Presuppositions of (Human Movement) Science (original) (raw)

METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SCIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF PRESUPPOSITIIONS

Several accounts of the logical status of metaphysical presuppositions of science, of Agassi, Wartofsky, and Harold Brown are surveyed and criticized. The logical treatment of presuppositions in terms of van Fraassen's logic of presuppositions is presented. This treatment is applied to the notions of 'gestalt switch' in Kuhn and Hanson and the notion of anomaly in Kuhn. It is claimed that the presupposition account here makes sense of these notions without making them subjective and without using the psychologistic accounts by given by Kuhn and Hanson. It accounts for the idea of refutation of presuppositions without claiming that simple modus tollens will account for it. In fact, showing a theory or statement is without truth value, or " meaningless " in the logical positivist sense suffices to refute its presupposition.

Tracing the Precept of Motion from the Ancient to the Scientific Revolution

International Journal of Mechanical and Production Engineering Research and Development, 2020

Philosophers since times immemorial have endeavoured to comprehend the reality of nature and within it the primacy of "motion". An attempt in this enquiry is being made, to sieve through the corpus of thought, relating to the ontology of motion through primary and secondary data. The article traces the systematic attempt over the ages to cogitate on and formulate the concept of motion, beginning with the ancient mechanistic view, and culminating in Newton's work. In this exposition we scrutinize the shift from positivism, to what Husserl called idealization to account for the scientific theories of motion. In Newton's own words, "Since the ancients esteemed the science of mechanics of greatest importance in the investigation of natural things, and the moderns rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities, have endeavoured to subject the phenomenon of nature to the laws of mathematics, as far as it relates to philosophy" (Newton,1952 ,p.1). In the spirit of a larger inquiry, we have tried to identify whether any of the thought processes emerging out with the onset of the Scientific Revolution could be gleaned in any of the preceding historical moments of intellectual investigation.

The Role of Presuppositions in the Social Sciences

Cadmus, 2017

Any expression of rationality is based upon premises, many of which cannot be ultimately justified. The role of these presuppositions becomes particularly important in the domains of the social sciences and the humanities. A philosophical reflection on the foundations and methodologies of these disciplines can shed valuable light on how to overcome the rigidity of many present conceptual systems in order to fully grasp the richness and complexity of human action.

Putting Presuppositions on the Table: Why the Foundations Matter

Zygon, 2006

Over time scientists have developed an effective investigative process that includes the acceptance of particular basic presuppositions, methods, content, and theories. The deeply held presuppositions are the philosophical foundation of scientific thought and do much to define the field's worldview. These fundamental assumptions can be esoteric for many and can become a source of conflict when they are not commonly shared with other points of view. Such presuppositions affect the observations, the conclusions drawn, and the positions taken. Furthermore, in some cases presuppositions in science have undergone important shifts in meaning, causing an increasing dissonance. We argue that disputes in religion and science often are due to these very basic differences in philosophy that are held by members in the different communities. To better understand the nature of science and its differences with religious views, presuppositions rather than conclusions should be articulated and examined for validity and scope of application.

Phenomenology as the Grounds to the Significant Human Movement

Resumo: O trabalho, teórico e qualitativo, investiga a argumentação que a fenomenologia proporciona para o entendimento do movimento humano como significativo. Usa como base o pensamento fenomenológico de Edmund Husserl e Merleau Ponty. A visão fenomenológica do movimento humano propõe que o sujeito seja o ator de seu movimento próprio e não apenas um objeto que recebe ordens para imitar padrões de movimento preestabelecidos. O movimento deve ser entendido como um diálogo entre homem e mundo. Manifesta-se como gesto criativo, com possibilidade de conhecer e transformar o mundo e deve orientar o trabalho na educação física, para que esta consiga recuperar seu real sentido no processo educacional. Palavras chaves: Fenomenologia. Movimento. Conhecimento. Educação Física

What Is the Philosophy of Movement?

Mobility Humanities , 2022

This paper is an introduction to the philosophy of movement. It describes the contemporary motivations and goals of the project as well as its similarities and differences with the mobilities paradigm and process philosophy. I argue that what is unique about the philosophy of movement is that it is the only philosophy that accepts the primacy of motion as its methodological starting point. The philosophy of movement is the analysis of phenomena across social, aesthetic, scientific, and ontological domains from the perspective of motion. It is a philosophy of indeterminacy or processes understood as processes. That is, not as a sequence of static discontinuous occasions as or as a continuous vital energy. In the philosophy of movement, the world is made of processes whose relatively stable iterations generate the phenomena we see around us. Things are emergent "metastable" patterns of indeterminate motion.

The Nature of Scientific Thought

Scientific thought' is regarded here as both a type of goal-directed behaviour (practice) and its product, and the question of its 'nature' posed in terms of that goal and of means appropriate for achieving it, preferably with regard to an existing paradigm (exemplar) such as the 'Galilean-Newtonian'. 'Empiricism', a widely received view of the nature of science, is examined and rejected, as is the general idea that scientific thought has 'philosophical foundations'. The question of the actual or possible scientific status of 'the human sciences' is raised and some methodological guidelines for an answer to it suggested.