The Economic Consequences of the Black Death (original) (raw)

Abstract

Contact with other animals was the cause of the worst infectious illnesses that have affected the human species in past agrarian societies. Various strains of influenza, smallpox, malaria, plague, measles, and cholera were provoked by infections which first affected domestic animals or those non-domestic species with which humans came into contact, such as mice, fleas or lice 1 and were then transmitted from animals to humans and from humans to other animals. In pre-modern agrarian societies, between two thirds and three quarters of deaths were caused by infectious diseases. Only in recent times has what is defined as an epidemic transition taken place. In 18 th-19 th century Europe there was a shift from illnesses transmittable from one person to another to degenerative non-infectious diseases. 2 The mortality rate has depended to a lesser degree on bacteria and viruses and on the inter-specific struggle among different animal species. Great epidemics mark the agricultural world of the past; from Neolithic times onwards. The formation of much denser societies with respect to those of hunters and gatherers, and daily contact with domestic animals are at the origins of serious epidemic infections which have accompanied humans for 10,000 years. Among these are infections of the digestive system-typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, dysentery, diarrhoea, cholera-; infections of the breathing apparatus, transmitted through the air-smallpox, diphtheria, measles, influenza: infections of the reproductive system-syphilis and venereal diseases in general-; diseases introduced into tissue and into the blood stream deriving from insect bites-plague, typhoid fever, yellow fever and malaria-. 3 Density and mobility of population, and poor diet have often been regarded as determinants of these epidemics. The relationship between population and resources plays an important role, but chance also plays a role in the spread of infections. The existence of the plague in Europe from the 14 th until the 18 th century has been discussed in recent years. Although some differences exist between the medieval disease and the one directly observed by modern epidemiologists, the prevailing opinion is still that the Black Death was actually caused by plague. 4

Figures (12)

Sources: Reinhard, Armengaud and Dupaquier 1968 (all countries); Urlanis 1941, 414 (all of Europe); Mols 1974 (early Modern; several countries); Wilson and Parker (eds.) 1977 (some coun- tries; early Modern); Dupaquier 1968 (France); De Vries 1984, 36-7 (Western Europe); Russell 1958; Wrigley and Schofield 1981 (England from 1541); Myrdal forthcoming (Scandinavia 1300 and 1400); Beloch 1937-61; Lo Cascio and Malanima 2005 (Italy 1300-1800); Bardet and Dupaquier (eds.) 1997 (several countries); Maddison 2001; 2003 (several countries); Klep 1991 (Belgium); De Vries and Woude 1997 (the Netherlands) ; Valerio 2001 (Portugal); Mc Evedy and Jones 1978 (several coun- tries); Glass and Grebenik 1965 (several countries); Woods 1989 (early Modern United Kingdom);  Campbell 2000; 2008 (England 1300).  Table 1. The European population (000), the density (inhab. per km‘) and rates of change in 1300-1600 (1300=100).

Sources: Reinhard, Armengaud and Dupaquier 1968 (all countries); Urlanis 1941, 414 (all of Europe); Mols 1974 (early Modern; several countries); Wilson and Parker (eds.) 1977 (some coun- tries; early Modern); Dupaquier 1968 (France); De Vries 1984, 36-7 (Western Europe); Russell 1958; Wrigley and Schofield 1981 (England from 1541); Myrdal forthcoming (Scandinavia 1300 and 1400); Beloch 1937-61; Lo Cascio and Malanima 2005 (Italy 1300-1800); Bardet and Dupaquier (eds.) 1997 (several countries); Maddison 2001; 2003 (several countries); Klep 1991 (Belgium); De Vries and Woude 1997 (the Netherlands) ; Valerio 2001 (Portugal); Mc Evedy and Jones 1978 (several coun- tries); Glass and Grebenik 1965 (several countries); Woods 1989 (early Modern United Kingdom); Campbell 2000; 2008 (England 1300). Table 1. The European population (000), the density (inhab. per km‘) and rates of change in 1300-1600 (1300=100).

Figure 1. Average (APL) and marginal labour productivity (MPL) as function of labour and re-  IFr;RAR  ES aaa I I I a ale ad  Figure 1 graphically represents this relationship between labour productivity and production factors.’* We know that in past agrarian economies the availability of both resources, and capital and labour, changed and that techniques (A) able to raise the efficiency of the production factors were far from stationary. Natural re- sources were influenced by climatic changes and natural catastrophic events; capi- tal goods could be increased by savings and investments; population and labour were the most dynamic variables, although their rates of increase were generally low by modern standards; technique was also progressing, although the basic elements did not change in the primary sector, while a slow progress was occurring in the secondary sector and especially in transportation and trade. However, our knowledge about the movement of wages in pre-modern societies suggests, even if indirectly, that the trend of population was more dynamic than that of natural re- sources, capital and technique. Changes in technical knowledge and resources were on the whole unable to counterbalance demographic growth, even though it was generally very low.  Then Davinn. ts. A WK MR MEA DR Rm KR Aba en. wo lm Are Mathias was mw. £i tema mt

Figure 1. Average (APL) and marginal labour productivity (MPL) as function of labour and re- IFr;RAR ES aaa I I I a ale ad Figure 1 graphically represents this relationship between labour productivity and production factors.’* We know that in past agrarian economies the availability of both resources, and capital and labour, changed and that techniques (A) able to raise the efficiency of the production factors were far from stationary. Natural re- sources were influenced by climatic changes and natural catastrophic events; capi- tal goods could be increased by savings and investments; population and labour were the most dynamic variables, although their rates of increase were generally low by modern standards; technique was also progressing, although the basic elements did not change in the primary sector, while a slow progress was occurring in the secondary sector and especially in transportation and trade. However, our knowledge about the movement of wages in pre-modern societies suggests, even if indirectly, that the trend of population was more dynamic than that of natural re- sources, capital and technique. Changes in technical knowledge and resources were on the whole unable to counterbalance demographic growth, even though it was generally very low. Then Davinn. ts. A WK MR MEA DR Rm KR Aba en. wo lm Are Mathias was mw. £i tema mt

Direct evidence on rents is scanty for the late Middle Ages. Information on specific regions such as Southern France, England and Northern Italy suggests a decline. As to the chronology of this decline, the evidence on the price of agricul- tural products is widely available and can be used as proxy for the changes in the cost of the production factor — land — from which agricultural products originate. Whenever the price of the goods produced through the use of land declines, it can be assumed that the price of that factor will also decline. Two series of wheat prices relating to Tuscany and England allow us to go back in time as far as the second half of the 13 century (Figure 2)."°   Figure 2. Wheat Prices 1300-1600 in Tuscany (soldi per staio) and England (pence per 1.25 bushels).  Sources: data on Tuscany are based on Goldthwaite 1975 and Malanima 1976. The English series is from Munro 2004a.

Direct evidence on rents is scanty for the late Middle Ages. Information on specific regions such as Southern France, England and Northern Italy suggests a decline. As to the chronology of this decline, the evidence on the price of agricul- tural products is widely available and can be used as proxy for the changes in the cost of the production factor — land — from which agricultural products originate. Whenever the price of the goods produced through the use of land declines, it can be assumed that the price of that factor will also decline. Two series of wheat prices relating to Tuscany and England allow us to go back in time as far as the second half of the 13 century (Figure 2)."° Figure 2. Wheat Prices 1300-1600 in Tuscany (soldi per staio) and England (pence per 1.25 bushels). Sources: data on Tuscany are based on Goldthwaite 1975 and Malanima 1976. The English series is from Munro 2004a.

In England the decline of the consumer price index began about 1390 and lasted until 1520 (Figure 3). Likewise, there was a fall in Tuscany at the end of the 14" century; although the recovery came about earlier than in England (Figure 4).  Figure 4. Consumer price index in Italy 1300-1600 (1420-40=1), Sources: Malanima 2007.

In England the decline of the consumer price index began about 1390 and lasted until 1520 (Figure 3). Likewise, there was a fall in Tuscany at the end of the 14" century; although the recovery came about earlier than in England (Figure 4). Figure 4. Consumer price index in Italy 1300-1600 (1420-40=1), Sources: Malanima 2007.

Figure 3. Consumer price index in England 1300-1600 (1420-40=1). Source: Munro 2004a.  was the rise of money per head. As said before, the Black Death did not destroy resources and capital. Nor did it destroy money. While gross product suddenly di- minished, an increase occurred “in the ratio of monetary stocks to population”, ’’ since the money stock remained unchanged. According to the quantitative theory of money, or Fisher equation, an abrupt decline in product and transactions re- sulted in a strong, but short-lived, rise in prices. This is a consequence we could also expect to find after other serious epidemics. According to the Fisher equation (P=(MV)/Q), the drop in Q must be followed for some time by a rise in prices, if the money stock (M) and the velocity of money circulation (V) remain the same.  Since wheat and agricultural goods represented a main component of the

Figure 3. Consumer price index in England 1300-1600 (1420-40=1). Source: Munro 2004a. was the rise of money per head. As said before, the Black Death did not destroy resources and capital. Nor did it destroy money. While gross product suddenly di- minished, an increase occurred “in the ratio of monetary stocks to population”, ’’ since the money stock remained unchanged. According to the quantitative theory of money, or Fisher equation, an abrupt decline in product and transactions re- sulted in a strong, but short-lived, rise in prices. This is a consequence we could also expect to find after other serious epidemics. According to the Fisher equation (P=(MV)/Q), the drop in Q must be followed for some time by a rise in prices, if the money stock (M) and the velocity of money circulation (V) remain the same. Since wheat and agricultural goods represented a main component of the

Figure 5. The cost of private capital in Europe 1150-1600 Source: Epstein 2001, 41.  While agricultural prices are well known and, as already mentioned, indirectly indicate the trend of rent, it is much more difficult to find evidence on the interest on capital goods. The available data on interest rates in England, France, Flanders and Germany from the High Middle Ages until 1600 reveal a remarkable decline from about 10 percent in 1150-1300 to 4-6 in the second half of the 16" century  (Figure 5).

Figure 5. The cost of private capital in Europe 1150-1600 Source: Epstein 2001, 41. While agricultural prices are well known and, as already mentioned, indirectly indicate the trend of rent, it is much more difficult to find evidence on the interest on capital goods. The available data on interest rates in England, France, Flanders and Germany from the High Middle Ages until 1600 reveal a remarkable decline from about 10 percent in 1150-1300 to 4-6 in the second half of the 16" century (Figure 5).

Figure 6. Agricultural wage-rates in Italy and England 1300-1600 (1420-40=1). Source: Malanima 2007 (Italy); Allen 2001.  Urban wages, exemplified by masons’ wages, rose less than rural wages (Figure 7). One of the reasons being that, in depopulated cities, there was little demand for masons’ work. However, on the other hand, urban wages concerning different urban occupations mostly confirm the trend of wages for builders. A pos- sible explanation could be that, since urban crafts were specialized in production of high quality and expensive goods, and since, as the theory suggests, rents and other incomes diminished both in relative and absolute terms, the demand for ur- ban goods diminished as well. A consequence was the less pronounced rise of ur- ban wages because of the lower demand for urban workers.

Figure 6. Agricultural wage-rates in Italy and England 1300-1600 (1420-40=1). Source: Malanima 2007 (Italy); Allen 2001. Urban wages, exemplified by masons’ wages, rose less than rural wages (Figure 7). One of the reasons being that, in depopulated cities, there was little demand for masons’ work. However, on the other hand, urban wages concerning different urban occupations mostly confirm the trend of wages for builders. A pos- sible explanation could be that, since urban crafts were specialized in production of high quality and expensive goods, and since, as the theory suggests, rents and other incomes diminished both in relative and absolute terms, the demand for ur- ban goods diminished as well. A consequence was the less pronounced rise of ur- ban wages because of the lower demand for urban workers.

Figure 7. Industrial wage-rates in Italy and England 1300-1600 (1420-40=1). Source: Malanima 2007 (Italy); Allen 2001.

Figure 7. Industrial wage-rates in Italy and England 1300-1600 (1420-40=1). Source: Malanima 2007 (Italy); Allen 2001.

A recently elaborated index of per capita output in late medieval Italy confirms the expectations from the theory (Figure 9).  Figure 9. Index of per capita product in Central-Northern Italy 1310-1600 (1420-40=1) Source: Malanima forthcoming b (available in www.paolomalanima.it).

A recently elaborated index of per capita output in late medieval Italy confirms the expectations from the theory (Figure 9). Figure 9. Index of per capita product in Central-Northern Italy 1310-1600 (1420-40=1) Source: Malanima forthcoming b (available in www.paolomalanima.it).

If we divide nominal urban wages by nominal rural wages, the result is the urban-rural differential in wages (Figure 8).  Figure 8. Differential urban-rural wages in Italy and England 1300-1600. Source: Malanima 2007 (Italy); Allen 2001 (England).  We see that ordinarily a mason’s wage is twice the rural labourer’s wage. It can also be seen that after the Black Death this differential dropped rapidly, both in Italy and England. This evidence supports the hypothesis that, after the plague and during the 15" century as a whole, the demand for urban labour was relatively lower than for rural labour. Since the differential in wages is the main reason for migration, both between the city and countryside and among regions and coun- tries, we assume that there was less incentive to migrate towards the cities after the plague and consequently a relative de-urbanisation. This hypothesis, however, does not seem to be confirmed by our knowledge of the urbanisation rates after the Black Death. The only available European reconstruction of urbanisation in the late

If we divide nominal urban wages by nominal rural wages, the result is the urban-rural differential in wages (Figure 8). Figure 8. Differential urban-rural wages in Italy and England 1300-1600. Source: Malanima 2007 (Italy); Allen 2001 (England). We see that ordinarily a mason’s wage is twice the rural labourer’s wage. It can also be seen that after the Black Death this differential dropped rapidly, both in Italy and England. This evidence supports the hypothesis that, after the plague and during the 15" century as a whole, the demand for urban labour was relatively lower than for rural labour. Since the differential in wages is the main reason for migration, both between the city and countryside and among regions and coun- tries, we assume that there was less incentive to migrate towards the cities after the plague and consequently a relative de-urbanisation. This hypothesis, however, does not seem to be confirmed by our knowledge of the urbanisation rates after the Black Death. The only available European reconstruction of urbanisation in the late

On the topic a definite answer is impossible. However, our revision suggests that only after the recovery of the European population on the whole, cities began to attract more and more people from the countryside. In the 14° and 15" centuries epidemics struck the urban population much harder than the rural one. If we take the centres with at least 10,000 inhabitants, their population fell not only in abso- lute, but also in relative terms. Italian urbanisation was seriously affected by the plague and England suffered likewise. The uncertainty of the data prevents the question from being answered with absolute certainty. However, at present, it seems that a structural change occurred and the weight of the urban economy di- minished in comparison to the rural economy.  Table 2. The European urban population (000) and urbanisation rates in 1300-1600.

On the topic a definite answer is impossible. However, our revision suggests that only after the recovery of the European population on the whole, cities began to attract more and more people from the countryside. In the 14° and 15" centuries epidemics struck the urban population much harder than the rural one. If we take the centres with at least 10,000 inhabitants, their population fell not only in abso- lute, but also in relative terms. Italian urbanisation was seriously affected by the plague and England suffered likewise. The uncertainty of the data prevents the question from being answered with absolute certainty. However, at present, it seems that a structural change occurred and the weight of the urban economy di- minished in comparison to the rural economy. Table 2. The European urban population (000) and urbanisation rates in 1300-1600.

more equal distribution of personal income. With the rise in wages, the social struc- ture is likely to become less unequal.  What actually happened after the Black Death could be represented by the following graph (Figure 10).  Productivity (as in Figure 1), is here replaced by per capita GDP on the verti cal axis as a function of labour on the horizontal axis. Part of per capita GDP mus cover the essential needs of the population. Subsistence is represented by the norizontal line S. The level of subsistence is always the same (it can therefore be represented by a straight line), since certain essential needs must be provided fo in order to survive. Subsequently, with population growth and per capita GDP di minishing from B to B;, the surplus, i.e. the part of income that is over the subsis ence level, shrinks. The deductive consequence is that surplus beyond the vita needs is modest. People are forced to work for their subsistence. Non-essentia ourchases diminish. Petty traders, craftsmen, middle groups shrink. Some wealthy andowners profit from this general poverty. Less than 1 percent of the populatior benefits, however, from the economic trend thus giving rise to the equality of the majority. Polarization of income will take place, but not inequality; which mean: hat a large section of the population is far from the average income. Any concen ration index, such as the Gini or Theil indexes, will present lower values wheneve economy moves from B to B;.

more equal distribution of personal income. With the rise in wages, the social struc- ture is likely to become less unequal. What actually happened after the Black Death could be represented by the following graph (Figure 10). Productivity (as in Figure 1), is here replaced by per capita GDP on the verti cal axis as a function of labour on the horizontal axis. Part of per capita GDP mus cover the essential needs of the population. Subsistence is represented by the norizontal line S. The level of subsistence is always the same (it can therefore be represented by a straight line), since certain essential needs must be provided fo in order to survive. Subsequently, with population growth and per capita GDP di minishing from B to B;, the surplus, i.e. the part of income that is over the subsis ence level, shrinks. The deductive consequence is that surplus beyond the vita needs is modest. People are forced to work for their subsistence. Non-essentia ourchases diminish. Petty traders, craftsmen, middle groups shrink. Some wealthy andowners profit from this general poverty. Less than 1 percent of the populatior benefits, however, from the economic trend thus giving rise to the equality of the majority. Polarization of income will take place, but not inequality; which mean: hat a large section of the population is far from the average income. Any concen ration index, such as the Gini or Theil indexes, will present lower values wheneve economy moves from B to B;.

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