Trust and Trustworthiness as a Behavioural Social Norm 1 (original) (raw)
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Norms of Reciprocation Exhibited by Polish Students in the Trust Game: Experimental Results
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS LODZIENSIS. FOLIA OECONOMICA, 2016
Norms of reciprocity and the level of generalised trust are components of the social capital of a society, which is argued to be associated with economic growth. This article presents results from a large scale study of Polish students based on the Trust Game, in which an initiator and respondent can obtain mutual benefits when the initiator exhibits trust in the respondent, who then expresses positive reciprocity. Based on these results, we investigate norms of positive reciprocation within the Polish student community. Analysis indicates that a large proportion of students seem to use one of four simple norms of reciprocation. In statistical terms, the level of reciprocation is rather well reflected in the expectations of the initiators.
An Experimental Investigation of Trusting Behaviour
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In this paper, we present the results of an experiment conducted in Italy on trusting behaviour. Our subjects participated in a trust game and filled in a questionnaire on trust and trustworthiness based on the attitudinal questions reported in the European Value Survey. The aims of the research are twofold. Firstly, using the experimental dataset, we construct two measures of trustworthiness among all recipients in the experiment, one based on the questionnaires’ answers and another based on the strategy method. We then compare the ex-ante behavioural decision to trust (before participants are allocated to a group) with the ex-post decision to trust (after participants are allocated to a group and trustors are informed of the level of trustworthiness of all the recipients who have been randomly allocated to each group). Our main finding is that trust strongly varies once the information is disclosed to trustors. The effect on trust is greater when the strategy method is used. Secon...
Operations Research and Decisions, 2014
Although studies using experimental game theory have been carried out in various countries, no such major study has occurred in Poland. The study described here aims to investigate generalised trust and reciprocation among Polish students. In the literature, these traits are seen to be positively correlated with economic growth. Poland is regarded as the most successful post-soviet bloc country in transforming to a market economy but the level of generalised trust compared to other postcommunist countries is reported to be low. This study aims to see to what degree this reported level of generalised trust is visible amongst young Poles via experimental game theory, along with a questionnaire. The three games to be played have been described. Bayesian equilibria illustrating behaviour observed in previous studies have been derived for two of these games and the experimental procedure has been described.
Operations Research and Decisions, 2014
Although studies using experimental game theory have been carried out in various countries, no such major study has occurred in Poland. The study described here aims to investigate generalized trust and reciprocation among Polish students. In the literature, these traits are seen to be positively correlated with economic growth. Poland is regarded as the most successful post-soviet bloc country in transforming to a market economy, but the level of generalized trust compared to other post-communist countries is reported to be low. This study aims to see to what degree this reported level of generalized trust is visible amongst young Poles via experimental game theory, along with a questionnaire. The three games to be played are described. Bayesian equilibria illustrating behaviour observed in previous studies are derived for two of these games and the experimental procedure is described.
Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not
Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 10 (2): 170-187, 2011
"Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends."
Does Trust Mean Giving and not Risking? Experimental Evidence from the Trust Game
Revue d'économie politique, 2015
In a within-subjects framework, we compare levels of transfer in the trust game and in the (triple) dictator game. We control preferences towards risk through the Holt and Laury test (2002) and social preferences with the ring test (Liebrand, 1984). We then provide evidence that social preferences correlate with levels of transfer, while risk attitudes do not. Finally, we also cast doubts on the predictive power of the two tests.
Verified Trust: Reciprocity, Altruism and Noise in Trust Games
2004
Behavioral economists have come to recognize that reciprocity, the interaction of trust and trustworthiness, is a distinct and economically relevant component of individual preferences alongside selfishness and altruism. This recognition is principally due to observed decisions in experimental "trust games". However, recent research has cast doubt on the explanatory power of trust as a determinant of those decisions, suggesting that altruism may explain much of what "looks like" trust. Moreover, empirical tests for alternative behavioral determinants can be sensitive to experimental bias due to differences in protocols and framing. Therefore, we propose discriminatory tests for altruism and trust that can be based on within-treatment and within-subject comparisons, and we control for group attributes of experimental subjects. Our results support trust (i.e. expected reciprocation) as the dominant motivation for "trust like" decisions.
Belief in others’ trustworthiness and trusting behaviour
Polish Psychological Bulletin, 2000
Data from surveys indicate that people, in general, do not trust others. On the other hand, in one-shot trust games, where the player decides whether to send money to an anonymous partner, the actual rate of trust is relatively high. In two experiments, we showed that although reciprocity expectations and profit maximization matter, they are not decisive for trusting behaviour. Crucial factors that motivate behaviour in trust games seem to be altruism and a type of moral obligation related to a social norm encouraging cooperative behaviour. Finally, we were able to divide participants into specific profiles based on amount of money transferred to the partner, altruistic motivation, and belief in partners' trustworthiness. This shows that the trust game is differently perceived and interpreted by different participants.
Discriminating strategic reciprocity and acquired trust in the repeated trust-game
2011
In repeated trust-game offers made by investors can be attributed to strategic reciprocation-based behavior. However, when a trustee is loyal, personal trust can build up between players, in the same way that lack of positive reciprocation on the part of trustees can motivate investors' distrust. Acquired personal trust or distrust and strategic reciprocation of the opponent's offers have then a cumulative and convergent influence on behavior in the trust game and are not prima facie distinguishable. We propose an experimental protocol which discriminates between these two determinants of trust. We furthermore show that acquired trust is the mere outcome of anonymous repeated interactions taking place during the experiment in the sense that it does not co-vary with an initial and independent baseline disposition to trust among investors: acquired trust crowds out background trust. Moreover, offers are sensitive to the amount and variance of trustees' returns. High ret...
Verified Trust: Reciprocity, Altruism, and Randomness in Trust Games
University of Lausanne Ecole des HEC …, 2005
Behavioral economists have come to recognize that reciprocity, the interaction of trust and trustworthiness, is a distinct and economically relevant component of individual preferences alongside selfishness and altruism. This recognition is principally due to observed decisions in laboratory “trust games”. However, recent research suggests that altruism may explain much of what “looks like” trust in such experiments. We formally derive discriminatory tests for altruism and trust based on within-treatment and within-subject comparisons, and we control for group attributes of experimental subjects. The central idea is to allow for rich and poor trustees, and to examine whether, consistent with dominant altruism, trustors give more to the poor, or whether, consistent with dominant reciprocity motives, trustors give no more to the poor than to the rich. Our results support trust as the dominant motivation for “trust like” decisions, with at most a subsidiary role for altruism.