WHAT A THEORY OF ACTIONS IS POSSIBLE?, 16 pp. (original) (raw)
Related papers
On the philosophy and logic of human action, 2017
Introduction In the last century, the philosophy and logic of human action received a lot of attention. Milestones in its development were Anscombe's Intention (1957), Davidson's 'Actions, reasons and causes' (1963) and von Wright's Explanation and understanding. Anscombe aimed at bringing out the subjective basis one must appeal to when ascribing an action to someone. Davidson defended the claim that action explanations are a sort of causal explanations. Von Wright pointed out that explanation in history and the social sciences proceeds in very different ways. Arguably, these studies formed the shape of the philosophical discipline now known as action theory. They sparked a host of philosophical contributions that eventually broadened the perspective on the philosophy and logic of human action so much as to include as diverse approaches as critical reviews of age-old problems (like the problem of weakness of the will) and present day concerns with normative aspects of reason-based approaches (like patient autonomy in medical ethics). So the stream became a river, and the river became a sea. Today there is no denying that action theory is in fairly good shape. Of course, like in all other scientific disciplines there are controversies and difficulties in action theory too. Yet there is a solid consensus as to the phenomena to be explained, there are paradigmatic theories constantly being made reference to, and there are classic contributions providing starting points for old insights and new debates. Although there are specialists in the field, philosophical action theory is not at all marginalised. Even theorists not specialising in action theory acknowledge its relevance for the practical disciplines without hesitation. Also, philosophers of every provenance generally have more than an inkling that the relevance of action theory must somehow extend further to the social sciences proper as well. Last, not least: Being a philosopher of action makes you neither left, centrist or right. It carries no hidden or overt implications as to your ideology, political and moral views, or creed. It is thus safe to conclude that as a scientific discipline action theory is a decent, well-established, and worthwhile field of study in its own right. How come all of this is immediately reversed once we shift focus and turn to economics? Apart from occasional fine words found in introductory chapters the study of human action in economics really has a bad reputation. It will be sketched what the study of human action in the way presented can contribute to the study of the social sciences (in general and economics in particular). From these discussions will emerge the outline of a systematic and integrated treatment making use of the well-estab- lished tools of action theory and some neighbouring disciplines and applying them in the field of the social sciences. It will be seen that the philosophy and logic of human action has quite a lot to contribute to economics and the social sciences. It will also be seen that it does so without compromising the rigour, richness and respectability it deserves as the decent, well- established and worthwhile field of study that it is.
Toward a general theory of action
Preface vii as humanly possible, the statement represents both a carefully considered and a collaborative product. To be sure that no member of the group was having views attributed to him which he did not really share, we agreed that each one should have the privilege of including over his own initials notes of explication or dissent on particular points. The fact that only two members have availed themselves of this privilege, one of them mainly for clarification, is, we feel, an index of the fullness of the measure of agreement we have been able to attain. This volume thus is the product of nine individual social scientists. The whole character of the enterprise, however, and the constitution of the group, which included four psychologists, three sociologists, and two anthropologists, make its relation to current movements of thought in the field of some interest. Many influences and sources are discernible in the material here set forth. Perhaps the two most important sources in the field of psychology are the study of human personality and the study of animal behavior. The former involves Freud, and the movements stemming from his work, perhaps more than any other influence, but this stream has flowed through several channelsand in its course has influenced the sociologists and anthropologists in the group as well as the psychologists. Other influences have also been important in their effect on personality theory, particularly those documented in Gordon AUport's book on that subject. The study of animal behavior is, we believe, relatively catholic in its influence upon us.
Action, objective, intersubjectivity: towards a theory of social action
Ethics in Progress, 2019
The reflection on intersubjectivity is a central question in the contemporary philosophical debate. In this field, current practical philosophy faces one of the most difficult challenges. Apparently, the research for a foundation of the intersubjective level seems to lead inevitably towards the abandonment of the logical-foundation theory on which the philosophy had been based up until Hegel. In this report, however, I would like to attempt something different. That is, I would like to explore the possibility of inserting the subject of intersubjectivity right into the heart of Hegelian thinking, with an aim to outline the foundation of a social action theory capable of exhibiting reasons stronger than those deriving from simple dialogic validation. It is possible, as Ho sle believed, that Hegel himself did not take this aspect of the profound dynamics of his thought too seriously, and that he had not prepared the notional categories to be able to think about it in depth. Nevertheless, the theoretical foundations of intersubjectivity, brought back to its Hegelian roots, is the fundamental cornerstone upon which to build the logical-rational foundations of social action
Some New Directions for Action Theory
Sociological Inquiry, 1979
Parsons's main theoretical work includes two partly separable efforts, not always carefully distinguished: (1) the persistent attempt since the 1940s to develop a basic conceptual frame -the general theory of action-to help unify the social-behavioral sciences; and (2) the more empirical task of developing a theory of "modernization," concerned with the distinctive organizational features of modem societies and their evolution. This section focuses on the first aspect.
Typology of Social Actions Based on the Living System Theory
It is impossible to make progress in social theory without inquiring about social actions; therefore, many leading sociologists refer to this notion in their work. Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and many other sociologists attempted to ground not only their works but also the science of sociology as a whole on a theory of social actions. Max Weber defined sociology as "the science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a casual explanation of its course and effects". Moreover, he explicitly singled out social action as the " central subject matter " of his sociology. Hence, comprehensive typology of social actions can be very helpful in sociological analysis. Usually, social actions are classified by actors' intentions. In this paper, types of social actions are categorized both by actors' intentions and by the actions' results, including both the intentional and unintentional outcomes. This was achi...
Typology of Social Actions based on the Living Systems Theory
2017
It is impossible to make progress in social theory without inquiring about social actions; therefore, many leading sociologists refer to this notion in their work. Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and many other sociologists attempted to ground not only their works but also the science of sociology as a whole on a theory of social actions. Max Weber defined sociology as "the science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a casual explanation of its course and effects". Moreover, he explicitly singled out social action as the “ central subject matter” of his sociology. Hence, comprehensive typology of social actions can be very helpful in sociological analysis. Usually, social actions are classified by actors’ intentions. In this paper, types of social actions are categorized both by actors’ intentions and by the actions ’ results, including both the intentional and unintentional outcomes. This was achieved through considera...
In his 1996 book, The Myth of Social Action, Colin Campbell wrote that contemporary social theory is lacking “a theory of action which is not in the first instance a theory of social action (that is to say, a theory of communicative action or interaction), and yet which both fully embodies the principle of voluntarism and recognises the reality and significance of intra-subjective processes –without, however, being so completely intellectualist as to regard its subject-matter as composed entirely of decision-making processes (or indeed of ‘meaning-making’ processes)” . By stressing the need for a theory of action that goes beyond contemporary theories of social action, Campbell was actually pointing a bit further to the need for recovering a stronger notion of subjectivity that is not diluted in social interaction . At the roots of this situation, according to Campbell, is a basic misinterpretation of Weber’s account of social action as a subcategory of action, and the enthroning of social action as the prevalent category instead. Campbell identifies the roots of this misinterpretation in the influential theories of Schutz and C. Wright Mills , and in certain developments in the philosophy of action derived from a linguistic turn that obscured the relevance of subjective motives distinct from end-reasons or intentions. It is on this latter aspect that I will focus in this chapter.
A dialectical approach to action theory1
Inquiry, 1976
Recent work in the theory of action by analytical philosophers has focused on explaining actions by citing the agent's motivating reason(s). But this ignores a pattern of explanation typical in the social sciences, i.e. situating the agent in a reference group whose members typically manifest that behavior. In some cases the behavior of such groups can itself be shown to be the product of social forces. Two extended examples of this explanatory pattern are studied. In each case the motivating reasons of the agents concerned can scarcely be understood apart from reference to the groups of which the^ agents are members and the social forces which work on those groups. However, attention to the agent's own reasons for action remains important, in part because of action theory's critical potential to help liberate people from arbitrary, hypostasized social forces.