The relationship between love and reason (original) (raw)
Related papers
Love, Faith, and Reason: On Academic Life as a Vocation
2011
Love, Faith, and Reason: On Academic Life as a Vocation" 1. A Statement on the Contemporary Situation of Faith and Reason: "…what for Patristic and Medieval thought was in both theory and practice a profound unity, producing knowledge capable of reaching the highest forms of speculation, was destroyed by systems which espoused the cause of rational knowledge sundered from faith and meant to take the place of faith," (John Paul II, Fides et ratio, #45, p. 69). A. Commentary: John Paul II's summary observation registers a large-scale truth though he earlier noted a small-scale exception when Tertullian exclaimed, "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? The Academy with the Church?" (De Praescriptione Haereticorum, VII,9: SC 46, 98; Fides et Ratio, 41, p. 61) Ironically, destruction of a 'profound unity' of faith and reason began in those late medieval, philosophical currents associated with William of Ockham and conveyed to Luther by his teacher Gabriel Biel. Luther reacted vehemently against Ockham's claim that reason could guide sterling behavior that merited God's grace. Yet behind readings of Aquinas by 15 th c. theologians Cajetan, Capreolus and Biel lay Aquinas's original thought that supports Luther or anyone against Pelagian tendencies to exaggerate and thereby falsify human nature's sufficiency in relation to God and salvation. Later, certain lines of thought in the French Enlightenment, contrary to both Aquinas and Luther, sought to exalt reason as a replacement for individual and societal faith.
This is a detailed account of the XVII century clash of views between the Jesuit Leonardus Lessius and the Dominican Thomas Lemos concerning grace and predestination.
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: ANALYTIC RESEARCHES, 2019
The fact of religious diversity is vital for the philosopher of religion but also, to some extent, for the believer of a given faith. It takes place in such a dimension in which the views of a given believer or the meaning of the practice of a given religion presupposes the truthfulness of specific claims concerning a given religion or the beliefs included in it. If now on the part of the philosopher of religion or the followers of another religion, there is a direct or indirect challenge to such a key proposition, religious disagreement with epistemic dimension is involved. At the same time, it is not the case that any religious diversity is a case of epistemically significant religious dissent. The paper, by distinguishing different aspects of religions and functions performed by religion, tries to show in which situations religious diversification leads to religious disagreement. Both the follower of religion and the philosopher of religion can and should seek the truth in matters of crucial importance to religion. The difference is that the follower of a given religion is more interested in the salvific and practical functions of religion, along with the associated sense of value and meaningfulness of life and, to a lesser degree, the theoretical certainty that her religion is correct at crucial points. On the other hand, the achievement of 'the soteriological' purpose of religion based on false belief is impossible, just as the meaningfulness of life 'based on the sand and not on the rock'. It is because the false foundation is devoid of higher value. That is why there is a community of a philosopher of religion and a follower of a given religion to search for the truth of it. Keywords: Religious disagreement, religious diversity, rationality of religious belief, philosophical and religious attitudes, functions of religion Citation: Pepliński M. "The importance of religious diversity for religious disagreement. Are the perspectives of believer and philosopher so different?", Philosophy of Religion: