Bayesianism and the Idea of Scientific Rationality (original) (raw)

The Rationality of Scientific Discovery: Part I: The Traditional Rationality Problem

The basic task of the essay is to exhibit science as a rational enterprise. I argue that in order to do this we need to change quite fundamentally our whole conception of science. Today it is rather generally taken for granted that a precondition for science to be rational is that in science we do not make substantial assumptions about the world, or about the phenomena we are investigating, which are held permanently immune from empirical appraisal. According to this standard view, science is rational precisely because science does not make a priori metaphysical presuppositions about the world forever preserved from possible empirical refutation. It is of course accepted that an individual scientist, developing a new theory, may well be influenced by his own metaphysical presuppositions. In addition, it is acknowledged that a successful scientific theory, within the context of a particular research program, may be protected for a while from refutation, thus acquiring a kind of temporary metaphysical status, as long as the program continues to be empirically progressive. All such views unite, however, in maintaining that science cannot make permanent metaphysical presuppositions, held permanently immune from objective empirical evaluation. According to this standard view, the rationality of science arises, not from the way in which new theories are discovered, but rather from the way in which already formulated theories are appraised in the light of empirical considerations. And the fundamental problem of the rationality of science—the Humean problem of induction— concerns precisely the crucial issue of the rationality of accepting theories in the light of evidence. In this essay I argue that this widely accepted standard conception of science must be completely rejected if we are to see science as a rational enterprise. In order to assess the rationality of accepting a theory in the light of evidence it is essential to consider the ultimate aims of science. This is because adopting different aims for science will lead us, quite rationally, to accept different theories in the light of evidence. I argue that a basic aim of science is to explain. At the outset science simply presupposes, in a completely a priori fashion, that explanations can be found, that the world is ultimately intelligible or simple. In other words, science simply presupposes in an a priori way the metaphysical thesis that the world is intelligible, and then seeks to convert this presupposed metaphysical theory into a testable scientific theory. Scientific theories are only accepted insofar as they promise to help us realize this fundamental aim. At once a crucial problem arises. If scientific theories are only accepted insofar as they promise to lead us towards articulating a presupposed metaphysical theory, it is clearly essential that we can choose rationally, in an a priori way, between all the very different possible metaphysical theories that can be thought up, all the very different ways in which the universe might ultimately be intelligible. For holding different aims, accepting different metaphysical theories conceived of as blueprints for future scientific theories will, quite rationally, lead us to accept different scientific theories. Thus it is only if we can choose rationally between conflicting metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories that we will be in a position to appraise rationally the acceptability of our present day scientific theories. We thus face the crucial problem: How can we choose rationally between conflicting possible aims for science, conflicting metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories ? It is only if we can solve this fundamental problem concerning the aims of science that we can be in a position to appraise rationally the acceptability of existing scientific theories. There is a further point here. If we could choose rationally between rival aims, rival metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories, then we would in effect have a rational method for the discovery of new scientific theories! Thus we reach the result: there is only a rational method for the appraisal of existing scientific theories if there is a rational method of discovery. I shall argue that the aim-oriented theory of scientific inquiry to be advocated here succeeds in exhibiting science as a rational enterprise in that it succeeds in providing a rational procedure for choosing between rival metaphysical blueprints: it thus provides a rational, if fallible, method of discovery, and a rational method for the appraisal of existing scientific theories—thus resolving the Humean problem. In Part I of the essay I argue that the orthodox conception of science fails to exhibit science as a rational enterprise because it fails to solve the Humean problem of induction. The presuppositional view advocated here does however succeed in resolving the Humean problem. In Part II of the essay I spell out the new aim-oriented theory of scientific method that becomes inevitable once we accept the basic presuppositional viewpoint. I argue that this new aim oriented conception of scientific method is essentially a rational method of scientific discovery, and that the theory has important implications for scientific practice.

Rationality of Science: Normative or Descriptive?

The rationality of science, which faced with a crisis in the late twentieth century, made a challenging problem for both the methodology and the epistemology of science. The problem of the rationality of science induced some revision in these branches of philosophy of science. In this paper, I shall examine the problem of rationality in science, then I choose a new look at the notion of rationality to overthrow its normative implication. I recognize four problems with instrumental rationality to show the difficulties of sustaining a normative account of the rationality of science. Then I suggest that a non-normative approach will be the only alternative to eliminate these difficulties.

Toward A Social Conception of Scientific Rationality

1982

This paper examines the consequences of Feyerabend's thesis against the notion of scientific method. It is claimed that he has a strong case. Comparisons are made with other contemporary philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos. A result of the case against method is that science appears not to be a rational enterprise. This conclusion is resisted. Nevertheless, in order to show that the rationality of science is compatible with Feyerabend's thesis, it is necessary to switch from a conception that ascribes scientific rationality to the individual scientist to a conception in which rationality is ascribed only to the enterprise of science as a whole. Then, scientific rationality is a social, or perhaps structural, property and our science actually has it to a large extent.

Rationality of Belief. Or: Why Bayesianism is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality

2004

Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. The practice of economics, however, distinguishes between rational and irrational beliefs. There is therefore an interest in a theory of rational beliefs, and of the process by which beliefs are generated and justified. We argue that the Bayesian approach is unsatisfactory for this purpose, for several reasons. First, the Bayesian approach begins with a prior, and models only a very limited form of learning, namely, Bayesian updating. Thus, it is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs. Second, there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior. Third, this lack of information is even more acute when we address the beliefs that can be attributed to a society. We hold that one needs to explore other approaches to the representation of information and of beliefs, which may be helpful in describing the formation of Baye...

Temperate Rationalism: An Option for the Methodology and Understanding of Scientific Enterprise

Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 2012

One of the fundamental difficulties that have bugged the minds of contemporary philosophers of science is the extent to which Popper and the Popperians' rational model can be adopted for explanatory purpose in science. Examining closely the controversy between the rationalists and the adherents of the so-called "strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge"-who attack the whole notion of "rational" model. This paper argues that both models represent extreme perspectives which, taken on their own, cannot produce a satisfactory notion of scientific enterprise, especially when the notions of goal, change, progress and truth are subsumed in the understanding of scientific methodology. It, therefore, proposes "temperate rationalism" as an option for scientific rationality on the grounds of relevance of its general picture of progress both in theories and in methodology.

Rationality and the Problem of Scientific Traditions

dialectica, 1978

The clash between rationalism and humanism presupposes a radical and optimistic view of reason, with science taken as the archetype. Popper's theory of reason as critical of tradition seems to offer a new direction. But Kuhn's discovery that scientists normally are uncritical of some basic ideas makes it vacuous. An improvement upon Duhem's analysis of tests gives us a new epistemology, however where viable alternative views which are not believed nevertheless influence the organization of research. The tacit debate can be regarded as an organized escape rather than as progress towards the Truth.

Understanding scientific rationality through scientific discovery

JST Vol.09(1-2) [January-June 2021], 2021

Philosophy of science and history of science were not so closely related in the past precisely because the problem of discovery was either thrown away or made an appendage to the problem of justification. This paper makes an attempt to explicate the complex interaction between the problem of discovery and history and philosophy of science, including its bearing on scientific practice. Post-positivist and anti-positivist critical discourses in philosophy of science totally disturbed the orthodox and established disciplines of knowledge and radically transformed our understanding about science, scientific knowledge and the context of scientific discovery. Understanding the significance of the problem of discovery to history and philosophy of science enables us to arrive at an adequate theory of science as a cognitive inquiry and creative human endeavor. The central argument in this paper is to drive home the point that the contemporary debates on problem of discovery can shed new light on the central issues of history and philosophy of science, and most importantly on the nature of scientific rationality.

Why Bayesianism? A Primer on a Probabilistic Philosophy of Science

Several attempts have been made both in the present and past to impose some a priori desiderata on statistical/inductive inference (Fitleson, 1999, Jeffreys, 1961, Zellner, 1996, Jaynes, 2003, Lele, 2004). Bringing this literature on desiderata to the fore, I argue that these attempts to understand inference could be controversial.