An Examination of Interpretive Bias Induction on Cognitive and Symptom Variables Associated with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (original) (raw)
Related papers
Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 2012
Anxiety sensitivity (AS) is a psychological risk factor for anxiety disorders. Negative interpretation biases are a maladaptive form of information-processing also associated with anxiety disorders. The present study explored whether AS and negative interpretation biases make independent contributions to variance in panic and generalized anxiety symptoms and whether particular interpretation bias domains (e.g., of ambiguous arousal sensations) have specific associations with panic and/or generalized anxiety symptoms. Eighty-nine female undergraduates (44 low AS; 45 high AS) completed measures of AS, interpretation biases, and panic and generalized anxiety symptoms. Findings showed that AS and negative interpretation biases both significantly added to the prediction of anxiety symptoms. Negative interpretations of ambiguous arousal sensations were uniquely associated with panic symptoms, while negative interpretations of ambiguous general and social events were uniquely associated with generalized anxiety symptoms. Findings support the conceptual validity of AS and negative interpretation biases and their unique and shared contributions to anxiety symptoms.
Threat-confirming belief bias and symptoms of anxiety disorders
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 2010
This study tested the hypothesis that a generally enhanced threat-confirming reasoning style would set people at risk for the development of anxiety disorders. Therefore, a non-clinical student sample (N ¼ 146) was presented with a series of linear syllogisms referring to threatening and safety themes and with the anxiety subscale of the SCL-90 and trait anxiety in order to correlate reasoning with anxiety. Half of the syllogisms' conclusions were in line and half were in conflict with generally believable threat and safety related convictions (e.g., potassium cyanide is more toxic than tylenol; The Netherlands are safer than Afghanistan). For each type of syllogism, half was logically valid and half invalid. Overall, participants showed a clear interference of believability on logical reasoning, which is known as the belief bias effect. Furthermore, in line with the idea that people are generally characterized by a better safe than sorry strategy, the pattern indicated that the participants took more time to solve invalid threat related syllogisms as well as valid safety related syllogisms. This threat-confirming belief bias was however not especially pronounced in participants reporting relatively intense anxiety symptoms. Thus, the present findings do not lend support to the idea that a generally enhanced threat-confirming belief bias is a diathesis for the development of anxious psychopathology.
Effects of positive interpretive bias modification in highly anxious individuals
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 2009
Over the past 20 years evidence has accumulated that individuals suffering from anxiety tend to interpret ambiguous information as threatening. Considering the causal role of this interpretive bias in anxiety, it was recently established that modifying interpretive biases influences anxiety. This suggests that anxiety can be clinically treated by directly targeting this interpretive bias. The present study was designed to modify a negative interpretive bias in highly anxious individuals, and subsequently assess the hypothesized beneficial effects on clinical measures. High trait-anxious participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a positive interpretational Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM-I) or a control condition (n = 2 Â 17). The program was offered online for eight consecutive days. Upon completing the program, participants who had followed positive CBM-I were less state and trait-anxious compared to the control group. Additionally, positively trained participants scored lower on a measure of general psychopathology . No effects were observed on social anxiety and stress vulnerability. The mixed pattern of findings renders them rather inconclusive, leaving interpretations of the potential therapeutic merits of CBM-I open for future research. ß
Depression and Anxiety, 2020
Background: Cognitive bias modification for interpretations (CBM-I) is a computerized intervention that has received increasing attention in the last decade as a potential experimental intervention for anxiety. Initial CBM-I trials with clinical populations suggest the potential utility of this approach. However, most CBM-I experiments have been conducted with unaffected samples, few (one or two) training sessions, and have not examined transfer effects to anxiety-related constructs such as stress reactivity. Method: This study compared a 12-session CBM-I intervention (n = 12) to an interpretation control condition (ICC; n = 12) in individuals (N = 24) with elevated trait anxiety on interpretation bias, anxiety symptom, and stress reactivity outcomes (electrodermal activity, heart rate, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia). Results: Compared to the ICC group, participants assigned to CBM-I experienced significantly greater improvements in interpretation bias and anxiety symptoms by post-intervention 4 weeks later, with impact on anxiety maintained at 1-month follow-up. While CBM-I and ICC groups did not differ in stress reactivity during an acute stressor at pre-intervention, the CBM-I group evidenced improved stress reactivity at post-intervention compared to ICC on two psychophysiological indices, electrodermal activity and heart rate. Conclusions: The results of this pilot study suggest that CBM-I may hold promise for reducing anxiety symptoms, as well as impact psychophysiological arousal during an acute stressor.
A follow-up study of cognitive bias in generalized anxiety disorder
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1995
Patients with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) without concurrent depression (n = 11) and normal controls (n = 17) were tested twice, about 2 months apart, on a modified Stroop colour-naming task, which presented anxiety-related, depression-related and neutral words in masked and unmasked exposure conditions. GAD patients received cognitive behaviour therapy in the test-retest interval, and were also retested at follow-up, about 20 months after initial testing. GAD patients showed interference in colour-naming negative words across both masked and unmasked conditions before treatment, but not post-treatment, compared with controls. Reduced interference effects of masked threat words over time correlated with reduced ratings of anxious thoughts at post-treatment, and at follow-up, in GAD patients. Thus, the preconscious bias for threat information in GAD appears to vary over time in association with changes in anxious thoughts and worries.
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 2012
Interpretations of negative, positive, and ambiguous situations were examined in individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), other anxiety disorders (ANX), and no psychiatric condition (CTRL). Additionally, relationships between specific beliefs about uncertainty (Uncertainty Has Negative Behavioral and Self-Referent Implications [IUS-NI], and Uncertainty Is Unfair and Spoils Everything [IUS-US]) and interpretations were explored. The first hypothesis (that the clinical groups would report more concern for negative, positive, and ambiguous situations than would the CTRL group) was supported. The second hypothesis (that the GAD group would report more concern for ambiguous situations than would the ANX group) was not supported; both groups reported similar levels of concern for ambiguous situations. Exploratory analyses revealed no differences between the GAD and ANX groups in their interpretations of positive and negative situations. Finally, the IUS-US predicted interpretations of negative and ambiguous situations in the full sample, whereas the IUS-NI did not. Clinical implications are discussed.
A review of the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and threat appraisal in anxiety
The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist, 2019
The development and conceptual relationship of the constructs of threat appraisal (TA) and intolerance of uncertainty (IU) are explored in the context of anxiety disorders. A narrative review tracking the development of these constructs and their relationship is undertaken. There is some evidence to suggest that the interaction between the components of threat appraisal (probability × cost) may partially account for or provide a theoretical framework which explains presenting levels of anxiety. Furthermore, research suggested that IU is a construct which contributes to a broad range of anxiety disorders. It was concluded that distinctive cognitive biases linked with IU – such as interpreting ambiguous and uncertain (both positive and negative) information as highly concerning – suggests that IU is interpreted negatively independent of threat appraisal. These findings mean a number of issues remain unclear, including whether IU in anxiety-provoking situations is sufficient in itself ...
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 2013
Cognitive theories of social anxiety indicate that negative cognitive biases play a key role in causing and maintaining social anxiety. On the basis of these cognitive theories, laboratory-based research has shown that individuals with social anxiety exhibit negative interpretation biases of ambiguous social situations. Cognitive Bias Modification for interpretative biases (CBM-I) has emerged from this basic science research to modify negative interpretative biases in social anxiety and reduce emotional vulnerability and social anxiety symptoms. However, it is not yet clear if modifying interpretation biases via CBM will have any enduring effect on social anxiety symptoms or improve social functioning. The aim of this paper is to review the relevant literature on interpretation biases in social anxiety and discuss important implications of CBM-I method for clinical practice and research.
2011
Intolerance of uncertainty, "a dispositional characteristic that results from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications" (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007, p. 24), has been implicated in worry/generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Despite significant advances in our understanding of its role as a cognitive vulnerability for GAD, questions remain regarding its measurement and construct validity, as a reliable set of negative beliefs has yet to be identified. The goal of this research was therefore to discern the specific negative beliefs about uncertainty which result in intolerance of uncertainty. In the first study, the factor structure of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston et al., 1994) was reexamined in separate large non-clinical samples, and the association of these factors with GAD symptomatology was explored. A second study further examined the convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity of these negative beliefs about uncertainty, as well as their specificity, in relation to similar behavioural and cognitive constructs and to information-processing biases. To this end, the Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire (ASQ) was developed to further assess interpretive biases in specific ambiguous situations and to differentiate the cognitive, behavioural, and emotional reactions that characterize these distinct beliefs about uncertainty. Two replicable negative beliefs about uncertainty were identified: 1) the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications, and 2) the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything. The first of these was specifically associated iv with indecisiveness, procrastination, the tendency to personalize negative situations, and with perceptions of specific ambiguous situations as having negative personal implications. This belief also showed stronger correlations with GAD analogue status, trait anxiety, somatic anxiety, and depressive symptoms. In contrast, the second of these beliefs was associated with a preference for order in the environment, with self-oriented and other-oriented perfectionism, and with perceptions of specific ambiguous situations as unfair and disruptive. Both negative beliefs about uncertainty were also associated with information-seeking, with negatively biased interpretations of ambiguous situations, and with pathological worry. Collectively, these studies' findings suggest that uncertainty is experienced as aversive by individuals who believe it negatively impacts their ability to function and who show a tendency to personalize these perceived difficulties. It is also experienced as aversive by individuals who believe it to be unfair, as it contradicts their expectations of structure in the environment and may be perceived as hindering elevated personal standards from being met. These findings further support the validity of this construct, and are consistent with a growing literature which suggests that intolerance of uncertainty contributes to information-processing biases and confers vulnerability to excessive and uncontrollable worry. v Acknowledgements I would like to express my indebtedness to my advisor, Dr. Michel Dugas, for his exceptional mentorship and support throughout my graduate studies, and for his direction, expertise, and enthusiasm for this project. Your guidance has always been most valuable and greatly appreciated. I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to
cognitive biases in anxiety and attention to threat year 2 maybe
nol evidence ~strating attentional vigilance to pessimistic interpretation of ambiguous items and an increased perception of likelihood of occurrence of negative events. We explore how these reactions can be understood within an evolutionary context, and present a descriptive model consistent with the experimental findings, conducive to modification of responses through ~ming. A computational implementation of aspects of the model successfully simulms changes in reaction time for a simple task as anxiety levels increase. diredions ind~ pursuing the causal nature of biases in anxiety and examining the potential for ~nge through training techniques.