Public Procurement in Law and Practice1 (original) (raw)

International Journal of Public Administration The Impacts of Different Regulatory Regimes on the Effectiveness of Public Procurement

The combination of two reforms in Russia, reform of public-sector entities and of public procurement, enables us to estimate the results of a transition from rigid to more flexible regulations in public procurement (PP). We consider two public universities in 2011-2012. The procurements of one university were regulated by rigid Federal Law during the entire period; the procurements of the other university were regulated by Federal Law until June 2011 and then by a more flexible regulation. Using the difference-in-differences methodology, we assess how the transition to this new regulation affects the main PP parameters. We show that more flexible regulation leads to a decline in bid competition but improves contract execution.

Measuring What Matters in Public Procurement Law: Efficiency, Quality and More

Journal of Management Policy and Practice, 2020

Modem public procurement laws-such as the US. Federal Acquisition Regulation-are based on the principle of efficiency. Recent revisions have introduced the concepts of sustainability and anticorruption. Decision makers are now confronted with new goals that ask for trade-offs. However, no structured method to assess their effects exists. This Article stresses the need for regulatory impact assessments to evaluate the economic consequences of public procurement regulation. It suggests two evaluation frameworks and defines parameters to measure the benefits of public procurement. Overall, the Article aims at informing the policy debate on better procurement regulation, suggesting a "more economic approach.

Measure and discipline in world procurement markets

Cuadernos de derecho transnacional, 2018

The revised Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) illustrates the long-term transformation in the way governments currently deliver public policies: steering, not rowing. Under a regulatory paradigm based on improving efficiency and best value for money, the 51 GPA Parties have reformed the previous GPA framework and expanded global procurement markets in accordance. However, the figures of this structural policy trend have not yet been properly mapped. This research estimates on basis of the available data that the GPA parties cover round 26% (US$2,140bn) of their GGCE (US$8,220bn), whereby the global GPA coverage could potentially be expanded substantially (compare to global GGCE: US$13,100bn) on the long term.

Introductiom. Public Procurement in 21st Century: Balancing Liberalisation, Social Values and Protectionism. A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Laws. The Chinese University of Hong Kong July 2016

Defined by the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) as “the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale,” public procurement has been employed by sovereign states to achieve manifold wider-policy goals, thereby suppressing the quest for the best value for money in the public sector. Governments have been using their purchasing power to achieve a host of goals, including measures such as appeasing uncompetitive domestic industries by not sourcing from more efficient foreign suppliers, or supporting grassroots charity by reserving certain public contracts to social enterprises. At the international level, this had been largely unaddressed until a small circle of less than twenty mostly developed countries concluded the Government Procurement Agreement (‘GPA’), the axiom of which was to advocate best value for money, contain other policy goals and curtail protectionism through the harmonisation of procedures governing public contracting. (...)

Competition Policy and Public Procurement in Developing Countries

Discussion Papers

Measures to support Competition Policy and enhance the efficiency of Public Procurement can enhance the impact of regional integration agreements. The first part addresses Competition Policy -measures employed by government to ensure a fair competitive market environment. Competition policy aims to ensure that markets remain competitive (through anti-trust or anti-cartel enforcement) or become competitive (through liberalisation). For a variety of reasons, competition is often restricted in developing countries and there are benefits from establishing some level of competition policy. Although the literature does not provide a blueprint, it provides guidance on the most useful ways to incorporate Competition Policy in regional agreements. The second part addresses issues in opening up public procurement and outlines the main potential sources of welfare gains. Open and transparent procurement can bring gains in terms of price reduction, competition and reduced corruption. While developing countries recognize these benefits for domestic policy, they appear opposed to including procurement commitments in international agreements.

Aspects of International Public Procurement Regulation

International Relations and Diplomacy

The public procurement market is classified as one of the most important segments of the world economy with share of 7-18% in the world GDP. The importance of this segment leads to continuous liberalization. Despite the existing legislative framework, the share of cross-border public procurement remains limited due to several obstacles including discrimination in public procurement that was raised by governments as one of the non-tariff barriers to international trade. Surveys of the European Commission or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indicate that there are many other obstacles to entry to international public procurement markets. These obstacles are discussed in the first chapter of this article. The goal of this paper is to review aspects of international public procurement regulation and find ways of eliminating the obstacles through this regulation. Therefore, the second, third, and fourth chapters of the paper analyse the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Public Procurement, and the role of regional trade agreements.

IS THERE ROOM FOR DISCRETION? REFORMING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN A COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED WORLD

The management of public expenditure is widely recognized as a crucial element in the global governance agenda and a key area of focus for the development community. However, public procurement-the purchase of goods, works and services by governments-is often examined with a focus on process and procedure, and seldom discussed in terms of outcomes and effectiveness. For the first time in several decades, the international finance institutions (IFIs), in response to the rapidly evolving landscape of development aid in general and the procurement profession in particular, are undergoing a major overhaul of their procurement policies. The dialogue around the potential reforms provides a juncture for "rethinking" the traditional approach to and understanding of public procurement. The purpose of this paper is to advocate a holistic view of the procurement process, to ensure the engagement of the broadest range of stakeholders, to raise key issues with implications for public sector governance, and to lay out a framework for addressing contentious and seemingly irreconcilable differences among the various actors.

1 Discretion and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement

2018

Using Italian data on municipal public works tendered in the period 2009-2013, we study how a reform extending the scope of bureaucrat discretion affects supplier selection. We find that the share of contracts awarded to politically connected firms increases while the (ex-ante) labor productivity of the winning firm decreases, thus suggesting a potential misallocation of the public funds. These effects are concentrated among municipalities characterized by less competent politicians and bureaucrats and by higher levels of corruption. We also show that under broader discretion public agencies comply less frequently with transparency requirements. JEL codes: D72, D73, H57, P16. * We thank Giuliana Palumbo, Paolo Sestito and participants at the Bank of Italy internal seminars, the Petralia workshop, the Political Economy Workshop of Galatina Summer Meetings, the SIEP Annual Conference in Catania and the ISLE Annual Conference in Rome for their helpful comments, and Ivan Triglia for exc...