Laboratory Biosafety Issues Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (original) (raw)
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Biosafety Risk Assessment of a Clinical Biochemistry Laboratory for SARS-CoV-2 Infection
International Journal of Medical Biochemistry, 2021
Biosafety risk assessment of a clinical biochemistry laboratory for SARS-CoV2 infection C oronavirus 2019 (COVID-19), caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1]. It was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March 2020 [2]. The first laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case in Turkey was announced by the Ministry of Health on March 11, 2020 [3]. COVID-19 is an aerosol transmissible disease, and the infectious dose of SARS-CoV-2 remains unknown. Healthy individuals can also be infected by touching contaminated surfaces and then transferring viral particles to the mucous membranes of the eyes, nose, and mouth (indirect contact or fomite transmission) [4]. Viral respiratory infection is confirmed with the detection of viral nucleic acid in tissue samples, which is indicative of active virus replication [5]. Upper respiratory material (nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab or wash in ambulatory patients) or lower respiratory material (sputum and/or endotracheal aspirate or bronchoalveolar lavage) has been defined by the WHO as the minimum sample for a diagnosis of COVID-19. It Objectives: Clinical laboratories are a transfer point for infected patient samples. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) Laboratory Biosafety Guideline, a risk assessment approach is the backbone of laboratory biosafety. In laboratories, risk assessment is recommended at predetermined periods and in the event of new circumstances. On February 12, 2020, the WHO published an interim guidance document, "Laboratory biosafety guidance related to the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)" and it was highly recommended that all coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) testing procedures be performed based on a local risk assessment. This study was designed to evaluate the biosafety risk in a biochemistry laboratory where routine testing of patients diagnosed with COVID-19 is performed. Methods: Risk assessment for tests performed on analyzers and a complete urinalysis was performed using the risk assessment template included in the subsequent WHO interim guidance document, "Laboratory biosafety guidance related to coronavirus disease (COVID-19). " Results: The overall initial risk for tests performed on analyzers and a complete urinalysis test was determined to be very high. Processes such as pipetting a sample and checking a sample tube by scanning the barcode during tests performed on analyzers were suspended until additional risk control measures could be implemented. The manual microscopic urinalysis process was also discontinued. To reduce the risk, surgical masks, surgical caps, eye protection, and disposable laboratory coats were added to the previously mandated personal protective equipment. After implementing additional risk control measures, the total residual risk of both processes was graded medium. Conclusion: Since there is as yet no effective treatment for COVID-19, exposure risk is considered severe. Therefore, the probability of exposure is important in determining the level of risk. Measures put in place reduced the total residual risk.
The Essential Points Regarding Laboratory Biosafety to Prevent the Spread of SARS-CoV-2
Journal of Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences
A current biosafety and biosecurity crisis, SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19, threatens public health, making it crucial to assess and follow optimal laboratory conditions to prevent any contamination and spread of the lethal virus. Much medical staff have been lost to the COVID-19 pandemic. The dimensions of laboratory biosafety were examined in this study to reduce risks associated with COVID-19 treatment. In addition, this research primarily focuses on assessing laboratory biosafety regarding emerging coronaviruses. This research will determine which aspects need to be addressed to address the risks and implement them in the correct order and at the right time to be as educational as possible.
Protective measures for COVID-19 for healthcare providers and laboratory personnel
TURKISH JOURNAL OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, 2020
In the COVID-19 pandemic, which affects the whole world, healthcare professionals (HCP) are at high risk of transmission due to their direct contact with patients with COVID-19. Therefore, how to ensure the triage of the patient with acute respiratory symptoms should be determined in advance, the contact distance should be arranged to be at least 2 m, COVID-19 suspect or diagnosed patient should be instructed to wear a surgical mask. During the care of these patients, HCP should wear their personal protective equipment (PPE) in accordance with the procedure and should not neglect hand hygiene. The samples of the patient with known or suspected COVID-19, patient should also be known to be risky in terms of contamination, and a risk assessment should be performed for the procedures to be performed in laboratories. The PPE should be used in accordance with the procedure to be performed. The protection of the HCP, who sacrifice at the risk of life, is possible only by complying with infection control and precautions.
2020
The 2019 Coronavirus pandemic which was initially referred to as 2019-nCoV, was first identified in Wuhan, China. Early response from the Chinese government included quarantine of infected persons, isolation and total lockdown of Wuhan province to prevent further spread. With the spread of the disease across national borders and declaration of the disease as a global pandemic, there has been a robust response by the international community to contain this deadly virus and prevent its further spread worldwide. Africa is not left out of this rampaging pandemic with documented cases in over 40 countries and still rising. Although extensive studies have been carried out on the novel SARS-CoV-2 on its pathogenesis, mode of infection and virulence but much is still unknown. However, potentially infectious samples are received routinely in the medical laboratory for analysis. This technical note reviews good laboratory practice (GLP) and processes across the different specialities of Medic...
SARS-CoV-2 and Biosafety in Laboratory
Iraqi JMS , 2021
The newly discovered coronavirus (Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2, SARS-CoV-2) is the causative agent of the ongoing pandemic. Broad arrangement has been done to minimize virus spreading among population and to control the worldwide outbreak. Expanded biosafety measure specifically with respect to the work require using SARS-CoV-2 in laboratory (lab.) and a special consideration should be taken to protect researcher and lab. worker during handling of specimens. Therefore, the aim of this review is to help the scientists, researchers, lab. staff and biosafety specialists to respond to the current coronavirus disease (COVID-19) through discussion of effective biosafety practices that can prevent laboratory acquired infections and to lessen the spread of infection into community and environment. Al-Shuwaikh AM, Al-Shwaikh RM, Hanna DB.
International Journal of Research in Medical Sciences
COVID-19, caused by SARS-CoV-2 virus which is declared as a pandemic by the WHO on March 2020 has made a huge difference in the practice and daily activities of the laboratory services. There are high chances of receiving potentially infectious samples to the laboratory for various tests. Authors propose a few biosafety measures in the preparation and processing of various pathology specimens received to the lab during this pandemic time in correlation with guidelines given by WHO. These safety measures aim at protecting and safe guarding the laboratory staff, trainees, and pathologists by minimizing the exposure to COVID-19.
WHO has published laboratory testing guidelines for COVID-19 in suspected cases. Recognizing that the global spread of COVID-19 has dramatically increased the number of suspected cases and the geographic area where laboratory testing needed to be implemented,intensified with shortage of molecular testing's and reagents can meet the definition and help us to understand the prevention and proper safety measures of samples. The 2019 Coronavirus pandemic which was initially referred to as 2019-nCoV, was first identified in Wuhan, China. Early response from the Chinese government included quarantine of infected persons, isolation and total lockdown of Wuhan province to prevent further spread. With the spread of the disease across national borders and declaration of the disease as a global pandemic, there has been a robust response by the international community to contain this deadly virus and prevent its further spread worldwide. Jharkhand, a developing state of INDIA with a population of approximately 3.19 crores is not left out of this pandemic with documented cases of 132 and 3 deaths as per till date. Although extensive studies have been carried out on this novel SARS-CoV2 on its pathogenesis, mode of infection and virulence but still it is unknown and assumptions are being made. However, potentially infectious samples are received routinely in the medical laboratory for analysis. This technical note reviews good laboratory practice (GLP) and processes across the different specialties of Medical Laboratory practice that should minimize the risk of infection to laboratory staff especially in resource-limited settings like RIMS, RANCHI, JHARKHAND, which is the biggest and core center for COVID-19.
Biosafety Measures for the Laboratories Engaged in the Diagnosis/Research of SARS-CoV-2
Acta Scientific Veterinary Sciences
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) infection emerged in Wuhan city of China, December 2019 and subsequently WHO announced COVID-19 pandemic. In the absence of effective antiviral drugs, change in genomic make-up which leads to evolution of new variant, effective biosafety measure in place, front line health care workers or laboratory personnel engaged in diagnosis and research are always at risk. As per the scientific risk assessments, the SARS-CoV-2 comes under Risk group 3 pathogens, and to prevent laboratory-acquired infections and disease transmission in the local population and environment, adequate biosafety containment levels are required. Therefore, non-propagative work and diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 with inactivated samples should be performed at least under Biosafety Level 2 (BSL2), while diagnosis with non-inactivated samples should be carried out under BSL3 or BSL2 with inward unidirectional air flow along with BSL3 safety equipments and work practices. However, SARS-CoV-2 culture and isolation, as well as research and development activities, must take place inside the BSL3 containment facility. We attempted to establish adequate and efficient biosafety strategies for avoiding SARS-CoV-2 infections within the laboratory. This may be accomplished by conducting a systematic and comprehensive biosafety risk assessment on a continuous basis in order to cope with evolving risks in the laboratory setting. Furthermore, the healthcare workers in hospital or researchers in the laboratories may be unaware of the possibility of aerosols and droplets mediated infection in the laboratory during the process of centrifugation, vortexing, pipetting, and so on, or by SARS-CoV-2 infected individual during the process of breathing, coughing and sneezing and that aerosolized virus may travel up to 1-6 m. Therefore, aim of this review is to describe the importance of biosafety measures against SARS-CoV-2 that should be introduced in laboratories undertaking diagnosis/research on SARS-CoV-2/any mutant form of SARS-CoV-2 like omicron suspected samples.
Applied Biosafety
Background: In this study, we aimed to perform a biosafety risk assessment to determine measures to be taken against coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the routine diagnostic parasitology laboratory of a tertiary health care center. Methods: The risk assessment template included in the supplement of the interim guidance of ''WHO Laboratory Biosafety Guidance Related to COVID-19'' was used for the risk assessment. Risk assessments were carried out for the ''diagnosis of protozoan diseases in respiratory tract samples'' and ''diagnosis of intestinal parasitic diseases'' processes. Initial risk of the laboratory activities was determined before additional risk control measures and overall initial risk was estimated for each process. Overall residual risk of the laboratory activities after risk control measures was estimated for each process. Results: Overall initial risk for both processes was ''very high.'' Fresh microscopic examination steps in both processes and concentration steps for ''diagnosis of intestinal parasite diseases'' were discontinued. All aerosol-generating steps were moved into a class-IIA biological safety cabinet. Overall residual risk was ''medium'' for both processes. Conclusion: This study serves as an example for clinical laboratories regarding how the risk assessment approach in guidelines can be transferred to daily practice.