Deconstructing the DSM-IV-TR: A critical perspective (original) (raw)
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Libr. Trends, 1998
PSYCHIATRIC activity that CLASSIFICATION IS A PROFOUNDLY IMPORTANT directs subsequent treatment decisions, assumptions about etiology, and prognostic considerations. While the ideal classification scheme would be clear, concise, comprehensively inclusive of, and hospitable to, the entities under consideration, in practice, all classification systems reflect tradeoffs and embody flawed structures. Accordingly, it is essential to be fully cognizant of the shortcomings, biases, and tacit assumptions of extant systems so that classifications can be improved and so that misrepresentations will not be blindly repeated or reproduced. Modern psychiatric classification and diagnosis are almost exclusively defined within the context of the nomenclature and diagnostic categories of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). This article adapts Giddens’s (1984) theory of “structuration” to explain how at least some of the consequences of ...
"[L]abels of Themselves Condition Our Perceptions”: The DSM and the Diagnostic Sign of Schizophrenia
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) has been partitioning mental illnesses into discrete disease entities for over 60years. The diagnostic class of schizophrenia has undergone several different labels and some profound changes to its criteria over all these iterations. In trying to develop the least-imperfect pragmatic description, the DSM has had to make several assumptions about the disease, and over the various iterations several critics – from within and without psychiatry – have increasingly felt that the APA have accepted their own assumptions as truth, creating a self-justifying and self-perpetuating ideology of schizophrenia. The latest edition, DSM-5, has incorporated some of this criticism, but it is unclear whether the dominant ideology of the diagnostic labels will be over-turned or will simply incorporate this challenge to its authority into its own “continuity myth” of ever-improving diagnostic criteria.
… , and Humanities in …, 2012
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM -whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.
… Ethics, and Humanities …, 2012
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM -whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.
Classification in psychiatry: Inevitable but not insurmountable
The debate about psychiatric nosology was reignited last year when the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) was published to widespread criticism. Critics cite a number of problems with ‘psychiatric diagnosis’, though it is sometimes unclear which classificatory practices are included under this broad heading. Although it may be possible to avoid the problems inherent in the DSM system, other difficulties associated with classification (labelling, stigma) may prove harder to escape. The first part of this article argues that some form of psychiatric classification is made inevitable by the communicative, epistemic and ethical pressures on psychiatry. In the second half it is suggested that there are ways to think differently about our relationship to psychiatric classification, and that these could play a role in mitigating the harms outlined by diagnosis’ critics.
A critical engagement with the DSM-5 and psychiatric diagnosis
Journal of Psychology in Africa
Classifications in psychiatry can result in the reification of hypothetical approaches, arbitrary categorization and social injustice. This article applies a social constructivist approach to critique the DSM-5 as a neurobiological model of psychiatric diagnosis which ignores psychosocial factors such as poverty, unemployment and trauma as causes of mental distress. It challenges the universality of psychiatric diagnosis and proposes that cultural psychiatry"s framing of "culture-bound syndromes," or "cultural case formulation" guidelines, is oversimplified. Use of the DSM in the South African context risks perpetuating injustice by labeling and stigmatizing people who have in the past been racially stigmatized by apartheid. In culturally diverse South Africa, psychiatric diagnosis should take into account alternative explanatory models that provide a more balanced view of the complex and dynamic relationship between biological and sociocultural forces in the manifestation of psychopathology.
Toward DSM-V and the classification of psychopathology.
Psychological Bulletin, 2000
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) developed by the American Psychiatric Association (1994) is a compelling effort at a best approximation to date of a scientifically based nomenclature, but even its authors have acknowledged that its diagnoses and criterion sets are highly debatable. Well-meaning clinicians, theorists, and researchers could find some basis for fault in virtually every sentence, due in part to the absence of adequate research to guide its construction. Some points of disagreement, however, are more fundamental than others. The authors discuss issues that cut across individual diagnostic categories and that should receive particular attention in DSM-V: (a) the process by which the diagnostic manual is developed, (b) the differentiation from normal psychological functioning, (c) the differentiation among diagnostic categories, (d) cross-sectional vs. longitudinal diagnoses, and (e) the role of laboratory instruments.