Ensuring scientific integrity in the Age of Trump (original) (raw)
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Dissent, 2005
have repeatedly criticized the Bush administration for "politicizing" science for the sake of its policy goals. Right-wing commentators, such as Steven Milloy, have responded to these accusations with attacks of their own, reminding the public of similar actions taken by President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore. The desire for value-free science seems to be one thing on which both right and left can agree. But is this a realistic or even desirable goal? The evidence that the Bush administration has stacked advisory committees, suppressed evidence, and disregarded scientific consensus is extremely troubling. However, simply calling for a thicker "wall" between science and politics does not resolve the fundamental problems. This position assumes that science is separate from the value-laden worlds of politics and everyday life. That is not the case. Science, like other social spheres, is a universe of divergent values and interests. Although we are strongly critical of Bush administration policies-and the use of scientific claims to justify those policies-we are equally concerned about the implications of the position that science should be sharply distinguished from politics and values. Such a distinction not only misrepresents the nature of scientific knowledge but also stifles democratic debate. Rather than pursuing the endless and misguided debate about "sound science," Democrats and the left should take advantage of recent attention to the issue of science in politics to push for a more democratic science and technology policy-making process.
2000
This book combines political-economic, sociological and historical approaches to provide a coherent framework for analysing the changing relationship between politics and science in the United States. Fundamental to this relationship are problems of delegation, especially the integrity and productivity of sponsored research: politicians must see that research is conducted with integrity and productivity, and scientists must be able to show it. A science policy regime changes when solutions to these problems change. After World War II, the 'social contract for science' assumed that the integrity and productivity of research were automatic and, despite many challenges, that contract endured for four decades. However in the 1980s, as rich empirical studies show, cases of misconduct in science and flagging economic performance broke the trust between politics and science. New 'boundary organizations', in which scientists and nonscientists collaborate to assure the integr...
When politicians get involved in science
Gregor Mendel, the statue of the founder of genetics in 1955 , 2023
It is 2022, the bicentenary of the birth of the Augustinian friar Gregor Mendel, the founder of genetics, and this is being celebrated in all kinds of ways. In 1955, as a biology student, I travelled with a group of young people to Brno (then part of Czechoslovakia), where he had done his experiments with peas in the abbey garden. And we then saw at first hand what happens when politicians interfere in scientific disputes.
“Science Debate”questions US political candidates on science policy
MRS Bulletin
The greatest accomplishments in American history have grown from decades of hard work, research and development, and scientific inquiries, many of which have been achieved through long-term federal investment in science, technology, and innovation… prioritizing long-term research over shortterm economic gain is a down payment on the improvement of the world we live in and is a fundamental role of the federal government.
PLOS ONE, 2020
President Trump and his administration have been regarded by news outlets and scholars as one of the most hostile administrations towards scientists and their work. However, no study to-date has empirically measured how federal scientists perceive the Trump administration with respect to their scientific work. In 2018, we distributed a survey to over 63,000 federal scientists from 16 federal agencies to assess their perception of scientific integrity. Here we discuss the results of this survey for a subset of these agencies: Department of Interior (DOI) agencies (the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the US Geological Survey, and the National Park Service); the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). We focus our analysis to 10 key questions fitting within three core categories that relate to perceptions of integrity in science. Additionally, we analyzed responses across agencies and compare responses in the 2018 survey to prior year surveys of federal scientists with similar survey questions. Our results indicate that federal scientists perceive losses of scientific integrity under the Trump Administration. Perceived loss of integrity in science was greater at the DOI and EPA where federal scientists ranked incompetent and untrustworthy leadership as top barriers to science-based decision-making, but this was not the case at the CDC, FDA, and NOAA where scientists positively associated leadership with scientific integrity. We also find that reports of political interference in scientific work and adverse work environments were higher at EPA and FWS in 2018 than in prior years. We did not find similar results at the CDC and FDA. These results suggest that leadership, positive work environments, and clear and comprehensive scientific integrity policies and infrastructure within agencies play important roles in how federal scientists perceive their agency's scientific integrity.
Review of Policy Research, 2009
In this article, we examine the difficult leadership position President Barack Obama inherited as he took office with respect to science and technology policy making and implementation, particularly following the Bush administration and years of the so-called "war on science." We contend that the Obama administration's challenge is not only to take substantive policy action, but also to reform certain administrative practices, particularly in light of the previous administration's practice of the politics of strategic vacancies, a managerial technique that rearranges an agency's ideological inclinations not through the usual forms of active politicization (i.e., by filling the appointee ranks with like-minded ideologues) but instead by "starving" the agency of staff and co-opting its agenda that way.
Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of Research. David H. Guston
Isis, 2001
David Guston's addition to the literature on the political history of U. S. science policy is particularly welcome inasmuch as it seeks to interpret historical change through a carefully articulated theoretical lens. Guston focuses on a subject that has drawn a great deal of attention-the breakdown in the "social contract" between Congress and scientists, a tacit contract built on the perceived success of scientists in World War II and, especially, the Manhattan Project. The contract implied "we members of Congress will provide you scientists with resources, with few strings attached, and you scientists will provide us with an endless stream of fundamental knowledge and technological innovation required to sustain economic growth." Most recent studies interpreting the history of U. S. science policy are more history than interpretation, more historical analysis than political analysis. Guston's work emphasizes political analysis, theory, and interpretation, while at the same time showing keen understanding of the history of U. S. science policy. Armed with the insights and analytical tools of principal-agent theory, Guston interprets the breakdown of the science policy compact as a problem of delegation. In principal-agent theory, the principal is the party who requires the performance of a task but has insufficient expertise, technical ability, or time to perform the task; the agent is the person who is contracted to perform the task and, presumably, has the resources the principal lacks and, at the same time, a need for the resources (usually financial) the principal furnishes under the contractual agreement. Principal-agent theory has identified several problems that occur often in contractual delegation and Guston focuses on two that are especially significant in the case of science policy. In the "moral hazard" problem, the principal frets that the agent may shirk, shift resources to an agenda not related to the contract, or otherwise not live up to the duties stated in the contract. In science policy, moral hazards include possibilities that scientists will divert money for, say, working on a satellite defense system to working on knowledge of astrophysics, perhaps yielding an important