting Cambodia’s forests and minerals. Most of the exported timbers from Cambodia might seem to supply high demands of the domestic consumers in China 85{ }^{85}. According to the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, around 50 percent of the total land concessions between 1994 and 2012 were reportedly granted to 107 Chinese companies with an equivalence of 3,374,3283,374,328 hectares of

[1]

1. 81{ }^{81} Ibid, 34
   82{ }^{82} The ACFTA was signed in Phnom Penh in 2002 to enhance trade and investment and to reduce trade barriers in goods and services, as well as trade facilitation and technology transfer. This agreement has been decided to take effects by 2010 among the six original ASEAN Member Countries (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Philippines) and by 2015 for the four newer Members (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar). Ouch, 11.
   83{ }^{83} The trade among the ASEAN Member Countries grown from US$ 44.2 billion in 1993 to US$ 73.4 billion, which represents an average increase of 13.2%13.2 \%. “ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): An Update.”, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, accessed 27 September 2013, http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/asean-free-trade-area-afta-an-update, paragraph 16.
   84{ }^{84} Jin, 2099
   85{ }^{85} China’s involvements in exploiting Cambodia’s forests might be seen directly and indirectly. In other words, it might have been done, on one hand, by the Chinese firms and, in the other hand, by Vietnamese firms but the final destination of exports might be China. Global Witness. “Rubber Barons: How Vietnamese Companies and International Financiers Are Driving a Land Grabbing Crisis in Cambodia and Laos.”, 4-5 ↩︎

forest concessions, 973,101 hectares of economic land concession and 268,316 hectares of mining land concessions 86{ }^{86}. China was reported to have imported from Cambodia a total of approximately 28,000 m328,000 \mathrm{~m}^{3} of plywood between 2003 and 2006 and 150,000 m3150,000 \mathrm{~m}^{3} of sawn wood between 2003 and 2007872007^{87}. In addition, though the size of the Chinese investments in mineral resources appear to be significant, the Global Witness Report in 2009 named merely a few Chinese firms that involved in exploiting iron ore and sand dredging because of, perhaps, an uneasy access to data collections and unavailability of the data to the public 88{ }^{88}.

Besides timbers and minerals, most of oil and gas concessions both in the onshore and the offshore were reportedly granted to Chinese firms (Figure 1). In the onshore, Block XIII a nd other unnamed blocks were controlled by Chinese firms such as the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC), the Chinese state-run oil company, and Guangdong Chenguan Enterprise Investment Group, a private real estate developer from Guangdong province 89{ }^{89}. In the offshore, Chinese companies were reported to hold a majority of the total six blocks (AF). Block D was believed to be held solely by China Petrotech or Mirach Energy whereas the Polytec Petroleum Corporation, which is incorporated in the Caymans and headquarters in Hong Kong, was reported to hold 100 per cent of Block C 90{ }^{90}. Also, Block F might seem to be under control of the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) 91{ }^{91}.

[1]

1. 86{ }^{86} According to the Cambodia Centre for Human Rights report, more than 8 million hectares of land concessions have been granted to 368 companies between 1994 and 2012. May Titthara, “China Reaps Concession Windfalls”, The Phnom Penh Post, Monday, 2 April 2012, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/ national/china-reaps-concession-windfalls.
   87{ }^{87} Global Witness, Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal Logging and the Stripping of Public Assets by Cambodia’s Elite, 44 .
   88{ }^{88} Global Witness. Country for Sale: How Cambodia’s Elite Has Capture the Country’s Extractive Industries, (Global Witness, February 2009), 21, 25, 31-32; http://www.globalwitness.org/library/country-sale
   89{ }^{89} Global Witness, Country for Sale: How Cambodia’s Elite Has Capture the Country’s Extractive Industries, 48 90{ }^{90} Ibid, 46
   91{ }^{91} Ibid, 48 ↩︎

Figure 1: Map of Known Oil and Gas Concession in Cambodia
(Source: Global Witness Report, Country for Sale, 2009, pp.43)
Strategic Interests of China
Cambodia might strategically provide China diplomatic, economic and military bases in Southeast Asia. China’s presence as a new emerging power, both economic and military, might need more supports from some countries in the region in order to reduce fears and build up trust among them. The demand for supports might become apparent when this emerging power has conflicting interests over shared water boundaries with other countries in the region. In addition, Cambodia’s land territories might be perceived as a bridge connecting this country to other mainland and costal ASEAN countries. Its sea territories might be a checkpoint where China’s oil and gas transport or a passage of the ‘String of Pearls’ comes across.

Cambodia not only supports the China’s presence but also mediates the two sides, China and her counterparts, over the dispute of the claimed areas in the South China Sea. In late 2012, when Cambodia chaired the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, the ASEAN failed to deliver a joint declaration for the first time in ASEAN’s 45-year history

to outline the group consensus 92{ }^{92} regarding the issue of the South China Sea and its code of conduct. Cambodia was consequently alleged to work for China’s interests over the South China Sea. Also, while the ongoing controversy over the disputed claims remains a cause of division among the ASEAN Members, Cambodia continues to lobby her colleagues to have a close tie with China. Just before a kickoff of the ASEAN-China Submit in Beijing from 28 to 30 August 2013, Hor Namhong, the minister of foreign affairs and cooperation for Cambodia, was quoted that “I hope that the meeting in Beijing at the end of the move will improve and consolidate the relationship between ASEAN and China and better understanding,” 93{ }^{93}.

Moreover, China might benefit significantly from the geographic location of Cambodia in terms of the regional and global economic expansion. Geographically, Cambodia might become an inland bridge where the newer members of the ASEAN might be connected to the original members. Therefore their economic integration within the ASEAN 94{ }^{94} might be greatly opportunistic for China’s market expansion.

Unfortunately, China’s interests in the region might depend partly on a favorable environment and readiness of the ASEAN newer members such as Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar members. In other words, the success of the economic integration in the region might necessitate China to direct her investment and aid towards infrastructures and energy through its 'sector-based allocation policy’95. For example, it might be reasonable to argue that many projects of both major road improvements and bridge constructions aim to create road networks among the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) 96{ }^{96}, the Greater Mekong region

[1]

1. 92{ }^{92} Daniel Schearf, “Southeast Asian Nations Aim to Restore Unity at Annual Summit”, VOA, 24 April 2013, http://www.voacambodia.com/content/south-asian-nations-aim-to-restore-unity-at-annualsummit/1647457.html?utm\_medium=email
   93{ }^{93} Kong Sothanarith, “Cambodian Miniser Urges Closer Asean Ties with China”, VOA, 22 August 2013, http://www.voacambodia.com/content/cambodian-minister-urges-closer-asean-ties-with-
   china/1734770.html?utm_medium=email
   94{ }^{94} China-ASEAN Free Trade Area began on 01 January 2010 with the goal of zero tariff rates for 90%90 \% of goods trade among China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam by 2015. Burgo and Ear, 629.
   95{ }^{95} Jin, 2096.
   96{ }^{96} The GMS composes of three countries including Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. With the initiative of the Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, in 1999, all the country members of the GMS agreed to create CLV Development Triangle Area in 2004 to boost their economy and to speed up their capacity of the economic integration into the region. This area composes of 3 countries & 13 provinces; Cambodia (Ratanakiri, Stung Treng, Mondulkiri and Kratie in Eastern). Laos (Attapu, Salavan, Sekong and Champasak in Southern) & ↩︎

(GM) and the ASEAN through passages of ASEAN highways such as the National Road 5 and the National Road 6 connecting Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand 97{ }^{97}.

Given that China’s aid assistance is effective, Cambodia might become the inland bridge connecting the mainland member countries of ASEAN to the coastal member countries. At the GMS level, Cambodia stands at the location where Vietnam and Laos might connect and cooperate together to speed up their economy with the regional pace. Consequently, the Development Triangle Area (Figure 3) was initiated by the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in 1999 and ultimately established by the Vientiane Declaration in 2004982004^{98}. Also, the Greater Mekong Sub-region might be a substantial framework that aims to the integration of the members of the Greater Mekong region (GM). The GM composes of six countries including China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam and a total territory of 200 million acres, the combined size of Texas and Arkansas 99{ }^{99}. China’s efforts for the economic integration in the GSM and the GM (Figure 2) might lead to achieving the frameworks for the regional and global free trade established by the FATA and ACFTA.

[1]

1. Vietnam (Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Dak Nong and Binh Phuoc). 111,021 square kilometres and a total population in 2002 of around 4 million. “Introduction of the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area”, Development Triangle Portal, accessed 15 September 2013, http://clv-
   triangle.vn/portal/page/portal/clv en/817327, paragraph 1 and 16.
   97{ }^{97} CDC, IV-8.
   98{ }^{98} The Development Triangle Area has Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam as members and composes of thirteen provinces with a population of around 6,663,0006,663,000 and a total natural area of 143,948 km2143,948 \mathrm{~km}^{2}. “Introduction of the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area”, Development Triangle Portal, accessed September 15, 2013, http://clv-triangle.vn/portal/page/portal/clv en/817327., paragraph 16.
   99 “Overview”, WWF, accessed 15 September 2013, http://worldwildlife.org/places/greater-mekong. ↩︎

Figure 2: Map of the GMS and the GM
(Source: the Mekong Tourism Coordinating Office 100{ }^{100} )

Figure3: The Administrative Map of Cambodia-Lao-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (Source: Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Portal 101{ }^{101} )

[1]

1. 100 “GMS Map”, Mekong Tourism Coordinating Office, September 17, 2013, http://mekongtourism.org/ website/about-mtco/what-is-the-gms/gms-map/
   101 “Introduction of the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area”, CLV Development Triangle Portal, accessed October 01, 2013, http://clv-triangle.vn/portal/page/portal/clv\_vn/817486/ 10147984/10551028/10630304/10666261 . ↩︎

Besides the economy and diplomacy, China might choose Cambodia as a strategic partner in the region to achieve her long-term policy for defense and energy 102{ }^{102}. The port of Sihanoukville in the Sihanouk province, about 230 kilometers southwest of the capital city, might seem to be a well-situated geopolitical location in the Gulf of Thailand for China to inject her vessels with supports of warship and aircraft carriers 103{ }^{103}. Given that the port was targeted, China would not only have reinforced her stronghold of the naval bases in the Southeast Asia but also improved her position in claiming disputed areas in the South China Sea with Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei as well as safeguard the claimed areas of Spratly Paracel Islands enriched with natural resources including oil and gas.

Though China has repeatedly argued it is a mere rumor and does not exist 104{ }^{104}, “String of Pearls” might remain frighten Asia and the United States of China’s threats in the region. China’s “String of Pearls” particularly refers to the port and airfield projects, diplomatic ties and force modernization along China’s sea lanes that might extend from the Hainan Island to Persian Gulf 105{ }^{105}. These pearls have also been suspected to be a container shipping facility in Chittagong (Bangladesh), a deep-water port in Sittwe (Myanmar) and a potential naval base in Gwadar (Pakistan) 106{ }^{106}. It is not least to notice that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy usually begins her journey from East China Sea, South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca in the Southeast Asia, pass through Andaman Sea and Arabian Sea in South Asia, ends up at Gulf of Aden or Persian Gulf 107{ }^{107}. Also, the sea lanes through which China’s oil and gas transport pass look very similar to the geography of China’s “String of Pearls”. Hence, in spite of the fact how far the rumor of the “String of Pearls” might be real, the growing

[1]

1. 102{ }^{102} Beside its geography, Cambodia’s historical and socio-political context might be also credits for China to choose this small country as a strategic partner. While Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia and, perhaps, Indonesia as well as Vietnam seem to be loyal to the US, China might have no more than Singapore, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. Fortunately, only Cambodia has a strategically-situated coast for China.
   103{ }^{103} Burgo and Ear, 620.
   104{ }^{104} Matt Blomberg, “Chinese Hospital Ship Docks in Sihanoukville”, The Cambodia Daily, September 25, 2013, http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/chinese-hospital-ship-docks-in-sihanoukville-43155/.
   105{ }^{105} Vivan Yang, “Is China’s String of Pearls Real?”, Foreign Policy in Focus (2011): 2.
   106{ }^{106} Ibid.
   107{ }^{107} Matt Blomberg, “Chinese Hospital Ship Docks in Sihanoukville.” The Cambodia Daily, September 25 2013, http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/chinese-hospital-ship-docks-in-sihanoukville-43155/ ↩︎

presence of China’s naval in the Middle-East and Asia might at least secure her sources of energy supplies through the protection of the sea lanes.

As a consequence, the port of Sihanoukville appears to be suspicious of a location where China might target as the strategic position for China’s sea lanes. Booz Allen Hamilton, the consulting firm for Pentagon, believed that China relationships with some countries in the Middle-East and the Southeast Asia aim to protect China’s energy along the sea lanes of those countries such as by helping Pakistan build a port at Gwadar and monitoring stations in Myanmar as well as negotiating for naval facilities in Bangladesh 108{ }^{108}. Yet, it seems like a coincidence that China has recently funded Cambodia to renovate the dock facilities at the port of Sihanoukville 109{ }^{109}.

The Sihanoukville port seems also be a checkpoint in the half-pathway of China’s oil and gas transport from the Middle-East and Africa (Figure 4 and Figure 5). Between 2003 and 2004, the top three supplier regions were Middle-East (Saudi Arabia, Oman and Iran from 50.9% to 45.4%), Africa (Angola, Sudan and Congo from 24.3% to 28.7%) and Asia-Pacific (Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia from 15.2% to 11.5%) 110{ }^{110}. Also, fourth-fifth of China’s imported oil and gas has been argued to come through the Strait of Malacca 111{ }^{111} while the rest might seem to pass through the Taiwan Strait 112{ }^{112}. Yet, Zhang Yuncheng, an expert at the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, seems to be skeptical of China’s energy security by arguing a hypothesis whereby China’s oil transport route might be blocked at the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca might be controlled by her adversaries 113{ }^{113}, in particular the United States and its allies in the Southeast Asia.

However, Guy C.K. Leung argues that China might have alternative passages to avoid the so-called ‘Malacca Dilemma’ by diverting its traditional gate through the Strait of Malacca to

[1]

1. 108{ }^{108} David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy”, Foreign Affairs 84/5 (2005): 35.
   109{ }^{109} Heng, Pheakdey, “Cambodia-China Relations: A Postive-Sum Game?”, Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2 (2012):74.
   110{ }^{110} Zweig and Jianhai, 28.
   111{ }^{111} Ibid, 34
   112{ }^{112} Ibid, pp. 33
   113{ }^{113} Ibid, 32 ↩︎

the Sunda strait at Jakarta gateway and the Lombok strait at Bali gateway to the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea with only an additional cost of as little as one or two dollars per barrel 114{ }^{114}. Based on the arguments claimed by Zhang Yuncheng and Guy C.K. Leung, it might be reasonable to presume that the sea lanes in the Southeast and South Asia are the most important ones compared to others in the Pacific, given that oil and gas supplies from the Latin America to China was smaller than Iran alone between 2003 and 2004 115{ }^{115}. Therefore, despite the fact that China’s oil and gas transports might come through either the Strait of Malacca under the control of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia or other two alternative straits in Indonesia, the port of Sihanoukville in the southern part of Cambodia might be a well-situated check-point in the mid-way of the passage.

[1]

1. 114{ }^{114} Guy C.K. Leung, “China’s Energy Security: Perception and Reality”, Energy Policy 39 (2011): 1334.
   115{ }^{115} While trade between Latin America and China was estimated at around US40billionbetween1999and2004,theinvestmentprojectsforoilandgasexplorationandotherprojectswererecordedataroundUS 40 billion between 1999 and 2004, the investment projects for oil and gas exploration and other projects were recorded at around US40billionbetween1999and2004,theinvestmentprojectsforoilandgasexplorationandotherprojectswererecordedataroundUS. 20 billion in late 2004 but this figure was still much smaller than the same projects in Iran that were valued at $US 70 billion in 2004 alone… Zweig and Jianhai, 28-29. ↩︎

Figure 4: Map of China’s “Ring of Pearls” and China’s Sea Lanes for Oil and Gas Transport (Source: Political Map of the World 2008 116{ }^{116} )

Directions of China’s Sea Lanes and Competing Countries

Persian Gulf/Gulf of Aden →\rightarrow Indian Ocean (United States) →\rightarrow Andaman Sea (India) →\rightarrow Malacca Strait (Indonesia, Malaysia & Singapore)/Sunda Strait & Lombok Strait (Indonesia) →\rightarrow Gulf of Thailand (Port of Sihanoukville: Cambodia) →\rightarrow South China Sea (Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan)

Figure 5: Schema of China’s Oil and Gas Transport from Africa/Middle-East/Asia-Pacific to China

III-Implication of the Relations from Cambodia’s Perspectives

The bilateral relationship between Cambodia and China bases on mutual beneficial interests. Yet, economic disparity might seem to be questionable while protests break up throughout the country one after another without an effective solution. Consequently, it might be argued that Cambodia’s dependence on the Chinese aid and investments might seem to prevent this post-civil war country from moving its democracy and human rights forwards but, in deed, deepen the vested interests of the elites and make other groups of the society marginalized. Therefore, the marginalization of the majority groups, particularly the rural poor, might lead to social unrests and, in turn, might have impacts on Cambodia’s domestic politics, especially its foreign policy towards China.

[1]

1. 116 “Political Map of the World 2008”, accessed September 17, 2013, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ world _maps/txu-oclc-264266980-world_pol_2008-2.jpg. ↩︎

A-Impacts of the Relations on the Local People and Domestic Politics

The partnership between Cambodia and China might have inevitably impacts on the socioeconomic situations of Cambodian people and, in turn, domestic politics of the government. While it might contribute to the poverty alleviation, these bilateral relations appear to be worsening the gaps between the rich and the poor. A concern of the economic disparity might be attributed from the fact that the redistribution of the social revenues is less diverse and inaccessible to the rural poor whereas the natural resources have been unfairly exploited. Also, the exclusive beneficiaries of the national natural resources, the government senior officers and their relatives might be involved both directly and indirectly in an abuse of human rights because of their unusual relations with Chinese firms. Consequently, the income inequality worsened by the corruption and the violation of human rights might fuel the popular stigma, therefore many protests break up consecutively one after another and, in turn, might severely implicate the domestic politics.

China’s investments and aid might clearly have positive impacts on the livelihood of Cambodian people. A majority of textile industries are dominantly run by Chinese firms while the unemployed and the employed in agriculture might benefit from this opportunity to have works and gain higher income for their living 117{ }^{117}. Also, China’s aid assistance in road and bridge constructions and restorations might also contribute to the poverty alleviation and the improvement of life quality through a better access of crops to the market, healthcare and education 118{ }^{118}. Some figures of the poverty alleviation from the government have shown a significantly annual decrease 119{ }^{119}.

The poverty reduction in Cambodia largely depends on the growing garment sector through a creation of more employment. Industry, Cambodia’s third largest currency earner

[1]

1. 117{ }^{117} Ouch, 1.
   118{ }^{118} Ibid, pp. 2
   119{ }^{119} Before the commencement of the 2013 national election, the Cambodian People Party (CPP) reported the poverty rate was cut to 22.9%22.9 \% in 2009, 20%20 \% in 2001 and 19%19 \% in 2013. Sok Serey, “Cambodian People Party Supports Hun Sen for the Candidate of the Prime Minister.”[Khmer], RFA, March 18, 2013. http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/politics/cpp-chose-hunsen-as-pm-candidate-03182013061047.html. ↩︎

after services and agriculture, fisheries and forestry, composes mainly the manufacture and construction but only the garment in the manufacture alone gains two time of revenues as much as construction sector 120{ }^{120}. The total amount of GDP provided by Textile, Apparel and Footwear fluctuated between 3,158 billion Riels 121{ }^{121} and 4,993 billion Riels from 2005 to 20111222011^{122}, and was reported to surge until around US4US4\US4 \mathrm{US} 4 billion in 20121232012^{123}.

The employment in the garment industries might have also improved living of the workers 124{ }^{124}. According to Cambodia’s Leading Independent Development Policy Research Institute (CDRI), while a share of agricultural labour dropped substantially from 51.4% in 1992 to 29.6%29.6 \% in 2009 , the garment’s share of export to China also showed a remarkable upward trend from 3.2%3.2 \% in 1992 to 28.2%28.2 \% in 20081252008^{125}. In overall, the garment workers were expected to earn an average basic salary of US80US80\US80 \mathrm{US} 80 per month or an equivalent of US2.67US2.67\US2.67 \mathrm{US} 2.67 per day, which was three times higher than the average poverty line in Phnom Penh of US0.76perday126126.Yet,thoughthisamountmightseemtobemuchbetterthanagriculturalworks,garmentworkershaverecentlyclaimedtheincreasingsalariesforatleastUS 0.76 per day 126{ }^{126}. Yet, though this amount might seem to be much better than agricultural works, garment workers have recently claimed the increasing salaries for at least US0.76perday126126.Yet,thoughthisamountmightseemtobemuchbetterthanagriculturalworks,garmentworkershaverecentlyclaimedtheincreasingsalariesforatleastUS120\$ \mathrm{US} 120 per month because their livings have been annually hit by a higher inflation 127{ }^{127}.

Conversely, though the poverty rate was gradually reduced from 47%47 \% in 1993 to 26%26 \% in 20101282010^{128}, the income inequality worsened as the Gini coefficient rose from 0.35 in 1993/94 to 0.40 in 2004 and 0.43 in 2007 . This income inequality appears to be partly caused by a less widespread of the garment factories nationwide. According to the survey released by the

[1]

1. 120{ }^{120} CDC, II-2.
   121{ }^{121} Riel is the national currency of Cambodia. Normally, US$ 1 is equivalent to about 4,100 Riels. Therefore, the annual revenue for the GDP between 2005 and 2011 averaged at about US$ 994 million.
   122{ }^{122} CDC, II-2.
   123{ }^{123} Menghour Ly, "Report: Garment Workers in Cambodia Must Get Their Montly Wages at Least $US 150 for Their Decent Livings " [Khmer], RFI, September 20, 2013, http://www.khmer.rfi.fr/cambodia/ 20130920-report-garment-worker-should-get-150-dollars-a-month.
   124{ }^{124} It is important to notice that some garment workers monthly send money homes. Therefore, it might be presumed that their salaries might not only support their living but also their families. That means the garment sector might not only contribute to the poverty reduction among the workers but also their families in the rural areas.
   125{ }^{125} Ouch, 1.
   126{ }^{126} Ibid, 2.
   127{ }^{127} Joshua Lipes, “Cambodia Ups Minimum Wages for Workers”, RFA, September 17, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/wages-03212013185628.html.
   128{ }^{128} Sok Serey,“Asia Development Bank Predicted Cambodia’s GDP Growth”, RFA, September 04, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/social-economy/cambodian-economic-growth-04092013044538.html. ↩︎

Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR) in May 2013, of 558 factories, around 70% is
located in the capital city while nearly 20%20 \% is allocated to its two surrounding provinces, Kampong Speu and Kandal 129{ }^{129}.

Moreover, the human rights abuse and corruption might be resulted from the unusual sugarcoated relations between Cambodia and China. Cambodia’s government has been criticized of using its nepotism to control tightly the political process 130{ }^{130} while the government senior officers and their relatives have been accused of being dealers between the Chinese investors and the government 131{ }^{131}. Notwithstanding of their roles as middlemen in the Chinese investment projects, those persons close to the government and its high ranking officers might be also suspicious of backing the Chinese investors in an illegal exploration and exploitation of the natural resources as well as land grabbing in exchanges for monthly remuneration or shares in their joint-ventures 132{ }^{132}. In consequence, many land titles have been drawn from the poor without fair compensation in advance by abusing their property rights and sometimes putting their lives at risk 133{ }^{133} but nearly most of disputes have never been successfully solved.

The number of land dispute s has increased gradually and spread throughout Cambodia. According to the NGO Forum on Cambodia, 173 cases in 2008134,2362008^{134}, 236 cases in 20091352009^{135} and

[1]

1. 129 “Garment Factories and Supply Chains”, sithi.org, accessed September 17, 2013, http://www.sithi.org/ temp.php?url=bltr/bltr_list.php&lg ==.
   130{ }^{130} Osborne, 118 .
   131{ }^{131} Chheang Vannarith, security director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, a non-partisan Phnom Penh based research, was quoted by Murray that the deals resulting from the coalition of the politicians and businessmen most of the time ‘violate human right’. Laura Rena Murray, “Target Cambodia”, World Policy Journal (2012):82-83.
   132{ }^{132} The Global Witness suspected the involvement of the Brigade 70, the special military unit of 2,000 soldiers and also the reserved force for Hun Sen’s 4,000 strong Bodyguard Unit, in the protection of a wide range of illegal activities such as illegal smuggling of timbers within Cambodia and to Vietnam, and other valuable products, perhaps, in exchange for remuneration, which was estimated of around US$ 200,000 per month. This military unit was reported under order of Bodyguard Unit Chief Hing Bun Heang, who was under command of General Kun Kim, one of four deputy-commander-in-chief of the Royal Cambodian Army Forces (RCAF). Global Witness. “Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal Logging and the Stripping of Public Assets by Cambodia’s Elite”, 75, 82, 87.
   133{ }^{133} Osborne, 127.
   134{ }^{134} Land Information Centre (LIC), “Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes Occuring in Cambodia 2008”, (PhnomPenh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2008), 1-2.
   135{ }^{135} Land Information Centre (LIC), “Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes Occuring in Cambodia 2009”, (PhnomPenh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2009), 3. ↩︎

282 cases in 20101362010^{136} were reported as unsolved and partly solved land disputes. The land disputes spread throughout the country but the most hit provinces were at the northwestern parts such Battam Bang, Banteay Meanchey, Phnom Penh, Phreasihanouk, Seam Reap, Kandal and Koh Kong and the two repeatedly-hit provinces throughout the time frame were Battam Bang and Banteay Meanchey. As a result, the livelihood of the people in those areas might have been severely challenged not only for short term but also the long term because most of those affected lands were the agricultural and residential lands, and the duration of the land concessions might be granted in between 70 and 99 years for dam constructions and resort developments.

Dam constructions might be one of sources of land disputes. Two of the total seven dam projects have le ft thousands homeless. About 1,500 families in Stung Treng province were forced to resettle for the construction of the Lower Sesan dam owned by Hydropower Lower Sesan 2 Ltd., the joint venture between Cambodian, Vietnamese and Chinese companies 137{ }^{137}. Another 1,500 villagers were estimated to relocate in new places if the Areng River dam owned by another Chinese firm would have been built in Koh Kong province 138{ }^{138}.

Another source of land disputes from land concessions might be resort development projects. One of the most recent model examples was a land grabbing of 328 acres in Boeung Kak Lake. In 2007, the Cambodian government handed this plot of land to Phnom Penh based Shukaku Inc. in the form of 99-year lease by displacing around 4,000 families 139{ }^{139}. This local company belongs to H.E. Lao Meng Khin, a senator from the Cambodia People Party and a close friend to the Prime Minister Hun Sen, while the Inner Mongolian Erdos Hongjun Investment Corporation is believed to have a 50 percent stake in the Shukaku Inc 140{ }^{140}. Also, at

[1]

1. 136{ }^{136} Research and Information Centre (RIC), “Statistical Analysis on Land Dispute Occurring in Cambodia 2010” (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2010), 2.
   137{ }^{137} Say Mony, “As Dam Plan Goes Ahead, Village Face Displacement”, VOA, April 02, 2013, http://www.voacambodia.com/content/sesan-two-dam-protest/1632713.html?utm\_medium=email.
   138{ }^{138} Say Mony, “Chinese Hydrodam Remains a Concern, Mystery to Locals”, VOA, May 10, 2013, http:// www.voacambodia.com/content/chinese-hydrodam-remains-a-concern-mystery-to-locals/1658612.html? utm_medium=email
   139{ }^{139} Murray, 79
   140{ }^{140} Ibid, 80 ↩︎

least 1,100 families in Koh Kong were forcefully evacuated to new sites for the implementation of the 36,000-hectare resort project granted to the Chinese Union Development Group under a 99-year lease 141{ }^{141}.

Yet, the violation of land rights might seem to be not only the most widespread but also the prevalent forms of human rights abuses in Cambodia. That means the land conflicts might be the most persistent issue and continue to exist until today. According the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights Mini-Report in 20121422012^{142}, the forceful evacuation was at the alarming level because the 2012 year was marked by the death of 14 year old girl who was shot by the authorities, the evacuation of around 1,000 families in Kratie province and over 300 families at Borei Keila in the capital city.

B-Consequences of the Domestic Politics on Cambodia-China Relations

Nationwide popular protests might have a blurring picture on the Cambodia-China relations in terms of its size and daily form of reactions to the national policy. Hence, a gradual widespread of land disputes and a widening gap of the economic inequality might not have enough strength to push the politicians for deep reforms in redistributing effectively the social revenues and Chinese firms to reassess carefully the impact of their projects on the livelihood of the people hit by their development projects. In consequence, while the trends of land disputes have surged significantly since 2008, the income inequality remains widening the gap between the rich and the poor.

However, the popular dissatisfaction might be mirrored through their votes in this year election held on 28th 28^{\text {th }} July and might attract an abrupt attention from both the government and its competing allies, China and the United States. After the declaration of the official result of the 2013 Election, the Cambodian People Party (CPP), the close ally to the Chinese Communist Party, lost its stronghold in the National Assembly whereas the Cambodia

[1]

1. 141{ }^{141} Say Mony, “On Coast, Chinese Development Pushes Thousands from Land”, VOA, July 24, 2013, http://www.voacambodia.com/content/on-coast-chinese-development-pushes-thousands-from-
   land/1708815.html?utm_medium=email
   142{ }^{142} CCHR. CCHR Mini-Report: CCHR’s Monitoring of Land Concessions in Cambodia in 2012 (Phnom Penh: CCHR, May 2013), 2. ↩︎

National Rescue Party (CNRP), the ally to the United States, regained a sharp increase of the seats to push the new government led by the CPP for more state reforms 143{ }^{143}. Consequently, China endorsed the victory of the CPP144\mathrm{CPP}^{144} whereas the United States backed the CNRP’s allegation of the election irregularities and called for an investigation into these irregularities 145{ }^{145}.

Moreover, the election result seems to be attributed from the land disputes and the economic disparity. Some data might seem to show a convincible proof between the election result and the anger of the voter victims. According to the NGO Forum on Cambodia reports between 2008 and 2010, land disputes spread wildly across the country but only seven city and provinces in the northwestern might be perceived as the most hit. Within these constituencies, the official results of the national election in 2008 and 2013 shown the CPP loses 6 seats, an equivalent of around 120,000 votes, to the CNRP by decreasing from 31 seats in 2008 to only 25 seats in 2013 (Figure 6).

[1]

1. 143{ }^{143} The CPP lost its stronghold of 90 seats in the National Assembly for the Fourth Mandate in 2008 and won merely 68 seats out of 123 seats, a relative majority, in the Assembly for the Firth Mandate in 2013 while the CNRP won 55 seats. “The Official Result of the National Election 2013 Declared by the Letter of the National Election Committee No.09.109/13 Dated on 08 September 2013”, National Election Committee, accessed September 09, 2013, http://www.necelect.org.kh/
   144{ }^{144} Khoun Narim and Simon Lewis, “Chinese Foreign Minister Endorses CPP Election Win”, The Cambodia Daily, August 22, 2013, http://www.cambodiadaily.com/elections/chinese-foreign-minister-endorses-cppelection-win-40497/
   145{ }^{145} Den Ayuthya, “The U.S Called on Cambodia to Have Investigation into Election Irregularities”, RFA, September 06, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/politics/us-ambassador-call-for-election-investigation09062013081108.html. ↩︎

2008/2013 between CPP and CNRP
(Source: The Official Result of the National Assembly Election in 2008 and 2013 146{ }^{146} )
Moreover, the result of the 2013 national election might become even worse when
availability of employment is only concentrated in the capital city and its surroundings where the garment workers struggle hard to meet their high living cost and the high inflation. According to the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, of the total 558 garment factories that employ around 480,000 workers, 394 factories are located in the capital city and nearly all of the rest is allocated in its surrounding provinces at the southeast and the southwest of the country such as Kandal, Kampong Speu, Kampong Cham, Takeo, Kampot and Kampong Chhnang (Figure 7). Those surrounding provinces were the constituencies where the CNRP won the landslide victory (Figure 8).

[1]

1. 146 “The List on the Official Result of the National Election 2008” [Khmer], National Election Committee, accessed August 17, 2013, http://www.necelect.org.kh/nec\_khmer/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=153&Itemid=386; “The Official Result of the National Election 2013 Declared by the Letter of the National Election Committee No.09.109/13 Dated on 08 Spetember 2013”, National Election Committee, accessed September 09, 2013, http://www.necelect.org.kh/. ↩︎

Figure 7: Allocation of Garment Factories by Provinces and City
(Source: CCHR, sithi.org: Garment Factories and Supply Chain 147{ }^{147} )

Figure 8: Diagram of the Seat Allocation in the National Assembly 2013 between CPP and CNRP
(Source: Official Result of the National Assembly Election 2013 Announced by the National Election Committee of Cambodia 148{ }^{148} and Picture by the Phnom Penh Post 149{ }^{149} )

[1]

1. 147 “Garment Factories and Supply Chains”, sithi.org., accessed September 17, 2013, http://www.sithi.org/ temp.php?url=bhr/bhr_list.php&lg ==.
   148 “The Official Result of the National Election 2013 Declared by the Letter of the National Election Committee No.09.109/13 Dated on 08 September 2013”, National Election Committee, accessed September 09, 2013, http://www.necelect.org.kh/.
   149{ }^{149} Post Stuff, “Big Opposition Gains”, The Phnom Penh Post, July 29, 2013, http://www.phnompenhpost. com/national/big-opposition-gains. ↩︎

Consequently, the result of this year election might seem to loosen Cambodia-China relations and would have reduced Cambodia’s dependence on China assistance. The new government led by the ruling party’s mere survival of the majority in the Parliament might seem to make a concession to the opposition by promising a balance of power, more reforms in the public institutions, and other reforms in the administration 150{ }^{150}, therefore the strategic interests the previous government used to benefit from China might be less significant in its fifth mandate. In short, the increasing influence of the opposition in the National Assembly and the loss of the strategic interests by the new government led by the CPP might be the main causes that would have implication on the Cambodia-China relations and, in turn, the Cambodia-US ties might seem to be restored to their close bond again as it used to be in the old day.

CONCLUSION

Cambodia-China relations seem to develop noticeably at each turning point of the global and regional politics throughout a fairly long time frame of their history. Aftermath of the World War II, China immediately begun to intervene into the affairs of the Indochina Communist Party that composed of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by breaking it into three domestic parties. China’s aims were to reduce the influence of Vietnam, her southern neighbor, and to check and balance the power of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, China’s ambition to expand her influence by moving southwards was temporarily blocked by an invasion of the Vietnamese in Cambodia under the supports of the Soviet Union but she has never given up by rallying the United States and the region to put pressures on the Vietnamese to withdraw the military forces from Cambodia.

In the post-Cold War period, the Khmer Rouge militia and other pro-Sihanouk rebellions, under supports of China and her allies, emerged over the borders of Thailand and fought against the PRK installed by the Vietnamese along the borders. Under the pressures of the

[1]

1. 150{ }^{150} Huot Vuthy and Rachel Vandenbrink, “Cambodia’s Hun Sen, Sam Rainsy ‘Narrow Differences’ in Election Stalemate”, RFA, September 17, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/talks-09172013181436.html. ↩︎

international community and the intermittent fights of the rebellions over the borders, the Vietnamese agreed to withdraw its forces from Cambodia and the communist regime led by the CPP to join peace talks. In the early days of the peace talks, China immediately softened her behaviours towards the Kampuchea government and wished to restore their relations back to normal.

Moreover, until this present day, Cambodia-China relations might seem to improve significantly until its highest level compared to the past. Their cooperation appears to mainly base on the mutual beneficial interests economically and strategically. While Cambodia, on one hand, has been under pressures of the West to speed up its reforms of democracy and human rights and, on the other hand, has sought for the investments in the infrastructures and energy for the economic growth, China seems to distinguish separately economy from politics by injecting her investment and aid into Cambodia without the interference into the domestic affairs. In other words, China’s policy might be more favorable to Cambodia compared to the West because of her non-intervention principle, sector-allocated aid programs and warm supports in the difficult time. In return, China might merely seek natural resources, economic expansion and the regional supports in Southeast Asia.

Tough these bilateral relations might give interests to both countries, Cambodia might seem to suffer more negative than positive implication. Cambodia’s government appears to be successful in achieving the constant economic growth in the last decades but the economic disparity and the violation of property rights remain the concerns. That means the protests by trade unions might seem not to decrease in both size and number. Also, in both the urban and rural areas, the popular dissatisfaction appears to be tense because the issues of land grabs, forceful evacuation without fair compensations, illegal loggings and deforestation have not been properly solved yet. These persistent issues might be attributed mainly to land concessions and the coalition of the government senior officers and the Chinese businessmen.

Yet, unlike in the past, Cambodia’s domestic politics might be noticeably more influent than the global politics in having implication on Cambodia-China relations. Though Cambodia and China have improved their relations significantly since the early 1990s and recently reached the peak at the late 2012, their ‘sugar-coated’ relations would not be stable in the future, given that the new National Assembly is more checked and balanced. Also, the CPP’s strategic interests might become loosened and, in turn, the new government’s policy might be less dependent on China because numerous state reforms might be more likely agreed upon a political concession of the two political parties, the CPP and the CNRP.

Consequently, all of these findings from the paper might underline some experiences most policy makers in both developed and developing countries might share together and therefore might learn from each other. In this 21th century, the inter-state relations might not only be influenced by the global politics but also domestic politics as a result of the popular dissatisfaction and social injustice. Therefore, it might be worth to examine both the economic and strategic interests each partner prioritizes in their foreign policy and to evaluate which interest category might be greatly challenged by their domestic politics.

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