Dignity and the Form of Human Existence (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity
Ratio Juris, 2008
We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well-being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of their possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self-consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives.
This paper challenges the claim that human dignity is not the foundation of human rights, but is rather a special kind of human right itself. The claim recognizes that human persons have a vulnerable and psychologically constructed identity called the Self which is continuously developed throughout their lifetime. Such a claim relies on moral Contractualism as the basis for human rights and the Self is said to be an integral part of the human person such that she both demands that it remain free from serious insult while agreeing to refrain from insulting any other person’s Self. The argument for human dignity as a right will be critiqued for too quickly dismissing alternative accounts of dignity which place it as the foundation, rather than a result of human rights. Dignity is, by definition, that which makes one worthy rather than the result of being worthy. Therefore, dignity is not the kind of thing which can be the result of human rights. Dignity is best understood as the foundation of human rights as articulated by the theory of “attribution-dignity” which argues that people have dignity based on their status as human beings. Human beings possess a self, and dignity is constituted by the possession of the Self by humans, rather than their demand that the Self which they possess be protected.
Human Dignity: Between the Existentialist and the Essentialist Approaches
Filosofija. Sociologija, 2019
Human dignity is an important part of Western culture, which has spread over the world, and theses on it can be considered in and applied to various spheres of human life and whole societies. In this paper, a selected aspect of dignity is undertaken, namely, how we get to know and understand dignity. This aspect is considered by per-sonalists and other philosophers interested in shedding some light on human dignity. Two approaches to the matter are adopted and contrasted: existentialist and essential-ist. The former stresses how dignity is discovered and how it exists in its very essence, via experience and phenomenological insight. The latter concentrates on the description of personal characteristics and other relevant factors, which result in a thesis on dignity. In the conclusions, the author points out that these two approaches should not be considered as alternatives contending with each other but rather narratives complementing one another.
In contemporary world there are a lot of idea of dignity and we can observe many differences in the perception and interpretation of it. One can find many reasons for this discrepancy. While focusing on the most important human rights, the authors want to demonstrate that, despite the many changes that have occurred in recent decades, the idea of human rights is essential to human dignity. For these reasons, we believe that the nature of human rights require its re-examination in the prism of human dignity. Analysis of philosophical, cultural and legal contexts in which a concept of dignity occurs, may contribute to a better understanding of what dignity is and what is not. Above all, may allow reflection on the crisis of dignity of the XXI century human. Dignity is a type of value that co-creates the sense of human life, directs to a specific goal, and also regulates interpersonal connections. Here, the authors analyze dignity in the context of specific concepts of man to show the relations between dignity and the eternal question: " who am I in the light of my rights? " Secondarily, we show how crucial contextual and hermeneutical thinking is, while studying fundamental concepts of human experiences such as dignity. The analysis of the subject carried out by experts in fields of legal and philosophical sciences, based on the common foundation, which is an individual and his life, points to many critical issues that need to be thoroughly evaluated, as long as the subject is approached holistically.
Nature of dignity and human dignity
Human Affairs
This paper argues that the concept of dignity should be understood as a concept that we use to describe an aggregate of values and qualities of a person or thing that deserves esteem and respect. The primary value that creates the right to have dignity is life. The degree of dignity a life form has depends on its place in the evolutionary scale. Human beings are the highest form of life so they possess the highest degree of dignity.
Human dignity as a person’s projection of integrity
2024
The main goals of the study are to expand knowledge about the concept of human dignity as a social value, analyse the historical, religious and philosophical foundations of the development of this concept in Europe and Ukraine, and characterize this concept in the system of legal values. The paper uses the following scientific methods: functional and dialectical approaches, logical analysis, synthesis, comparative analysis, analysis of scientific literature and generalization. The paper examines the problem of protecting human dignity as a natural and inalienable value, the source of human and civil rights and freedoms in the world's states' constitutions, decisions of constitutional courts and some countries' criminal legislation. The main result is theoretical and practical problems of implementing the right to human dignity, and justifying human dignity in the constitutions and decisions of some countries' constitutional courts. The study was conducted on the following countries' basis of laws and regulations: Ukraine, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland.
Human Dignity - A Heuristic Discipline Of Human Rights
2013
Dignity is an appeal to human nature. Transposed in the juridical field, human dignity highlights the necessity to establish (in favour of the individual) a juridical treatment compatible with human nature. Our disquisition is destined to analyse the contributions brought by the concept of human dignity in the process of the juridical avowal of human rights and to study, at the same time, the category of relations between two frameworks of analysis: human rights and human dignity. We propose the thesis of conceptual correspondence human-rights-human dignity, in the attempt to demonstrate two fusing frameworks of analysis, that can almost mutually define one another. The intricacy, the hardship of legal reconnaissance, the variety of significance, give the precise nature of human dignity and human rights, pleading in favour of this conjugate study. The defining of man – as an analytical category – is seated within human dignity, pointing out, as natural consequences of this seating, ...
A Stepkowski Human Dignity and Two Ways of its understanding
New challenges for law: Studies on the dignity of human life, 2020
The paper presents two ways of understanding human dignity i.e. rational dimension of our human nature, making us ethically exceptional and deserving for special protection. Those two ways of understanding human rationality have inspired two different anthropologies: one presuming social nature of man and the other considering man as an individual for whom any form of community life is artificial and secondary to natural solipsistic condition. The argument within this paper is, that in fact, only one of those two ways in which we understand our rationality allows for true distinction between man and animals i.e. only one of them is defending moral exceptionality of man. Strikingly, this is not the way of understanding human dignity, which is underpinning contemporary intellectual culture of the West. The question thus arises, whether we are really seeking for rationally reliable explanation of our moral distinctiveness from animals? If so, we have to realise it is not possible to uphold special character of human dignity within the intellectual framework that is provided by modern way of perceiving rationality. Therefore, it seems that the only way to save proper understanding of humanity and human dignity is the return to intellectual foundations of classical (i.e. pre-modern) intellectual culture. This classical intellectual framework seems to be able to securing moral status of human being as radically distinct from animals.
Human Dignity - Functions and Meanings
Global Jurist Topics, 2000
The concept of Human Dignity has become more and more prevalent in legal, moral and philosophical discourses. However, as much as linguistic functions of the concept have become widespread, its meanings have become ambiguous and blurred. This paper seeks to map and depict the main functions and meanings that the concept of human dignity encompass, and, hence, to enable both those concerned with law and its interpretation, and moral-philosophers to discern the different linguistic-spheres and the different meanings this concept encircle. The analysis will show that the meanings of human dignity are socially constructed in accordance with particular cultural and historical contexts. There is no one "true" meaning of human dignity, but rather different levels of "thickness" and "thinness" that are culturally determined in each society. The paper advances insights regarding the use of human dignity in both the legal parlance -as a justification for human rights in legal documents; and in the moral-philosophical parlance -as compared to a worldview on the one hand, and as related to humiliation on the other.
Applying “Dignity” in the Light of the Concept’s Typologies
Obnovljeni život
The concept “dignity” is neither clear nor unambiguous. The author presents two ways in which to typologise this concept as proposed by Daniel P. Sulmasy and Adam Rodziński. The problem is that different philosophers attach different meanings (types) to the term. The author tries to analyse these meanings, which have taken shape in the course of the history of Western philosophy, and also to provide a short review on the development of its most common contemporary interpretation which equates dignity with the presence of autonomy.