Beyond the EU as the ‘Only Game in Town’: the Europeanisation of the Western Balkans and the role of China (original) (raw)
Related papers
Academia.edu, 2021
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fall of the Milosevic regime, Serbia experienced tremendous changes in its foreign policy. While the country tried to distance itself from the past conflicts and nationalist enthusiasms with its European Union membership; it also copes with historical and political obstacles due to the region's characteristics while also simultaneously fight against economic hardships. Serbian President Alexander Vucic called his country's relations with China as an 'opportunity' to meet the EU's economic and social standards. But on Brussels's side, the same story looks different as, EU increasingly sees China as alien power in a region, where the ghost of nationalist and authoritarian experiences continues to coexist. This research will compare both Serbia and the EU's views towards the Sino-Serbian relationship as to whether an opportunity for furthering the Europeanization process of Serbia or whether as an off-track path towards an old-school nationalism and authoritarianism.
China in the Western Balkans: A New Competitor for the European Union?
2020
RESUME The Western Balkans are under geopolitical competition. China’s influence in the region is growing thanks to its Belt and Road Initiative and the 17 + 1 project, which has been specifically designed for Eastern and South Eastern Europe. However, the geopolitical hegemon in the Western Balkans is the European Union, who wants to maintain its dominance in the region. For now, China is just filling the gaps that the EU does not control but the situation might be changing. RESUMEN Los Balcanes Occidentales son zona de competición geopolítica. La influencia china en la región está aumentando gracias a su Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta o Belt and Road Initiative y al proyecto 17 + 1, que ha sido específicamente diseñada por los países del Este y Sureste de Europa. Sin embargo, el hegemón en los Balcanes Occidentales es la Unión Europea, quien, además, quiere seguir siéndolo. Por ahora, China tan solo está rellenando los huecos que la UE no controla, pero la situación puede cambiar.
Chinese Influence in the Western Balkans: An Annual Review
2019
After publishing the analysis of the impact of Chinese influence and investments in the Western Balkans last year, we can now evaluate its impact from a year-long perspective. The year-long reflection allows us to evaluate China's policy towards the Western Balkan countries whilst considering all of its possible side effects. This analysis revolves around two main questions: 1) what is the impact of Chinese activities on two individual WB countries-Serbia and Bosna and Herzegovina; and 2) how such policy is evaluated by the EU and Western European countries. Whilst acknowledging the need for a wider crosscountry analysis, we shall focus primarily on these two recipients of Chinese investments in the Western Balkans for the following reason: they both share a stronger strategic interest coming from Beijing, but at the same time they have different political and economic motivations when it comes to development and cooperation with China. The paper is divided into three parts. In the first, we analyse the recent progress of Chinese involvements in the Western Balkans within the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (through the 16+1 initiative) in 2018. The second part focuses on individual Chinese-funded projects started or to be implemented in Serbia and BiH with focus on domestic policy. Lastly, the concluding part deals with the impact of Chinese involvement in the region on the EU integration process of Serbia and BiH.
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Chinese influence in the Western Balkans
With the past export-led economic growth that has gradually become a tool of Chinese soft power, China showcased globally a powerful and inviting policy of economic power in action, and investment-seeking countries (especially from the Western Balkans) are willing to show their eagerness towards Chinese loans and capital. On the reverse side, China presents itself as an equally eager investor, and can be counted on in all situations, including when Chinese investors picked up projects declined by the EU. This paper suggests that the impact of Chinese influence on the Western Balkans is paradoxical: Beijing seems to benefit from EU-led convergence towards political stability (in order to increase its opportunities to implement its economic agenda), whilst Chinese eager pockets result in a divergence from EU criteria and an undermining of EU membership prospects for the recipients.
The China challenge to the EU uniqueness - the case of central and eastern Europe
Balkan Social Science Review, 2021
China's cooperation approach demonstrated through the Belt and Road Initiative is quite different in comparison to regional integration in Europe. Geographical limits, differences in culture, value systems, social and political realities make such a comparison disputable. The aim of this paper is not to compare the European integration experience with the most significant Chinese cooperation project. The study is rather focused on briefly evaluating the cooperation model applied by China towards the region of Central and Eastern Europe and the way it interacts with and affects theEU integration model. It also gives consideration to the evolving geopolitical situation at the regional and global levels. Methodologically, the study builds on an interdisciplinary approach that allows for assessing the problem in historical, legal, economic, and diplomatic aspect. The methodological framework is supplemented by the application of some instruments of geopolitical analysis.The paper argues that China's approach towards the CEE region has the potential to exacerbate some of the divisions within the increasingly fragmented European Union.
China in the Balkans: the battle of principles
2017
In recent months concern has risen in Europe over geopolitical competition in the Balkans. In March, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini warned, “The Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played.” Russia may have been the principal target of the remark, but another of the big powers in the region is China, which with its sweeping Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) heralds new roads and railways for the region. This may provide a boost to the region by connecting it with China’s massive market, but it may also challenge the region’s relations with the EU, as China-backed projects undermine reforms promoted by the EU.
Countering Geopolitical Competition in the Western Balkans: the EU, Russia, and China
Foreign Policy Review, 2023
While the European Union (EU) has long considered the Western Balkans its sphere of influence, the growing geopolitical competition from Russia and China has created harmful countercurrents in the region. In order to adequately challenge these, the EU needs to overcome its credibility crisis in the Western Balkans, produced by years of national vetoes and enlargement fatigue in the EU, paired with slow reforms or even democratic backsliding in the region. This situation could be remedied by focusing on Montenegro, which has long been considered the region's frontrunner in the EU accession process and is already a NATO member. By actively working towards full EU membership for the smallest country in the Western Balkans, the EU would not only be able to fortify its geopolitical role in the region, it could simultaneously create positive momentum, proving that there is indeed a believable path towards EU membership, which remains the most reliable tool to combat destructive influence from Russia and China.
Central and Eastern Europe’s courtship with China: Trojan horse within the EU?
Relations between China and 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have been developing rapidly in recent years, with the opening-up of the new 16+1 platform, the establishment of annual summits and further specialised forums, and promises for an upsurge in investment and trade. While the new platform is still ‘work in progress’, it has attracted increasing attention for supposedly affecting the united stance of the EU in the conduct of its foreign policy. In this paper the rationale of each of the three sides – China, CEE countries, and the EU – will be analysed. It is argued that there is nothing substantive in this relation which would go against the EU; moreover, neither the CEE countries nor China have any motivation to try to weaken the EU. While there may have been some mishandlings in the messaging towards the rest of the EU, Western European countries should rather try to understand their CEE fellows instead of criticising them without much valid argumentation. In fact, this may instead demonstrate internal EU problems, including the marginalisation of some of the countries and the application of double standards for different member states.
As front runners in the EU accession process, Serbia and Montenegro have failed to control corruption yet managed to advance along the path to EU integration. Although they have stronger state capacity compared to other Western Balkan countries, the two have recently reverted to previous poor governance practices after initial headway meeting EU good governance conditions. An in-depth analysis of the two countries explains this paradox as the result of the combination of the EU accession process and increasing Chinese finance. While the EU's stability-oriented strategy helped to consolidate these authoritarian regimes, Chinese funding policies have further strengthened patronage networks, fuelling corruption in the EU's 'stabilitocracies'. 'WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES BELONG IN THE EU', THE European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed following the EU-Western Balkans summit, held online in March 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic (European Commission 2020). By doing so, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to the Western Balkan Six (WB6) (Albania, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia) after over a decade of neglect and decided to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania (Tocci 2020). Until that time, only Serbia and Montenegro out of the WB6 had managed to engage in EU membership negotiations. Yet, these two countries combined have only managed to provisionally close five out of the 35 negotiating chapters. 1 Characterised by high levels of corruption and patronage structures (Bieber 2019), they are still far from full EU membership. The EU's transformative power, which effectively promoted political and economic reforms in the Central and East European (CEE) states two decades ago (Schimmelfennig &