Religious belief (original) (raw)

David Hume and the Philosophy of Religion

Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia for Philosophy of Religion , Eds. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro

David Hume (1711-1776) ranks among the greatest of philosophers and issues of religion lie at the heart of what most concerned him. Although the exact nature of Hume’s attitude to religion is a matter of some controversy, there is general agreement that his basic stance was critical, if not hostile, to the doctrines and dogmas of orthodox religious belief and practice. There remains, however, considerable disagreement about whether or not Hume believed that there is any truth or value in religion. According to some, Hume was a sceptic who regarded all conjectures relating to religious hypotheses to be beyond the scope of human understanding – he neither affirmed nor denied these conjectures. Others read Hume as embracing a highly refined form of “true religion”. On the other side of this spectrum, it is claimed that Hume was committed to atheism, although due to social conditions at the time, this had to be (thinly) concealed or masked. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of Hume’s core concerns and arguments on this subject and to provide the reader with a framework for interpreting and assessing his various contributions.

Skepticism and Natural Religion in Hume's Treatise

Journal of the History of Ideas, 1988

My principal objective in this essay will be to show that the widely held view that Hume's Treatise' is not significantly or "directly" concerned with problems of religion is seriously mistaken.2 I shall approach this issue by way of an examination of a major skeptical theme which runs throughout the Treatise, namely, Hume's skepticism regarding the powers of demonstrative reason. In this paper I shall be especially concerned to bring to light the full significance of this skeptical theme by placing Hume's arguments in their appropriate historical context. I shall show that both Hume and his contemporaries recognized that these important skeptical arguments were aimed primarily against the dogmatic Christian rationalism of John Locke and above all Samuel Clarke, and that they were, therefore, well aware that these arguments had considerable theological significance.

The relevance of Hume’s natural history of religion for cognitive science of religion

Hume was a cognitive scientist of religion avant la lettre. His Natural history of religion (1757 [2007]) locates the origins of religion in human nature. This paper explores similarities between some of his ideas and the cognitive science of religion, the multidisciplinary study of the psychological origins of religious beliefs. It also considers Hume’s distinction between two questions about religion: its foundation in reason (the domain of natural theology and philosophy of religion) and its origin in human nature (the domain of cognitive science of religion).

A Critique of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Hume’s philosophy is empiricist and skeptical. He is considered an atheist and a non-believer. The dialogues are convened between three participants based on the premise of the existence of God. Among the common theories about God, the design theory is up for debate in the dialogues. It considers the world as the craft of a maker. Cleanthes represents and defends the design theory that is also called “natural religion.” Demea represents and defends revealed religion (faith based upon the scripture), and Philo is the skeptic philosopher. The objective of the dialogues is the critique of the design theory. Design theory is considered closer to the truth as the conclusion of the dialogues. That these dialogues are not convincing on how to know God and Hume might have had deliberately distanced himself from his system of thought to avoid the notorious religious scrutiny. As a result, the conclusion of the dialogues in part XII is not in agreement with Hume’s philosophy.

True Religion and Hume's Practical Atheism [revised draft]

Sceptical Doubt and Disbelief in Modern European Thought: V. Rosaleny & P. Smith, eds. /Springer: Dordrecht., 2020

Atheists may well agree that the religious hypothesis is false but still disagree about the practical significance of this conclusion. Some (e.g. Spinoza and Philip Kitcher) claim, for example, that for the good of society, we need to retain and accommodate religion in some preferred or more benign form (e.g. “true religion” of some kind). Others philosophers (e.g. D'Holbach and the New Atheists) have argued that the atheist should aim to eradicate all traces of religion. The brand of atheism that Hume recommends rejects both these proposals. The first proposal, he maintains, mistakenly supposes that there is some benign and constructive form of religion available to the masses that will effectively support and sustain ethical life. The second proposal fails to acknowledge the extent to which religious propensities are, in various ways, an inescapable feature of human life and society. In the final analysis, both these proposals rest on optimistic assumptions that Hume rejects. The form of practical atheism that Hume defends is founded on a more pessimistic understanding of the human predicament.

Hume on "Genuine," "True," and "Rational" Religion

Eighteenth Century Thought 4, 2009

Hume appears to have sometimes taken religion to be founded on reason, at other times to have taken it to be founded on faith, and at yet other times to be based on authority. All of these views can be found in the different pieces collected together in the second volume of his Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. By means of an analysis of what Hume meant by "genuine religion," "true religion," and "rational religion," I uncover a consistent, sincere view that Hume sustained throughout his published works. This view is atheistic.

A Critique of Hume's Critique of Religion in the "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion"

Hume Studies, 2024

Hume doubted that the immediate experience of order, goodness, or beauty in the world, on which religion depends-"the feeling of design," as J.C.A. Gaskin put it-is anything other than the product of an overactive imagination. But what were his reasons for doing so? And were they sufficient? Since the Dialogues are the locus classicus of Hume's critique of religion, I propose to read them carefully, if critically, with both of these questions in mind. I conclude that Hume's critique of religion, while powerful in its way, does not ultimately succeed.

An Analysis of Religious Belief’ Vol. 1

An Analysis of Religious Belief, 1877

From the GENERAL INTRODUCTION "HUMAN nature, among all the phenomena it offers to the curious inquiries of the student, presents none of more transcendent interest than the phenomenon of Religion. Pervading the whole history of mankind from the very earliest ages of which we have any authentic knowledge up to the present day; ..." We see from this Introduction that religion sprang up in the ignorant mind of the most primitive human beings many centuries ago, and must not be accepted as a foundation of knowledge today. Quite the contrary; the complete ignorance of early human beings is almost unimaginable to us today. Primitive man evolved into a world without a history, he had to develop articulate speech, invent writing, of nature he knew nothing, so he made guesses as to the why and reason of the things he saw, understanding nothing. Those oblivious guesses from ignorance were that a preexisting something must have created it all. Those ignorant guesses must not be allowed to over-shadow the magnificent amount of factual knowledge humanity has developed over centuries of the progress of knowledge. Emmett F. Fields