D. Chalmers and J. Perry on Zombie problem and the Content of Phenomenal Concepts (original) (raw)
2021, Semiotic Studies
D. Chalmers and J. Perry both construe phenomenal concepts as irreducible to descriptive concepts of physical properties or properties, which logically supervene on them. But they draw different conclusions from this point. D. Chalmers in "The Conscious Mind" argues that the epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical properties shows that the former cannot be ontologically identified with the latter. J. Perry in "Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness" claims that we can identify phenomenal properties with physical ones without being committed to reductionism. In this paper I am going to examine Chalmers' and Perry's views on meaning and necessity, especially with respect to identity statements, in order to find where exactly their ways of thinking about the content of phenomenal concepts.
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