¿Son posibles las divergencias genuinas en lógica? (original) (raw)

Logoi, 2012

Abstract

El presente trabajo evalua, a la luz de ciertos resultados en logica paraconsistente, especificamente los sistemas M y N de Bunder, los argumentos esgrimos en Philosophy of Logic de Quine en contra de la posibilidad de una divergencia genuina en logica. A diferencia de Quine, se muestra que podemos tener una divergencia genuina empleando las conectivas usuales con el mismo significado clasico y sin trivializar la distincion verdad/falsedad. Finalmente se considera la contribucion de Lukasiewicz a la interpretacion de un conocido y dificil pasaje de los Segundos Analiticos, a saber, A11, 77a 10-22, que versa sobre la posibilidad de construir silogismos validos (no verdaderos) con premisas contradictorias. Abstract The present essay works, under the light of certain results from the paraconsistent logic, specifically from the systems of M. and N. of Bunder, the resulting arguments from the Philosophy of Logic of Quine, against the possibility of a genuine divergence in logic. As opposed to Quine, we show that it is possible to obtain a genuine divergence, using the usual connectives with their classical meaning and without trivializing the distinction between truth/falsehood. Finally, we consider the contribution of Lukasiewicz of the interpretation of a known and difficult passage from the Second Analitics, that is, A11, 77a 10-22, which talks about the possiblitiy of the construction of valid syllogisms (not true), with contradictory premises.

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